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INTRODUCTION
Long discounted by arms control critics, traditional nonproliferation
efforts now are undergoing urgent review and reconsideration even by their
supporters. Why? In large part, because the current crop of nonproliferation
understandings are ill-suited to check the spread of emerging long-range
missile, biological, and nuclear technologies.
Attempts to develop a legally binding inspections protocol to the
Biological Weapons Convention, for example, were recently rejected by
U.S. officials as being inadequate to catch serious violators while being
prone to set off false alarms against perfectly innocent actors. Missile
defense and unmanned air vehicle (UAV) related technologies, meanwhile,
are proliferating for a variety of perfectly defensive and peaceful civilian
applications. This same know-how can be used to defeat U.S. and allied
air and missile defenses in new ways that are far more stressful than
the existing set of ballistic missile threats. Unfortunately, the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is not yet optimized to cope with
these challenges. Finally, nuclear technologies have become much more
difficult to control. New centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities and
relatively small fuel reprocessing plants can now be built and hidden much
more readily than nuclear fuel-making plants that were operating when
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the bulk of International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections procedures were first devised
30 or more years ago.
This volume is designed to highlight what might happen if these
emerging threats go unattended and how best to mitigate them. The book,
which features research the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
commissioned, is divided into three sections. The first, Life in a Well-Armed
Crowd, focuses on what a world proliferated with these technologies
might look like. The first chapter, “Alternative Proliferation and Alliance
Futures in East Asia” by Stephen Kim of the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, projects how the United States, Japan, Korea, and China will
relate and compete with one another as each becomes more competent to
deploy strategic weaponry. The good news is that further proliferation and
war in the Far East are not inevitable. The bad news is that it will take
considerable effort to avoid this fate.
Much is the same in the Middle East as Patrick Clawson of the Washington
Institute makes clear in Chapter 2, “Proliferation in the Middle East: Who
is Next after Iran?” Here, the lynch pin for further proliferation is Iran.
Certainly, if Iran is able to edge toward nuclear bomb making capabilities



with impunity, Tehran’s neighbors are likely to hedge their security bets
by developing strategic weapons options of their own.
This, then, brings us to this section’s final chapter, “Nuclear 1914: The
Next Big Worry.” In it, I argue that the greatest security danger renewed
strategic arms proliferation presents is not the increased chance of nuclear
theft or terrorism, so much as the increasing difficulty small and large
nations will have in determining who they can rely upon and how militarily
capable they might be. In such a world, even the best plans and diplomatic
hedging may be incapable of preventing miscalculation and war, much as
was the case in 1914 with World War I.
The book’s second section, New Proliferation Worries, details three of the
most important emerging proliferation technology threats we face—the
spread of new biological, missile, and nuclear technologies. As detailed
in Mitchell Kugler’s chapter, “Missile Defense Cooperation and the
Missile Technology Control Regime,” the United States has a clear desire
to encourage missile defense cooperation with its friends and allies even
though key portions of the technologies in question are restricted by the
MTCR. Mr. Kugler of the Boeing Corporation makes it clear that he believes
the case for sharing this technology is stronger than the case for restricting
it. He believes that the MTCR should be changed to allow such commerce,
or it should be put aside.
Current nuclear controls also are being challenged by emerging
technology, as former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner Victor
Gilinsky makes clear in his comprehensive chapter, “A Fresh Examination
of the Proliferation Dangers of Light Water Reactors.” This detailed history
and technical analysis of the proliferation resistance of the most popular
type of power reactor concludes that the current international nuclear
safeguards system needs to be modified to cope with the new risks that a
proliferating state might divert the fresh or spent fuel from these machines
to small, covert reprocessing or enrichment plants that could bring a state
within days of having a small arsenal of weapons.
In the biological weapons threat field, current control approaches are
also in desperate need of help. Dr. Allan Zelicoff explains precisely what
can and is being done that can be of immediate use with health monitoring
in his chapter, “Coping with Biological Threats after SARS.” What is
reassuring is how much public health monitoring can and has accomplished
to identify and immediately treat outbreaks of infectious disease. What is
challenging is how much more can and needs to be done. All of this is laid
out in Dr. Zelicoff’s chapter.
This brings us to the book’s final section, What Can Be Done. In the
missile technology area, Dennis Gormley and Richard Speier identify
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what specific new missile defense and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
technologies should be added to the MTCR control lists. Their chapter,
“New Missiles and Models for Cooperation,” also explains how the United
States and other advanced states might share UAV services and turn-key
missile systems rather than handing over the means for their production or,
in the case of missile defenses, the countermeasures technologies needed
to defeat them.
In the nuclear field, the key recommendation of the chairman of the
German Bundestag’s committee on energy and the environment is not
to push nuclear power beyond what the market itself might otherwise
demand. Certainly, if nuclear power is pushed with government subsidies
too hard or too fast, there is a risk that the proliferation problems noted
in Victor Gilinsky’s analysis could come far sooner than the safeguards
upgrades that are needed to keep them at bay. The way out here is to
buy more time as Ernst Ulrich Von Weizsäcker explains in his chapter,
“German Nuclear Policy.” Specifically, he argues that we need to focus
first on promoting the most economical way to extend energy supplies,
through increased efficiencies and productivity for whatever amount of
energy is available.
What are we to do with the time this might buy? In the book’s
concluding chapter, “President Bush’s Global Nonproliferation Policy,”
the author details a series of steps that build on the proposals President
Bush made in a February 11, 2004, speech on nuclear proliferation at the
National Defense University in Washington, DC. All of these proposals
deserve attention. This is especially so given the shocks the NPT and the
IAEA have felt since the mid-l990s from Iraqi, North Korean, and Iranian
noncompliance, Pakistan’s proliferation activities under A. Q. Khan, and,
most recently, the U.S. offer of civilian nuclear assistance to India, a nuclear
weapons state outside of the NPT. As always, it is uncertain if we and
our friends will take action. The hope is that this book and the writings of
others will make clear that the price of failing to do so is sure to exceed the
costs of any attempt.
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SECTION I
LIFE IN A WELL-ARMED CROWD



CHAPTER 1
ALTERNATIVE PROLIFERATION
AND ALLIANCE FUTURES IN EAST ASIA
Stephen J. Kim
The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism
and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking
weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing
so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to
succeed. … History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger
but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to
peace and security is the path of action.
President George Bush1

A central pillar of U.S. national security strategy is to control
the spread of nuclear weapons. In pursuit of that objective, bilateral
alliances emerge more important and pertinent than ever. If the
United States and its East Asian allies can strengthen their existing
bilateral relationships, and if the United States and China can come
to a clearer bilateral understanding, nuclear proliferation in East Asia
can be curtailed. The consequence of abandoning such alternatives
could potentially be devastating.
I believe that if the United States shies away from existing treaties
and alliances due to anti-American sentiments or for fear of appearing
anachronistic, then doomsday exhortations will go past paranoia
and become reality.2 Anywhere from 12 to 20 nuclear powers will
emerge in the next 2 decades. Terrorists and nonstate actors will
exploit this worldwide proliferation as a succession of East Asian
states go nuclear—North Korea, followed by South Korea, then
Japan, then Taiwan.3 An alarmed China would not sit idly by while
being encircled by an island chain of democratic nuclear powers.
In the absence of a strong U.S. presence and influence in East Asia,
buttressed by its existing treaties and alliances, East Asia in 2025
looks bleak.



But I believe that if the United States strengthens, renews, and
revamps its existing bilateral treaty alliances with Japan and South
Korea, the nuclear temptation in East Asia could be dampened. That
is, if the United States maintains its nuclear deterrence umbrella over
Japan and South Korea, North Korea’s nuclear breakout will not
lead governments in Tokyo and Seoul to seek an indigenous nuclear
option. Concurrent with the strengthening of existing treaties and
alliances in East Asia, the United States will also need to reach a new
bilateral understanding with China over the proliferation of nuclear
weapons.
What We Want.
One can envision some ideal scenarios for East Asia in 2025. One
can project an economically vibrant China with its nuclear capability
remaining at about the current level of 35 weapons without multiple
independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability, a unified Korea
shorn of nuclear capability, a rejuvenated Japan without nuclear
weapons, and a perfunctory U.S. military presence in Guam. Trade
and investment issues would largely overshadow security concerns
or worries about a heavy U.S. footprint in East Asia.
One can hope that by 2025, China will have abolished the laogai,
the Chinese prison camps akin to the Soviet gulag, and that Japan will
have thoroughly deromanticized the sentiment and philosophical
rationale behind the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, a
political, psychological, and intellectual tool wielded to great effect
by Japanese militarists to justify colonial rule over Korea, Taiwan,
and Manchuria.
One can hope that the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing will
encourage reformist factions within the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). If economic growth were to continue at today’s pace and if the
Chinese government were to relax control over loans and property,
there is a possibility that the CCP could evolve into a dominant party
with various factions akin to Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
Chinese Vice Minister of Commerce Ma Xiuhong recently predicted
that China will quadruple “its GDP of the year 2000 by 2020.”4
One can hope that such a development can serve as an impetus
for the emergence of a semi-democratic China by 2025. No one


expects U.S.-style democracy to emerge from the devolution of the
CCP, but one holds out hope for a China with limited free elections
and some freedom of the press. Democratic centralism could evolve
along the lines envisioned by Eduard Bernstein rather than Peng
Zhen and the Eight Immortals. Such expectations are not pie-in-thesky speculations. After all, no one could have imagined in 1978 that
Deng Xiaoping’s China would permit Hooters restaurants to operate
26 years later in 2004, even if it is Shanghai.
China can continue to serve as a market for thriving and mature
economies. Trade between India and China more than doubled
between 2001 and 2003.5 South Korean, Taiwanese, and Japanese
investments in China are large and growing. Such a China would
have no reason to fear Japan, a unified Korea or the presence of U.S.
forces in East Asia.
One can hope that North Korea does not exist by 2025. One may
hope that North Korea implodes from within (due to some critical
external pressures) and that a benign military dictatorship assumes
power after the fall of Kim Jong Il. If China blocks its 800-km border
with North Korea and the United States and South Korea maintain
the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the fear of millions of refugees
pouring into Seoul or northern China would dissipate. China fears
North Korean refugees due to the potential ramifications for its own
regime security arising from the social and economic instability the
refugees might bring.
One can imagine that new investments from South Korea, Japan,
China, Australia, the European Union (EU), and the United States
could pour into this “refugee-contained” North Korea teeming with
a large pool of literate, skilled, and cheap North Koreans eager for
work and real wages. Nongovernmental organizations and programs
(i.e., the United Nations [UN] and the World Food Program) would
continue to dispense humanitarian and food aid. Given its cultural
and linguistical ties, South Korea could take the lead in these
initiatives by promising 200 tons of rice every year, a pittance for the
country.
As for reunification, one holds out the hope that the new
leadership would elect to unify peacefully with a prosperous South
Korea into a single democratic Korea, tied firmly to the United
States, if not militarily then economically.6 There are two schools


of thought on Korean unification. The first school emphasizes that
Koreans are one people of a singular culture. In this view, economic
difficulties of unification are secondary to physical unification. The
second school holds that South Korea will absorb North Korea. In
this view, North Korea’s nuclear weapons will merely fall into the
lap of a unified Korea, and the resultant large pool of labor would be
used to compete with an emerging China. Both of these schools of
thought are anchored on the optimistic assumption that South Korea
would take the lead—with its democracy, free markets, wealth, and
freedom.
One can hope that Japan faces up to its colonial and imperial
past, apologizes unequivocally once and for all to Koreans, Chinese,
Taiwanese and Filipinos, and suppresses its expansionist nationalism.
One hopes that there shall be no nostalgia for the Kwantung Army
mentality among military leaders, no reversion to the hesitation and
weakness of the Fumimaro Konoe government, and no repeat of
any whiff of a Marco Polo Bridge incident in July 1937 to justify the
advancement of any irrendentist or revanchistic goals. One hopes
Japan will emerge as a “normal” country, amending its pacifist
Constitution without alarming its neighbors.7
This “new” Japan would continue to welcome U.S. forces without
striving for nuclear capability. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda
made an impassioned argument against Japan going nuclear:
“Currently, Japan need not, and should not, have a nuclear deterrent.
Japan having such arms would be a threat to other countries, and it
would be tragic if that led to (further) nuclear proliferation.”8 For
the time being, Fukuda’s argument still holds sway in the LDP
establishment and the general public. With a rejuvenated economy,
Japan would be able to spread its capital and wealth throughout a
unified Korea, China, and the world markets. That would be some
East Asia.
What We Do Not Want.
But what about alternative futures we do not want to see in 2025?
It is easier to be a pessimist because one has selective recourse to
the data of history. One remains anxious as to whether the lure of
past glory and regional predominance tugs at the heart of Chinese


or Japanese leaders. In their long histories, China has rarely been
democratic; Japan has rarely been pacifistic; Korea has rarely been
unhindered by great power conflicts. The withdrawal of U.S. forces
that would accompany the abrogation of our treaty and alliance
commitments in East Asia would likely harbinger a future reeking
with the unpleasantness and chauvinism of East Asia’s past.
Rather than serving as a rally point for reform and genuine
opening of the society, the 2008 Beijing Olympic games could be
used as a bugle for Chinese nationalism. If the United States and
China fail to reach a clear understanding about nuclear proliferation,
the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea and Japan will only
embolden a confident and assertive China. Chinese nationalists will
want to throw their weight around East Asia. In this environment, I
believe that as soon as China achieves domestic stability, it will try to
penetrate culturally into neighboring countries. The Chin, Sui, Tang,
and Qing dynasties were not exceptions. As soon as it feels that it
has achieved its original target for economic reforms, and buttressed
by its confident nationalistic impulses, China is likely to claim, at a
minimum, its regional power hegemony in East Asia.9
The next generation of Chinese nationalist leaders suffers little
in confidence, panache, or assertiveness. On May 7, 1999, during
Operation ALLIED FORCE, U.S. forces mistakenly struck the Chinese
Embassy in Belgrade. The young Chinese vice president condemned
the bombing and “allowed” anti-U.S. demonstrations. He argued that
these demonstrations “fully reflect the Chinese people’s great fury
at the atrocity of the embassy attacks by NATO [the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization] and the Chinese people’s strong patriotism.”10
The voice belonged to none other than Hu Jintao.
The October 15, 2004, launching of Shenzhou V to space is a source
of great national pride in China. Lieutenant Colonel Yang Liwei is a
hero.11 One suspects that China will forge ahead aggressively with
is space program as well as attempt to acquire MIRV capability by
2025. Even as it faces rising unemployment, the Chinese military
has announced its intention to modernize the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) for the 21st century. A China insecure about the “three
Ts”—Taiwan, Tibet, and Tiananmen—will mean a more threatening,
paranoid China.12



Japan has begun to “talk” about the possession of nuclear
weapons. That in itself may signal a portentous change. One fears that
if the United States is lukewarm in sharing high-tech conventional
capabilities or back-pedals on promises to share missile defense
technology, Japanese nationalists will clamor for an independent
nuclear capability.13 Kenzo Yoneda has been especially vocal in
challenging the nuclear “taboo,” arguing that the United States may
not automatically and unconditionally come to wield its sword in
defense of Japan.14
Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba pushes aggressively for missile
defense cooperation with the United States, and young politicians
petition for a new security system for the new century.15 Deputy
Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe has stated that Japan needs to
rethink its fundamental values as a nation.16
The apotheosis of Japanese conservative nationalism, Tokyo
Governor Shintaro Ishihara, has insulted China by ridiculing its
recent space flight: “The Chinese are ignorant, so they’re overjoyed.
That (spaceship) was an outdated one. If Japan wanted to do it,
we could do it in 1 year.” In the same week, Ishihara insulted his
other Asian neighbor. Resuscitating the “arrogance” of Japanese
imperialism, Ishihara said Koreans chose Japanese annexation of
their country in 1910. Ishihara added salt to the Korean wound:
“. . . the annexation was the fault of their ancestors, and even though
Japan’s rule was in the form of colonialism, it was advanced and
humanitarian.”17 No one has yet heard strong condemnation of these
remarks from prominent Japanese politicians and academics.
Other ominous signs of Japanese nationalism are the rapid
growth of youth nationalist societies, some of which have inserted
themselves in the island disputes between Japan and China on the
South China Sea, especially over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Tai).
Due to the North Korean threat, the general mood in Japan is one of
a terrified atmosphere, a feeling of powerlessness. Reports of “North
Korean guided missiles threaten Japan” are plastered everywhere.
There is a feeling of chaos, that civilian leaders are not up to the
challenges of the times—with uncomfortable echoes of a leaderless,
drifting Japan of the Taisho period of the 1920s and 1930s. Japanese
nationalists are and will continue to gain political and social ground
in Japan.


One fears that the North Korean problem will exacerbate. North
Korea may not collapse. Though some 8-10 percent of its 22 million
population have starved to death or have fled, there are little overt
signs that the regime will collapse any time soon, though the strength
of its stability may be overemphasized. Many Western observers
assessed that North Korea would not last beyond 5 years during the
1993-94 nuclear negotiations, and key policy decisions were made
on that “mistaken” assumption. Credible reports of North Korean
diversion of food and humanitarian aid to its military are coming
in.18
By 2025, North Korea may have proven its nuclear capability to
the world. A North Korean nuclear breakout is worrisome for the
effect it would have on states outside of East Asia. Arguing that, “the
only possible way for nations who want to survive proudly and live
independently is to be strong and grow muscles of their own,” Iran
has declared, “We must believe that the proper and effective way
is that which has been opted by North Korea.”19 Iran lacks neither
money nor ambition, and it is only a matter of time before it acquires
nuclear capability.
The normal standards of economic and moral constraints are
inapplicable to North Korea. Though North Korea spends some $5.2
billion on its military, some 11 percent of its gross domestic product
(GDP), it has ostensibly been able to advance its nuclear program.
North Korea is considered to possess materials to make one or two
nuclear weapons. Some estimate that it could produce five or six
nuclear weapons in a relatively short time.20 As worrisome as its
nuclear weapons program, North Korea’s advancement in ballistic
missiles may be even more disturbing.21
There is a good chance that by 2025, North Korea may have
succeeded in developing ballistic missiles (Taepo Dong II) with
tighter circular error probables (CEPs) that could hit targets all across
the United States. The Kim Jong Il regime may still be in power by
2025, having struck a deal with the United States to remain in power
in return for inspections of some of its facilities. There could be a
second succession in North Korea (see below).
The situation in South Korea could develop for the worse. If the
United States tries to eliminate the remnants of the North Korean
nuclear program via strike operations, young Korean nationalists


will increase their anti-American rhetoric and demand the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. The “386” generation
(those who are in their 30s, attended university in the 1980s, born
in the 1960s) have been a political force since the Chun Doo Whan
administration, but with the election of President Roh Moo Hyun
in December 2002, they have entered the corridors of power.22 The
386ers in the current administration are less inclined to rely on the
United States, with some questioning the very rationale for the U.S.
defense commitment. Some have espoused looking at things from
a North Korean point of view.23 Some from the jusapa, the National
Liberation faction, are flat-out pro-North Korea.24 The “spirit of 6.15”
and the rhetoric of han minjok (a single unitary race) are distilled in
a powerful call for the cultural and racial unity of “fellow brothers”
in a unified Korea. They have unwittingly inherited the nationalistic
argument from the over-confident South Korean conservatives of the
1980s who boasted that North Korean nuclear weapons should not
be worrisome because “it will be ours one day” (after unification).
To be sure, there are more “conservative” 386ers.25 But even many
younger members of the opposition party, the Grand National Party
(GNP), hold a skeptical view of the United States. Even as Choe
Byung-Ryul called for a strengthening of U.S.-ROK alliance upon
his election as party leader, Choe has surrounded himself and has
at times accommodated the demands of the Mirae Yondae, a young
reformist faction of 386ers.26 It is uncertain at this juncture whether
the new GNP chief, Park Geun Hae, has consolidated support of
these “conservative” 386ers within the GNP. Despite the nominal
political differences, the next generations of Koreans glamorize an
autonomous republic, independent of the United States, a foreign
policy utopia fueled by President Roh Moo Hyun.27 Many members
of this generation consider the United States to be “most threatening
to the ROK (Republic of Korea)” after North Korea.28 Regardless of
their political inclinations, the nationalistic 386ers, as a political and
social class, will be the dominant political force in South Korea for
the next 20-30 years.
In 10-20 years time, South Korea may be “sandwiched between
China, increasingly known as the ‘factory of the world,’ and Japan,
with its cutting-edge technology.”29 Things could get worse. Soon
after it gains a security guarantee, North Korea could demand the
10

withdrawal of all foreign (i.e., U.S.) forces from the Korean peninsula.
Buoyed by pro-North Korean sympathizers in South Korea, North
Korea would echo the Roh Moo Hyun government’s repeal of South
Korea’s National Security Law, on the books since 1958.
As for reunification possibilities, prospects may not be that rosy.
South Korea may not be able to take the lead, let alone absorb North
Korea. There could emerge a unified but weak Korea. South Korea
has barely recovered from the 1997 financial crisis that required
International Monetary Fund (IMF) intervention. South Korea has
7 million unemployed. According to South Korean conservatives,
nearly 10 percent of South Koreans are believers or sympathizers
of North Korea—that is about 4 million people. In North Korea,
one can reasonably surmise that some 3-4 million (those formerly
in the Korean Worker’s Party and the Korean People’s Army)
may extol the good old days of North Korean communism. Some
15 million North Koreans will likely be unemployed if the Kim
regime is removed. North Koreans may at first welcome unification,
but economic difficulties may lead them to reflexive nostalgia for
socialism. A generation that has starved and a people who have
been taught to think and behave for over 50 years will not become
active participatory citizens overnight. Anyone can do the math. The
democratic center, rooted in free elections and the market economy,
may not hold. West Germany was a strong economic power in 1989;
East Germany was the best-run country in Eastern Europe. And,
still, a unified Germany underwent a very unstable period of time
during which many Germans themselves and outsiders thought that
the financial burden of unification could not be met.
How to Get What We Want: Alliances and Treaties.
Given our optimistic and pessimistic projections for the next 20
years or so, how does the United States go about seeking what we
want? In other words, what is likely to develop in East Asia by 2025,
and how does the United States mold, shape, and adjust to those
anticipated developments? I argue that the strengthening of our
bilateral alliance with South Korea and Japan and the forging of a
new understanding with China on nuclear proliferation are the keys
to shaping the East Asian future we want to confront in 2025.
11

At first glance, the East Asian structure seems an ill fit to tempering
nuclear proliferation. Observers are quick to point out the absence
of a NATO-type structure for East Asia. There are no East Asian
equivalents of a Monroe Doctrine, the Rio Pact, the Organization of
American States (OAS); no West European Union (WEU) political
counterpart. At best, there is the now defunct South East Asian
Treaty Organization (SEATO).
But on closer examination, the United States is “blessed” not to
have a NATO-type organization in East Asia.30 Critics who pinned
the mistakes and shortcomings of U.S. policy in East Asia on this
absence of multilateral organizational structure miss the mark. U.S.
Forces Korea’s (USFK) commander General Leon Laporte has more
flexibility and leeway than General Lauris Norstad had at the height
of Supreme Allied Command Europe’s (SACEUR) prestige and
responsibility. Multilateral alliances can fall victim to factionalism
and disagreements over “who’s turn” it is in rotation assignments
and responsibilities. Bilateral alliances and treaties, on the other hand,
give the United States flexibility in offering positive inducements
and holding out negative consequences. If the collective sum of a
multilateral alliance is its strength, then the one-on-one nature of
bilateral alliances gives the United States more direct leverage over
its ally and lowers the probability of misunderstanding and collusion
against it. Bilateral alliances can be leveraged to pressure third parties
with whom its allies have relations. Examples are not hard to find.
Despite Tokyo’s insistence that the abduction issue is their top
priority in negotiations with North Korea, Japan has agreed that a
written security guarantee of North Korea takes precedence. Japan
will “not insist on including the abduction issue” in the second round
of the 6-nation talks over North Korea’s nuclear program.31
Ostensibly, the United States also pressured Japan to not sign a
$2 billion contract for Iran’s oil. Shoichi Nakagawa, the new minister
of economy, trade, and industry stated that Japan would treat the
bilateral agreement for Iran’s Azadegan oil field “in its totality,”
indicating that the “contract could not be separated from suspicions
over Iran’s nuclear programme.”32
Anti-American sentiments reached its apex during South Korea’s
December 2002 Presidential election. Though hardly at its nadir
today, anti-American sentiments are on the wane, due in large part
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to the U.S. decision to pull back frontline troops beyond the Han
River, south of Seoul, as well as a well-timed announcement for
possible draw down of some of its 37,000 troops stationed in South
Korea.33 The calibration of the deployment of U.S. forces will have
a palpable effect on how South Korea defines its national security
and decides on its defense policies. The U.S.-ROK alliance emerges
as ever important in the resolution of the North Korean nuclear
problem, as any potential strike operations against selective North
Korean facilities would require Seoul’s approval of the use of its
airspace.
The United States can also dangle to Japan and South Korea the
prospect of joining the 10 rotating UN Security Council memberships
for their cooperation in keeping East Asia nuclear free. Algeria, the
Philippines, Romania, Brazil, and Benin are to begin their term on
January 1, 2004. The 2-year rotation for the other 5-member group
begins on January 1, 2005.34
On a final note, Japan and South Korea are free, democratic, liberal,
capitalistic, and open societies, and have been our allies for over 50
years. Yet the United States still does not know Japan and South Korea
all that well. If we have shortcomings in our understandings of our
East Asian allies, how do we even approach minimal understanding
of our East Asian adversaries? As one observer noted: “When we
confront an opponent with nuclear weapons, we misread cues,
signals, threats, and responses, most of all when the opponent stands
outside of Western culture. They will misread us in turn.”35 Thus, the
strengthening of existing bilateral alliances gains more importance
for our efforts to curb nuclear proliferation in East Asia.
Treaties.
The two pillars of post-World War II treaties—the San Francisco
Peace Treaty (September 8, 1951) and the Korean Armistice
Agreement (July 27, 1953)—appear outdated. Some have even called
for the end of the U.S.-ROK alliance.36 But those calling for the end of
such alliances never posit what would replace them.
The abolition of these two treaties would be recognition of the
restoration of Japan and South Korea to “normal” status. New
treaties or agreements that would replace the San Francisco Peace
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Treaty and the Korean Armistice Agreement would have to consider
how Japan and South Korea would defend themselves in their new
role as normal nations, nations responsible for their own defenses
and which would no longer be divided.
But it seems difficult to imagine a scenario where this would
occur absent the unification of Korea. Thus, the crux of the matter
is what will develop on the Korean peninsula by the year 2025. The
fallout of Korean unification will affect developments in Japan and
China. An important factor will be how the United States confronts
and manages such developments.
If Korea is unified peacefully and emerges as a single, democratic,
capitalistic nation, then the armistice agreement will become moot.
And if such a benign development were to occur, then the San
Francisco treaty would become irrelevant. But both treaties are
“holding” treaties that are buttressed by specific defense commitments
in the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaties, the two
most important alliances in East Asia.37 The strengthening of these
treaties and bilateral alliances is critical. Such buttressing sends a
clear message that the United States keeps its word and adheres to its
commitments. At the same time, the nature of the bilateral alliances
with Japan and Korea allows the United States to be flexible.
Any revision of the mutual defense treaties will require a revision
of America’s nuclear umbrella over and defense commitment to South
Korea and Japan. The clause allowing the deployment of U.S. forces
“in and around” Japan and Korea will need to be expunged. A peace
treaty in Korea will need to replace the armistice agreement, and a
new treaty or agreement would need to follow the San Francisco
treaty.
In light of our deep concern about proliferation, we should not
be so hasty in revising or replacing these two key alliance treaties.
In short, if the United States continues to provide a nuclear umbrella
for the defense of Japan and South Korea, then the two nations will
have a difficult justification for going nuclear.
Some have argued that a nuclear North Korea would be a
sufficient threat to make Japan go nuclear, to provoke South Korea
to revisit suspension of its nuclear programs in the mid-1970s, or
to force China to accelerate weaponization of its nuclear materials.38
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But despite these views, and despite the rhetoric of some politicians
and officials in the United States and East Asia, I believe that Japan
would not go nuclear even if North Korea declared itself a nuclear
power or was proven to have nuclear weapons.
The underlying assumption of such a conjecture is that the status
quo on the Korean peninsula will hold, that the Kim Jong Il regime
will continue to persevere.39 In 2025 Kim Jong Il will be 83 years old.
There is already circumstantial evidence that a second succession
is in the works. The glorification of Kim Jong Il’s third wife, Koh
Young Hee, has already begun. Their two sons, Jong-Chul and JongUn, are likely successors. A fantasy? In 1980, the same year that the
glorification of his mother, Kim Jung-Sook, began in earnest, Kim
Jong Il was officially anointed the successor.40
Kim Jong Chul works in the Operation and Guidance Department,
the very same launching pad for his father’s accession in 1973 when
he assumed control of the same department. Kim Jong Il’s first son,
Jong-Nam, reportedly works in the State Security Department (SSD)
but his careless attempt to enter Japan on a fake Dominican passport
might have ruined his chance to succeed his father. Chang SeungTaek, Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law, is under house arrest, similar to
the isolation, marginalization, and containment of Kim Young-Ju
(Kim Il Sung’s brother) and Kim Pyong-Il (Kim Jong-Il’s half-brother)
in the early 1970s.
But I posit that the Japanese and South Korean nuclear calculus
may change if Korean unification is achieved under the following
circumstances: If Korea is unified via South Korean absorption of the
North and if U.S. forces remain in a unified Korea, then the presence
of U.S. forces may dampen the temptations of a united Korea to restart
a nuclear weapons program.41 However, if Korea is unified with the
South inheriting the remnants of the North’s nuclear program and
a Seoul-centered, unified Korea is unwilling to abandon or freeze
the program and begins to engage in irredentist rhetoric, it is highly
unlikely that Japan will remain quiet.
Some have argued that Japan does not oppose a unified Korea.
Others have said that Japan’s real concern is China.42 They may
be peripherally right. But China already has nuclear weapons and
missiles capable of reaching Japan. South Korea does not. The August
1998 Taepo Dong launch already had underscored Pyongyang’s
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ability to hit all of Japan. Yet, Japan did not go nuclear. If the U.S.Japan alliance stays intact and if a unified Korea does not abrogate
the U.S.-ROK security treaty, then the Japanese nuclear temptation
may be alleviated.
However, if a unified Korea acquires nuclear capability (as well
as having nearly 1.8 million Koreans in arms—1.1 million North
Korean and 680,000 South Korean soldiers) and decides that the
United States is no longer needed for its security, then the nuclear
temptation will metastasize into a critical need for Japan. If Japan
confronts what it considers (still) an upstart, uppity, unitary Korea
getting its hands on nuclear weapons and unconstrained by a U.S.
alliance, then Japan will seek nuclear weapons capability—and seek
them rapidly. Japan will never accept a Korea outpacing it, let alone
one that can threaten it with nuclear diplomacy. Thus, a unified Korea
with nuclear weapons, unfettered by an alliance with Washington,
rather than a nuclear North Korea is the triggering point for Japan
going nuclear.
China will likely continue its modernization of existing nuclear
capability by seeking MIRV capability. China is also likely to pursue
at full speed its space program.43 But even this projected development
depends on U.S. actions. If Korea is unified and retains nuclear
capability, if the United States remains tied to such a unified Korea
with troops stationed close to the Chinese border, and if Japan goes
nuclear, China will become threatened. Already, China has taken
precautionary steps to ensure against any undesirable American
encroachment of influence over the Korean peninsula by deploying
Chinese troops along the North Korean border. At the very least,
Chinese leaders would prefer to have a pro-China government,
compliant to its regional desiderata in a post-Kim Jong Il North
Korea.
However, if nominal U.S. forces remain in Korea far from the
Chinese borders, with the bulk stationed in Guam, then a delicate
balance could be reached. There is no need for China to fear a unified
Korea tied militarily to the United States if no U.S. troops are on its
northeastern border. In this scenario, the United States will not have
completely withdrawn from East Asia per se. U.S. forces will not be
near Chinese territory yet not too far away to deter possible outbreak
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of hostile movement by China against Korea or Japan. U.S. presence
in Guam will also serve as a “psychological buffer” for potential
conflict between Japan and a unified Korea—even if both possess
nuclear capabilities. A mobile U.S. missile defense capability and
technology, along with Guam’s location, will allow it to accomplish
a balance of power in East Asia without withdrawal of its presence
from the region.
Thus, we need to reach a very clear understanding with the Chinese
about nuclear nonproliferation. As in 1994, we can pressure China to
“not oppose” economic sanctions against North Korea. In the event
China continues to supply North Korea with sensitive materials that
could be used for its nuclear program, the United States can make
clear to China that selective tariff measures could be contemplated
if such activities were not halted. To be sure, such “trade wars”
would hurt the U.S. economy. But it would cripple China’s. The last
thing Chinese leaders want at this stage is a slowdown of the pace of
its economic growth. To be sure, Chinese leaders worry about the
possibility of North Korean nuclear materials falling into the hands
of pro-independence groups in Xinjiang (East Turkmenistan) to
advance their separatist goals. But that problem is viewed as one
among many on its periphery. The continued acceleration of its
economy is central to the Chinese leaders’ political epistemology.
Chinese leaders view the 2008 Olympics, the 2010 Shanghai Expo,
and the 2014 World Cup as the catalyst by which the Chinese
economy can advance to its next huge take-off. An administration
official nailed it on the head: “It is the possibility of a huge economic
impact that we hope gets the attention of Chinese decisionmakers
to do more on preventing WMD [weapons of mass destruction]
proliferation.”44 We have broad, mature relations with China. And
Chinese leaders strive for stability on its frontiers and borders so as
to continue its economic development. We need to expand on that
relationship and intersection of national interests to make it clear
what we are prepared to overlook and what we will not tolerate.
What to Do—New Approaches.
The United States cannot remain wedded to 20th century
solutions to 21st century problems. We need to question, rethink,
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and produce bold, sweeping approaches to the prospect of curtailing
nuclear proliferation in East Asia.
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the UN
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) need to be strengthened.45
IAEA inspections have been able to neither affirm innocence nor
prove guilt in a manner that is effective in the international policy
context and opinion. The set-up as it is incorporates the possibility of
failure because it permits capability acquisition. I think that national
will matters as much as technical ability in the pursuit of nuclear
weapons. But if one were to focus specifically on technical means,
I would take mild issue with those who emphasize the primacy of
nuclear weapons design (important as it is). There are problems
with this emphasis, not the least of which is that the IAEA mandate
does not cover nuclear weapons design because nuclear weapons
design is very difficult to monitor and verify. Instead, I posit that
the engineering of nuclear fissile material is the critical node, the
most important bellwether of the problem. Thus, we may explore
the possibility of modifying the IAEA mandate to include a beefed
up inspection regime, exploring the gamut of the nuclear fuel cycle.
At this point, the Additional Protocols are voluntary. We may have
to make Special Inspections mandatory and the norm.46
Related to this, we can think of ways to expand IAEA personnel
to include those who can be permanently deployed overseas to
undertake monitoring. We can also propose that the various national
laboratories keep ready a team of scientists and country experts
deployable on a 48-hour notice.
The UN Charter may need to be modified to include
nonproliferation as a central tenet of its mission. The current 2year rotation of the elected 10 members of the UN Security Council
could be shortened to a year, giving more countries a voice and a
responsibility on nuclear proliferation matters.
We should also think of expanding the 5-member permanent
Security Council. If this is resisted, we should think of creating
an Asian Security Council with the United States, China, Japan,
South Korea, Russia, and Australia as members to discuss, plan,
coordinate, and implement collective security measures to curb
WMD proliferation. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a
good first step toward tackling the proliferation problem. We may
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want to formalize PSI into a treaty, as well as persuading South
Korea and China to join.
We can put forth a 21st century version of a nuclear nonproliferation
Lend-Lease. American and international personnel could be leased as
managers or supervisors overseeing the indigenous nuclear reactors
in return for opening credit pipelines to the Asian Development
Bank, the World Bank, and the IMF. After all, the professed objective
of such a reactor is to generate electricity.
Missile defense also can serve to strengthen our bilateral alliances.
The U.S. nuclear deterrence/umbrella should remain but is not very
useful in the absence of a full-scale war akin to the Korean War. If so,
how is one to respond to threats short of total war but still deemed
serious? How does one go about defending and fighting back without
going truly nuclear—that is, going to nuclear war?
In the 1950s, this dilemma was one of credibility. The massive
retaliation policy rested precariously on the belief that the United
States would be prepared and willing to sacrifice New York for
Paris or London in a nuclear exchange with the Soviets. Today, the
dilemma is one of nuclear temptation as a default. In the absence of
an independent nuclear capability, and in the face of a nuclear North
Korea, South Korea or Japan may feel the acute need to respond
to nuclear threats by North Korea without going nuclear itself. A
diplomatic and military panacea may be the sharing of some missile
defense technologies and platforms. The continuation of a U.S.
nuclear umbrella and the establishment of a missile defense system
are not mutually exclusive. Both can be had—without the attending
“arms race” that some portend. In East Asia, both are needed.
At a force deployment level, the United States can reconfigure its
command structure in Korea as well as update its arsenal. Currently,
the arsenal inventory of U.S. missile forces in Korea is comprised
mostly of MK-84s leftover from Vietnam. Putting Joint Direct Attack
Munition (JDAM) kits on them would neatly make smart these dumb
bombs, making virtue out of necessity.
Currently, the commander in Korea wears, in essence, three hats.
The 4-star general who commands Korea is Commander in Chief,
UN Command (CINCUNC), Commander, Combined Forces Command (CFC), and Commander, USFK. The army component of USFK
is the commander of the Eighth U.S. Army.
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To be sure, such command structure reflects the historically
international nature of the situation on the Korean peninsula, but
it also reflects the complex bilateral relationship with South Korea.
Given recent political developments in South Korea, as well as our
rethinking of our own “footprint” in East Asia and the reconfiguration
of our overall worldwide deployment, we may want to explore the
possibility of consolidating the command structure in Korea and
Japan with a North East Asian command based in Guam. We can
explore the idea of returning to a subregional commander within
Pacific Command (PACOM) such as a Commander in Chief, North
East Asia (CINCNEA), similar to a Commander in Chief, Far East
(CINCFE) that we had in the 1940s and 1950s.
An important step is to redefine the “language” of proliferation,
its symbols and syntax. We need a defining doctrine in the tradition
of the Monroe Doctrine and NSC-68 to confront this problem.
Every doctrine has its key words and grammar. The new doctrine’s
vocabulary should be “prevention.” Its new grammar should
be new targeting guidelines. The White House’s new Office of
Global Communications should propagate U.S. values on nuclear
proliferation. After all, our values on nuclear proliferation are just
as important as the rule of law, freedom of speech, private property,
religious tolerance, and equal justice.
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM may be a threshold in military
operations. Deterrence, containment, and preemption have to a
certain degree been part of U.S. policy. But going after leadership
targets in the very beginning of war is a big shift in thinking. It has
rendered ineffective the thrust of effects-based operations, to wit,
that punishing the ruled will pressure the ruler to sue for peace. As
President Bush said: “With new tactics and precision weapons, we
can achieve military objectives without directing violence against
civilians. No device of man removes the tragedy from war; yet it is
a great moral advance when the guilty have far more to fear from
war than the innocent.”47 Nothing symbolizes more eloquently
and delivers a more powerful message than this new targeting
philosophy.
If one were to deduce the logical corollary of this shift in thinking,
one can propose that the United States expand on the recent National
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Strategy on WMD: “The United States will continue to make clear
that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force—
including resort to all of our options—to the use of WMD against
the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.”48 This
clause can be expanded to include those regimes that give materials
to terrorists that could be used to make WMD. The implicit threat
of nuclear annihilation for giving sensitive nuclear materials to
terrorists should be contemplated as the ultimate deterrent option.
North Korea must be made to understand clearly that the pain and
cost of selling sensitive nuclear materials to terrorists are that it must
then live under a serious and credible nuclear threat.
Lastly, as important as changes in organizational structure,
deployments, and language may be, they pale in comparison to the
role of individual personalities. The insouciance of sophisticated
theories of international relations has yet to successfully traduce
the age-old importance of individuals. Personalities matter a great
deal even as predicting the rise of key players in China, Japan, and
the two Koreas is extremely difficult. One may be unduly optimistic
in expecting the emergence of an East Asian trio of Metternich,
Castlereagh, and Talleyrand, and an East Asian Congress equivalent
of that of 1815 Vienna. But the difficulty of prediction and the
disappointment of high expectations should not preclude the United
States from seeking to identify and investigate key players, and their
intellectual and social backgrounds.
For example, a North Korea without Kim Jong Il, but one still
with nuclear weapons and a sub-par human rights record, is certainly
far from ideal. One cannot state with certainty that a North Korean
military figure or one of Kim’s sons or relatives will not be as cruel and
totalitarian as Kim Jong Il. But I posit that it is still preferable to one
with Kim at the helm. The stability of the status quo, as advocated by
“realists” is misguided. The status quo itself is inherently unstable.
Realistic solutions posed by the realists have produced little in the
way of stability or realism. Regime change in North Korea will be
destabilizing. But the uncertainty of a future without Kim Jong Il
should not hamper our intellectual exploration and policy execution
of a North Korea state in the absence of a Kim regime.
Some 20 years elapsed between the signing of the Versailles
Treaty and the Munich agreement. We cannot emulate that historical
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pattern. It is conceivable and desirable that 20 years after the North
Korean withdrawal from the NPT, a new nonproliferation set-up,
based on a strengthening of our existing bilateral alliances and the
establishing of a new understanding with China, will guide the
United States and East Asian nations in the second decade of the
21st century. Disraeli said, “Man is not a creature of circumstances.
Circumstances are the creatures of men.” The year 2025 in East Asia
need not be an Annus Horribilis. The United States must and will
shape our circumstances as it fits our needs.
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CHAPTER 2
PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
WHO IS NEXT AFTER IRAN?
Patrick Clawson
Were Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, its neighbors and the
entire region would have to consider carefully the impact on their
own security situation. The sobering reality is that several other
Middle Eastern countries would seriously consider acquiring nuclear
weapons were Iran to do so. Indeed, there could be a vicious cycle
in which first one additional country acquires nuclear weapons,
then others concerned about that country’s possession proceed with
their own weapons programs, and that further proliferation in turn
convinces more countries to act.
The thesis of this chapter is that such a proliferation outbreak
is distinctly possible unless the United States responds to Iranian
proliferation with firm, concrete measures to offset Iran’s actions.1
The structure of the chapter is to briefly summarize the reasons for
concern about the Iranian nuclear program and then to turn to the
potential proliferants: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, other Arab states, and
Turkey. The chapter closes with what the United States could do to
influence the decisions of Middle East states about whether or not to
imitate an Iranian proliferation.
Reasons to Worry about the Iranian Nuclear Program.
Repeated warnings by U.S. officials about a potential Iranian
nuclear weapon have been regarded as exaggerated by many
academic students of Iran. The mid-1990s warnings that Iran might
have a nuclear weapon within 5 years turned out to be overly
pessimistic. But it appears that after years of problems and delays,
Iran’s nuclear ambitions have made considerable progress. The
March 2003 visit by a United Nations (UN) International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) team showed that Iran was well along on its
announced commitment to developing a full fuel cycle capability. Iran
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has aknowledged to the IAEA that it is constructing a plan to convert
natural uranium, which Iran is mining from domestic deposits, into
uranium hexafluoride gas. That gas presumably would be used in the
Nantanz enrichment facility visited by the IAEA team. The Nantanz
facility has 160 functioning centrifuges in a pilot facility, while 1,000
more centrifuges are being assembled in another building which is
planned to hold 5,000 centrifuges.2 While Nantanz could be used
to produce lightly enriched uranium to refuel the electrical power
generating reactor under construction at Bushehr, it also would be
capable of producing highly enriched uranium. Depending on the
capacity of the machines, the facility when completed in 2005 could
produce enough highly enriched uranium for two or more nuclear
bombs per year.
Meanwhile, satellite photos indicate Iran also is building a heavy
water production plant which raises troubling concerns, given
that Iran is not known to have a reactor that would make use of
the plant’s production and such a reactor could well be a means to
acquire plutonium, giving Iran a second route to a nuclear weapon.
And construction on the light-water reactor at Bushehr is making
substantial headway, with commissioning of the plant likely in 2004,
which means that Iran will shortly thereafter accumulate spent fuel
in holding tanks. The fuel will be too radioactive to be returned
immediately to Russia, even assuming that the long-discussed
agreement to return the fuel is made operative. If heroic efforts are
made to return the spent fuel to Russia while still quite hot, the spent
fuel in the holding tanks will provide Iran the material from which
it could extract highly fissile material for several dozen weapons in
relatively short order. In short, considering the progress it is making
on several different facilities, it seems accurate to say that Iran is
developing a substantial nuclear infrastructure.
Of course, it is possible that Iran will use this nuclear infrastructure
only for the announced goal of a self-sufficient nuclear power industry
rather than for pursuing nuclear weapons. However, four factors
suggest Iran will perceive that the constraints against proliferation
are not great compared to the reasons to acquire nuclear weapons.
1. Attitude Towards Arms Control Agreements. Iran is a state-party
to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), but
that may not constrain its nuclear program. Iran’s attitude towards
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arms control agreements is not reassuring. Iran’s declaration to the
Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) denied that
Iran had ever produced chemical weapons, which is a transparent
lie. U.S. sources say Iran imported uranium hexaflouride from China
without declaring this to the IAEA, and that some of this has been
enriched, which would violate its NPT obligations. Meanwhile, Iran
has refused to accept the enhanced IAEA inspections under the
Program 93+2 Additional Protocol; indeed, it has not modified its
safeguard agreement with the IAEA to incorporate the IAEA’s 1995
restatement of what it is empowered to do with its powers to enforce
the NPT. (This restatement was the first part of the two-part Program
93+2, with the Additional Protocol). Nor is Iran going beyond
the minimum required under its current safeguard agreement,
as evidenced by its recent delays in notifying the IAEA about the
construction of new facilities (about which the IAEA was well aware
because of satellite photos), and its refusal to allow inspection of
those facilities (as distinct from a walk-through “visit” without any
examination of the facility by experts). All of this despite the European
Union (EU) pressure for progress about nuclear transparency before
Iran can get the trade agreement with the EU it badly wants.
It would be fair to characterize Iran’s attitude towards the
NPT as doing the minimum required while loudly proclaiming its
adherence. That is discouraging for the hopes of using the NPT to
constrain Iran’s nuclear program, because as interpreted by the IAEA,
the NPT gives Iran every right to build robust uranium enrichment
and plutonium extraction capabilities if it declares those activities,
while simultaneously developing the expertise and equipment to
weaponize the fissile material; that is, the IAEA view is that only
assembling the fissile material into weapons is prohibited. And the
NPT gives Iran the right to withdraw with 6 months’ notice. So Iran
could remain in good standing with the IAEA even as it acquired
the capability for a rapid breakout once leaving the NPT, that is, for
developing dozens of bombs within a short period. This route would
allow Iran to claim adherence to the NPT while still having a nuclear
potential so obvious and awesome as to worry, if not intimidate,
neighboring countries.
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2. International Reaction to Proliferation. The contrast between how
the world—especially, but not only the United States—reacts to Iraq
and to North Korea could have troubling implications for Iranian
proliferation. The correct lesson which Iran should draw from the
contract is the advantages accruing to those who offer to negotiate
with the United States and proclaim their willingness to make
strategic compromises if offered the right incentives, compared to
the high price paid by those who refuse to cooperate. But Iran may
well draw from the contrast the wrong lesson, namely, that those
who have nuclear weapons are treated with kid gloves, while those
who do not are treated with boxing gloves. In other words, Iran
may conclude that the best, if not the only, way to deter the United
States is to possess nuclear weapons. And there is the possibility
that a defiant, nuclear North Korea might aid proliferation in Iran.
Respected Israeli military analyst Ze’ev Schiff warns, “Israel fears
that if the North Korean crisis is not settled, Pyongyang would try to
form an anti-American coalition in the Middle East comprising Iran,
Syria, and Libya.”3
3. Threat Environment. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein greatly
reduces the threat of invasion from Iraq; it is difficult to see why—or
for that matter, how—a new Iraqi government would want to invade
Iran. And the end of the Saddam regime could well lead over time to
a reduced U.S. presence in the Gulf—a presence which Tehran has
often complained is aimed at it rather than Baghdad. Plus, Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia are likely, post-Saddam, to cut their military spending;
indeed, all the Arab monarchies of the Gulf are facing economic and
social pressures which make large weapons purchases less attractive.
Just as the threat from the Gulf is on the decline, so, too, the potential
for an Iranian-Israeli confrontation fades if Hezbollah is reined in
by Syria, which is distinctly possible given Syrian concerns about
U.S. pressure after the overthrow of Saddam. But unfortunately,
there is little reason to expect that the reduction in regional threats
will change Iran’s determination to acquire nuclear weapons. The
perceived threat from the United States will remain; indeed, it could
become more preoccupying, if Iran’s leaders worry that Washington
may be tempted to promote overthrow of the Islamic Republic by the
increasingly disaffected youth. Since, as discussed above, deterrence
of the United States could be seen by Iranian leaders to require
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nuclear weapons, the perceived greater U.S. threat would increase
the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons.
Domestic Political Environment.
Iran’s domestic political scene is characterized by a bitter dispute
between hardliners and reformers. But there is little evidence that
the two camps differ in their approach to nuclear weapons. Being
better informed about the outside world, the reformers may be more
sensitive to the political price Iran would pay for proliferation. On
the other hand, the reformers are more nationalist; indeed, they
have at times criticized hardliners for putting ideological regime
interests above national interests. It would seem that the opposition,
which has blocked Majlis ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), came more from reformers than from hardliners. It
seems that both hardliners and reformers see Iran as strategically
isolated, unable to rely for its security on allies or on foreign
weapons suppliers. The argument goes that Iran must therefore
develop indigenous weapons capabilities. But the prospects are
poor that Iran could develop on its own world-class conventional
arms, despite the billions of dollars it is spending to develop a full
range of conventional weapons systems. Convinced of this analysis,
dedicated Iranian nationalists, no matter how democratic or desirous
of good relations with America, may indeed support Iran pursuing
nuclear weapons. In his February 18, 2003, testimony to the Senate
Intelligence Committee, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director
George Tenet stated, “No Iranian government, regardless of its
ideological leanings, is likely to willingly abandon WMD [weapons
of mass destruction] programs that are seen as guaranteeing Iran’s
security.”
Faced with Iranian nuclear progress and the limited prospects
that international or domestic factors will lead Iran to back off from
the pursuit of nuclear weapons, it would be quite appropriate for
Middle Eastern countries to consider the security implications
were Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. It would not be surprising
if some countries were already developing their contingency plans.
This chapter asks, what are the prospect those plans could include
acquisition of nuclear weapons?
31

Saudi Arabia: Proliferation Consistent with the NPT.
Saudi Arabia is the state most likely to proliferate in response
to an Iranian nuclear threat. To be sure, such an action could
threaten the U.S.-Saudi relationship which has been the foundation
of Saudi security. But the Saudis keenly remember that when they
felt threatened by Iran—in the early days of the revolution, when
the Iran-Iraq war was starting—the U.S. response to their entreaties
was to send to the Gulf F-15 fighters which President Jimmy Carter
publicly described as being unarmed. As Richard Russell put it,
“It would be imprudent, to say the least, for Riyadh to make the
cornerstone of their national-security posture out of an assumption
that the United States would come to the kingdom’s defense—under
any and all circumstances.”4
A nuclear-armed Iran could well see itself as the natural leader of
the region to which all other states should listen closely. That would fit
with the Iranian nationalist self-conception, which sees Iran as a great
and ancient civilization in contrast to the parvenu unsophisticates in
the Arab minor statelets of the Gulf (that is a toned-down version
of comments Iranian nationalists make about their neighbors in the
Arab Gulf monarchies). Saudi Arabia would have excellent reason to
worry about Iran projecting itself as the protector of the Saudi Shia
community and as a state which should be consulted about how to
manage the Mecca pilgrimage and holy sites—all of which would be
utterly unacceptable to Riyadh.
Saudi Arabia might be unsure how much assistance it could
count on from the United States in face of such Iranian indirect
intimidation, which might not rise to the level at which Washington
would be prepared to risk a crisis with Iran. Riyadh may therefore
deem it necessary to possess a self-defense capability against Iranian
intimidation. And Saudi Arabia is in no position to defend itself with
conventional means, as is well illustrated by how ineffective the
Saudi military remains despite spending billions of dollars each year
on the most advanced weaponry and on training by U.S. advisors.
So a nuclear option could fit with the Saudi needs.
An instructive case to consider is the Saudi 1986 acquisition of 5060 CSS-2 missiles and 10-15 mobile launchers from China—missiles
used by China for its nuclear forces which can carry a warhead of up
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to 2,500 kg to a range of 700 km.5 While the Saudis and the Chinese
both insist that the warheads are conventional, the missiles are a
peculiar way to deliver conventional explosives, since they are highly
inaccurate (with a circular error of probability of about 1-2 km). The
Saudis acquired the missiles without detection by the United States,
and they since steadily have refused to allow any outside inspections
of the missiles—suggesting that the Saudis have both the capability
and the willingness to acquire advanced weapons in the face of
strong U.S. objections.
The CSS-2s raise an interesting question. There is a widespread
impression in West and South Asia that Saudi Arabia provided
much of the finance for the Pakistani nuclear program in return for
a rumored Pakistani commitment to provide Saudi Arabia nuclear
warheads if needed. Pakistan has been interested in developing
nuclear warheads for its missiles. Richard Russell speculates, “The
Saudis might be willing to help fund Pakistani research, development,
and deployment costs for their nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles in
exchange for nuclear warheads.”6 It would be possible to structure
such an arrangement without violating Saudi obligations under the
NPT. As explained to this writer by a senior Pakistani official well
versed in the matter, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia could follow the
example set by the United States and Germany during the Cold War
with dual-key missiles. America and Germany took the position that
Germany was not violating the NPT when the United States stored
nuclear warheads under its control in Germany even though the
delivery means for those warheads were missiles under German
control. So Pakistan could store in Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads
designed to fit on to Saudi-controlled missiles.
Egypt: Proliferation to Maintain Its Status.
Were Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, that would affect the
on-going debate in Egypt about whether it needs to nuclearize to
maintain its status as a regional power. If, in addition, Saudi Arabia
were to acquire nuclear weapons—even if by the indirect Pakistani
route described above—it is difficult to see Egypt remaining nonnuclear, because it would be unacceptable to Egypt to be perceived
as a less potent power than another Arab country.
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What would drive Egyptian decisions about proliferation would
be its determination to be the leading Arab power. There is broad
consensus among the Egyptian elite that such a status requires that
Egypt have the most powerful Arab army: the Egyptian view is that
great states have great armies. It is worth recalling that the original
Egyptian proposal for a WMD-free zone in the Middle East came
after Iraqi president Saddam Hussein threatened in 1990 to “burn
half of Israel.” Perhaps Egypt’s motivation was to protect Israel,
but certainly one could argue for the alternative interpretation that
Egypt could not accept another Arab state having a more potent
WMD capability than Egypt possessed. Indeed, the 1998 Indian and
Pakistani nuclear tests led to a debate in Egypt about proliferation,
with Egyptian President Hosny Mubarak suggesting that these could
lead to a generalized proliferation throughout the region.
An obvious factor in the Egyptian calculus about proliferation is
Israel. The WMD imbalance with Israel is a deep wound. Egypt is
bitter that it has had no success in securing an Israeli commitment
to give up nuclear weapons within a fixed time frame. Israel has
offered that 2 years after it has peace treaties with all regional states,
it would begin negotiations on a robust regional inspection process
which once functional would monitor Israeli denuclearization.
Faced with the perceived imbalance, Egypt has long had a strong
pro-nuclear lobby. Egyptian president Hosny Mubarak stated in
1998, “when the time comes and we need nuclear weapons, we will
not hesitate.” In May 2002, former Egyptian representative to the
IAEA Dr. Mustafa al-Fiqi wrote an article for the semi-official Alhram
newspaper questioning whether President Anwar Sadat made the
right decision when he suddenly and surprisingly signed the NPT in
1981; al-Fiqi argued that nuclear weapons might have been a useful
deterrent against Israel.7
It is also worth noting that Egypt has long had an ambiguous
attitude about WMD. Egypt has refused to sign the Chemical Weapons
Convention. It has a history of using chemical weapons in 1964 in
its war in Yemen—at the time, documented by the International
Committee of the Red Cross and discussed in the Security Council.
So there is no taboo in Egyptian thinking about the use of WMD.
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Other Arab States: Those with Ambitions Lack Capability.
Other Arab states would not pose as much a proliferation worry.
Those that could proliferate would not particularly want to; those
that would want to would have a hard time doing so.
Syria would be very unlikely to change its approach to nuclear
weapons in the event of an Iranian nuclear acquisition. Syrian
weapons decisions are not driven by prestige factors, in part because
Syria does not see itself as the natural leader of the Arab world. And
Syria is quite aware of how severely Israel would react to a Syrian
nuclear acquisition. Syria has been quite clear-headed in thinking
through its WMD options. It has been bent for more than a decade
on acquiring a large enough inventory of CW-tipped missiles that
it can threaten Israel with unacceptable losses. And Syria has been
relatively responsible about its CW-tipped missiles, giving every
indication that it sees these as weapons of last resort to be used only
if Israel threatened Syria’s national existence. Given the strategic
logic to this approach—it is after all reasonable for Syria to worry
about the country being overrun and to therefore have a weapon of
last resort—it is not surprising that the U.S. response to the Syrian
CW proliferation effort has been rather low-key. So much for the
charge that the U.S. government has a dual standard about the Israeli
nuclear program: in fact, Washington has been rather understanding
when Middle East states faced with existential threats acquire a WMD
capability appropriate to that threat. Indeed, it is remarkable that the
United States has done so little about the Syrian WMD threat, given
the bad relations between the two countries and the fact that Syria’s
WMD threatens a close U.S. ally, namely, Israel.
In the category of countries that would want to proliferate
but would have problems doing so, the most obvious case before
Qadafi’s nuclear renunciation, was Libya. The Palestinians might
try to proliferate—after all, most of them think they are already
being attacked with WMD (i.e., chemical and biological weapons)
by Israel—but they have a low capability to buy or build nuclear
weapons. Of greater proliferation worry would be the smaller Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) states, especially the United Arab
Emirates, which are well-placed to buy nuclear weapons if anyone
can, but it is not at all clear that there would be anyone prepared to
sell such weapons.
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Turkey: Will NATO Be Enough?
Historically Turkey has been at peace with Iran, and the two
countries have generally paid relatively little attention to each
other, compared to what one might expect from two neighbors with
considerable economic interaction. That said, Turkey has many
reasons to worry about meddling by an Islamic Republic which is
ideologically opposed to Ankara’s secular policies. If Turkey faces
serious internal problems—be it from Islamists or from Kurds—Iran
might seek to take advantage of that situation, and Iranian nuclear
weapons would make Turkey think long and hard about how much
it could complain about such Iranian meddling. In other words, an
Iranian nuclear capability could make the Turkish General Staff
nervous.
Faced with a nuclear-armed Iran, Turkey’s first instinct would
be to turn to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Turkey places extraordinary value on its NATO membership, which
symbolizes the West’s acceptance of Turkey—a delicate issue for
a country which feels it is excluded from the EU on civilizational
grounds more than for any other reason. The cold reality is that
NATO was not designed to defend Turkey: assisting Turkey faced
with a general Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe is one
thing; defending Turkey when it alone faces a threat is an altogether
different matter. It is not clear how much NATO members want to
take on this burden. It will be only natural for Turkey to wonder
how much it can rely on NATO.
Were Turkey to decide that it had to proliferate in order to defend
itself, it has good industrial and scientific infrastructures which it
could draw upon to build nuclear weapons on its own. It would
be difficult to prevent a determined Turkey from building nuclear
weapons in well under a decade.
How Can America Influence Middle East Decisions after Iranian
Proliferation?
Whether or not Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons leads
to further proliferation among America’s friends in the region will
depend in considerable part on what policies the United States
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adopts as Iran’s nuclear capabilities become more evident. Were
Washington to do little besides deploring Iran’s actions, further
proliferation is likely. That is the case irrespective of how loudly and
frequently the United States condemns Iran’s actions.
Calls for economic sanctions or diplomatic steps against Iran
seem an unpromising way to affect the calculus of other proliferants.
For one thing, it is not clear that the international community would
agree to impose sanctions. For more than a decade, the United
States and the EU nations have profoundly disagreed about the
utility of sanctions on Iran, and attitudes have hardened on both
sides. It is hard to see the EU abandoning its long-held opposition
to sanctions, since it is firmly convinced that engagement is the best
way to moderate Iranian policy and to support Iranian moderates.
Furthermore, it is not clear how much impact sanctions would have
on Iranian actions; the impact of the long-standing unilateral U.S.
sanctions is subject to different readings. All in all, other regional
states pondering proliferation would probably be skeptical that
sanctions would change Iran’s policy, and they might not even
been greatly concerned that they would face sanctions were they to
proliferate.
Nor is it clear how much impact there would be if the United
States responded by reemphasizing controls on exports of sensitive
technology. Such export controls would seem unlikely to influence
Iranian actions, since Iran has in theory faced strict controls for some
time and yet has managed to make do, one way or another. The
impact of reinvigorated export controls on the proliferation plans of
the regional states would vary. A country like Turkey, which might
consider building its own weapons, would presumably be more
vulnerable, whereas countries that might consider acquiring nuclear
weapons fully assembled, such as the Gulf monarchies, would
presumably be less affected.
In the event of Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, the most
promising U.S. anti-proliferation tool would be closer security ties
with allies threatened by the Iranian proliferation breakthrough.
America’s friends in the region are going to feel more vulnerable
in the face of Iranian nuclear weapons, and they will need to be
reassured that their security concerns are being met if they are to
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be dissuaded from imitating Iran’s proliferation. The United States
could reassure them through some combination of policies that:
• Change declaratory posture. For instance, were the United
States explicitly to extend a nuclear umbrella over its regional
friends, that could weigh heavily in the minds of regional
leaders—especially if done loudly, frequently, and at the
highest levels.
• Enhance access to advanced weapons. For instance, if the
United States assisted regional states in acquiring improved
missile/air defenses that could lessen the threat posed by
Iranian nuclear-tipped missiles.
• Expand U.S. presence in the region. To take an extreme
example, if the United States were to station ships with
nuclear-capable cruise missiles off Iran’s shores, that would
make a powerful point about the depth of U.S. commitment
to the changed declaratory posture cited above.
These policies to reassure U.S. friends in the region would have
the added advantage of showing that Iran’s security has become
worse off because of its acquisition of nuclear weapons—that is,
Iran’s nuclear weapons would have increased the U.S. military
threat to Iran, rather than providing a means to balance the greater
power of the United States. That would be a useful precedent for
other regional actors to contemplate in that it would suggest that the
acquisition of nuclear weapons, in fact, may not be a force-enhancer.
If the United States can point to strong actions it has taken to counter
Iranian nuclear weapons, that will lend more credibility to U.S.
warnings to its friends in the region that were they to proliferate,
Washington might take the strong step of reducing or ending the
U.S. security relationship with their country. This could become a
significant factor in their calculations about whether to head down
the proliferation path.
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CHAPTER 3
NUCLEAR 1914: THE NEXT BIG WORRY
Henry D. Sokolski
The next use of nuclear weapons, if followed quickly by others,
is nothing the United States or its closest friends could suffer lightly.
Like Rome after it was repeatedly pillaged, Washington, even if not
directly attacked, would find its authority immediately undermined.
Powerless to stop nuclear attacks after having so long warned
against them, the United States could soon find itself under assault.
Assuming nuclear use begets nuclear use, what would follow could
be the next dark ages.
An alternative and sunnier future would be one in which the
United States and its allies can and do limit severely the use of nuclear
weapons. The question is: What would this require? At a minimum,
enough nations falling into line, either voluntarily or otherwise, to
keep nuclear attacks at bay.
This is hardly a sure thing. Most nuclear-capable states are
reluctant to provide information on their nuclear inventories,
activities, and facilities, which is necessary to check nuclear
proliferation or terrorism. As more states acquire nuclear weapons
or become increasingly ready to do so, the inclination to share such
facts is only likely to decline. Nuclear-capable states are unlikely to
open up if it implicates them in proliferation or undermines their
option to acquire nuclear weapons in the future.
The news since September 11, 2001, is depressingly instructive in
this regard. More than a year after the first revelations about Iran’s
uranium enrichment program were made public, the United States
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were still
trying to drag information about A. Q. Khan’s nuclear activities from
the Pakistani government. First, Islamabad denied that any Pakistani
ever shared nuclear technology with anyone. Then, after Iranian
officials fingered Pakistan, the Pakistani government admitted that
Dr. Khan had made some sales to Tehran. Then it was revealed that
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Dr. Khan and his subordinates sold plans, equipment, and bomb
designs to Libya. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had Dr.
Khan arrested—but just as suddenly decided to grant the Pakistani
scientist a pardon, praising him as a national hero. The United States
and the IAEA are still anxiously trying to learn what exactly Dr.
Khan sold and to whom. But so far, the Pakistani government has
refused to allow either the United States or the IAEA to interview
Dr. Khan directly.
It is not just Iran and Libya that benefited from Pakistani nuclear
exports. Several other countries, including North Korea, Egypt,
and perhaps even Brazil have received them as well. Brazil’s case is
unclear because its navy has put off allowing inspectors full access
to the country’s enrichment plant for nearly a year, for fear that
IAEA officials might pinpoint the foreign sources of their imported
enrichment equipment. Pakistan could be of immense help in
this situation. But so far, it has done the bare minimum to clarify
matters. How successful might we be, then, in securing nuclear
materials and facilities against terrorist theft or in tracking down
nuclear terrorists in a world with more Pakistans and Brazils? If the
past year of news is prologue, our prospects do not look good.
An Unsteady Balance.
More speculative but every bit as chilling is how such nations
might use their own nuclear capabilities against one another. Here,
too, there is cause to worry. A key reason why is the amount of
diplomatic entropy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. During
the Cold War, there was a clear subordination of nations to one or
another of the two superpowers’ strong alliance systems. More
important, the aim of the alliance in the West was to check or contain
the efforts of the Warsaw Pact. The net effect was relative peace with
only small wars (see Figure 1).
This system no longer exists. Instead, we now have one
superpower, the United States, with a growing but relatively weak
alliance system being challenged by an increasing number of nuclear
or nuclear-weapons-ready states. So far, the United States has tried
to cope with the emergence of these independent nuclear powers by
making them “strategic partners,” e.g., India and Russia, or “non42

Figure 1.
NATO allies,” e.g., Israel and Pakistan; or by fudging if a nation
actually has attained full nuclear status, e.g., North Korea (see Figure
2).
There are limits, however, to what this approach can
accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set
of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international
system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to the First World
War. Of course, unlike 1914, there is no power today that can rival
the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But
in a world with an increasing number of nuclear or nuclear-ready
states, including Iran, North Korea, Algeria, Egypt, Japan and many
others, this may not matter. In such a world, the actions of just one
or two states could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington
could have difficulty winning (see Figure 3).
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Figure 2.
Consider Taiwan. It tried to acquire nuclear weapons several
decades ago. Now, with China constantly increasing its conventional
missile and amphibious strength across the Taiwan Strait, Taipei
could easily have cause to try to acquire nuclear weapons again. If
it were to try, China would surely demand that the United States
get Taiwan to cease and desist and threaten invasion if Taiwan did
not. Taipei would probably stand down—but undoubtedly would
try to condition its denuclearization on having the United States
produce some clear signal of security support. Would the United
States blink or back Taiwan? If it expressed support for Taiwan’s
existence (perhaps with a forward U.S. naval deployment) and
thereby defused Taiwan’s nuclear proliferation moves, could the
United States cope with what undoubtedly would be a sharp,
threatening response from Beijing? The point of this hypothetical
case is that even the slightest move by Taiwan to acquire nuclear
weapons could overwhelm the strategic relationships Washington
has built with China and other Asian nations over the last halfcentury to head off such wars.
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Figure 3.
Another case of increasing interest is that of India and Pakistan.
The United States recently made Pakistan a non-NATO ally, and
is in the midst of making India a strategic partner. Washington’s
professed aim is to bolster stability between these two nations. But
how would the United States view Pakistan if another attempt on
President Musharraf’s life proved successful and Pakistan fell under
Taliban control? At that point, a number of things would likely
occur. Immediately, the political stock of the nation’s current hero,
Dr. Khan, would rise; indeed, there has already been talk about him
succeeding Musharraf under such circumstances. If Dr. Khan did
not succeed Musharraf, someone sympathetic to Dr. Khan surely
would.
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In any case, a Talibanized Pakistan could be counted on to work
more closely with its ideological allies in the front lines in Kashmir
against India and with Saudi Arabia. Riyadh—a financial backer
of Pakistan’s nuclear activities—is now investigating how it might
acquire nuclear weapons in the likely case that Iran continues on its
current nuclear course. Meanwhile, senior Pakistani military officials
sympathetic to the Taliban already have suggested that Pakistan
could legally base some of its nuclear warheads on Saudi soil as
long as they remained under Pakistani control; a Taliban-dominated
Pakistan might well implement this idea in order to achieve strategic
depth for any future conventional conflict with India. If a Talibanized
Pakistan ignited another war with India, China would diplomatically
side with Pakistan, and the United States would side with its strategic
friend, India. This would appear to create a balance. But if Pakistan
thought it could count on Saudi missiles armed with Pakistani
warheads to counter any Indian aggression, would Islamabad
recognize this balance and be deterred?
Again, the point of this hypothetical case is that a little nuclear
proliferation—in this case, from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia—could
undo a considerable amount of American diplomacy and might well
tip the balance toward dragging Washington into war. This set of
observations suggests that nuclear terrorism, per se, may no longer
be our biggest worry. Instead, the greater danger would be that
with more nuclear and nuclear-ready states, the coalitions needed
to check or undo nuclear terrorist efforts would be too few to be
effective and the willingness of countries to toy with mortal strategic
combat too great for existing efforts to keep them in check. The
insufficient interest of states in fighting nuclear terrorism and their
interest in strategic combat, moreover, may be mutually reinforcing.
As states fail to do what is needed to stem nuclear terror, more will
sense the weakness of large powers and thus be more inclined to
risk nuclear brinksmanship themselves. This, in turn, would tend to
reduce the willingness of nuclear-capable states to open up their own
nuclear activities in order to ferret out possible terrorist schemes or
proliferation networks.

46

Can Proliferation Be Stopped?
This is not good news, but it is hardly inevitable. Three things, in
particular, could improve matters greatly. First, much more can be
done to reduce the production and accessibility of weapons-usable
plutonium and uranium. Terrorists seeking to explode a nuclear
device need not acquire very much material: The crudest nuclear
mechanism would only require 60 kilograms of highly enriched
uranium, divided into two pieces, with one dropped upon the other
from a height of as little as 10 feet. A plutonium bomb would require
more sophistication, but Dr. Khan has made such devices easier to
build by making a workable engineering design much more widely
available. Even if such bombs had only a one-kiloton yield—a
fraction of the explosive power of the bombs used on Japan in World
War II—the effects on a densely populated city would be terrible. A
recent analysis of such an attack by the Natural Resources Defense
Council, in which a one-kiloton bomb was used in San Francisco,
resulted in estimates that 26,000 people would be killed and
another 10,000 would be injured—casualties an order of magnitude
greater than the deaths on September 11. In the United States and
Russia alone, there are tens of thousands of bombs-worth of highly
enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium stored as surplus.
Meanwhile, over 40,000 weapons-worth of weapons-usable civilian
plutonium is being stored in Europe, India, and Japan. As President
Bush has pointed out, none of this material or the means to make it is
necessary to produce nuclear energy, and all of it can bring nations
within days of having nuclear weapons of their own. Fortunately,
safer nuclear fuels, unsuitable for weapons, are readily available; an
effort to use them is urgently needed and imminently doable.
Second, we must be willing to act on first indications and early
intelligence. Consider the A. Q. Khan network. We knew about
some of the key actors there, not weeks ago, not years ago, but
decades ago. We did not pursue what we knew. Many of the same
names that are part of the present proliferation problem appeared
in the 1981 book, The Islamic Bomb—the first names have sometimes
changed, but the last names remain the same, as one generation has
passed on the business to the next. For more than 2 decades, those
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who were engaged in helping Pakistan secure the bomb, and who
worked with Dr. Khan to help him distribute this knowledge, were
not questioned about their activities. Given the ease with which a
nuclear weapon can now be made—requiring less time, money,
and manpower than ever before—we no longer have the luxury
of waiting to act.
Third, more should be done to raise the political and economic costs
of acquiring nuclear arms or coming within weeks of doing so. The
most important thing is to start reading the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty properly. It calls for the sharing of nuclear technology, but
only in conformity with the treaty’s prohibitions against doing
anything to encourage or assist nonweapons states in getting nuclear
weapons. President Bush is one of the very few American presidents
(the others being Presidents Ford and Carter) to try to spell out
what “in conformity” means. On February 11, 2004, the president
laid out seven worthy proposals that would restrict or reduce the
number of nations making weapons-usable plutonium or uranium.
These proposals deserve greater support both within the
United States and internationally. They include taking direct action
against proliferation networks using the same techniques we use to
fight terrorism; strengthening the laws and international controls
that govern proliferation; expanding efforts to keep dangerous
materials out of the wrong hands; preventing countries like North
Korea and Iran from producing weapons-grade nuclear material
while pretending to work only on peaceful, civilian nuclear energy
programs; and taking measures to make the IAEA stronger, more
legitimate, and more decisive.
Several additional steps should be taken to sustain the
president’s proposals. First, we should view additional large civilian
nuclear projects—including nuclear power and desalinization
plants, large research reactors, and regional fuel-cycle centers—as
illegitimate under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty if they are
not privately financed or approved after an open international
bidding process against less risky alternatives. This would not only
spotlight countries like Iran that refused to allow non-nuclear energy
alternatives to compete openly to supply their electrical power needs;
it would also discourage the United States and allied governments
from building large nuclear commercialization projects and subsidi48

zing nuclear power with billions of dollars, as was supported in the
energy bill of 2005.
Second, we should get as many declared nuclear weapons states
as possible formally to agree not to redeploy nuclear weapons onto
any other state’s soil in peacetime and not to tolerate any other
nation’s attempt to do so. This could help thwart rumored schemes
to have Pakistan legally transfer nuclear weapons under its control
to Saudi Arabia, or North Korea’s threat to transfer nuclear weapons
to other states. It also could help establish restraints over nuclear
weapons states that have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (India, Pakistan, and Israel) and allow the United States to get
credit for what it has already begun to do—withdraw its unnecessary
overseas basing of obsolete tactical nuclear weapons.
Finally, we should encourage the United Nations (UN) to adopt
a set of country-neutral rules against any nation that the IAEA and
the UN Security Council do not clearly find in full compliance with
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Rather than wait for either of
these bodies to find a specific country in clear violation of the treaty
and then impose particular sanctions—something these bodies are
increasingly loath to do—the United States and its allies should spell
out in advance the minimal steps to be taken against any country not
clearly in full compliance. This recommendation would reverse the
present dynamic by making it the default position of the IAEA and
the Security Council to encourage complying members to take action
against states that defy the rules.
A New Pillar.
These additional measures may seem ambitious. But they build
on what President Bush and our allies have been doing—namely,
working to establish a third major security pillar to international
relations. Two pillars dominated the last 4 centuries of international
politics. The first pillar is freedom of commerce, which gave rise to
a common international usage against piracy. The second pillar is
the humane treatment of people, which produced an international
common usage against slave-trading. These pillars have justified
a significant number of wars and alliances, and have powerfully
shaped modern international relations.
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What remains to be done, and urgently, is to create a third pillar
pertaining to the further spread of strategic arms, particularly nuclear
weapons. Just as piracy and slave-trading can only operate outside
the protection of international law, so must the illicit trade of nuclear
weapons-related goods be considered out of bounds. Ultimately,
this will entail a major reorientation of international affairs. This task
will not be easy. The alternative to moving in this direction, though,
is far grimmer—slipping into the kind of chaos that prevailed in
1914, when a single anarchist’s bullet set off a series of strategic wars
that nearly snuffed out Western civilization. With nuclear weapons
all around or on the ready, this is hardly a condition that anyone,
even the strongest of nations, can sanely entertain.
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SECTION II
NEW PROLIFERATION WORRIES

CHAPTER 4
MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION
AND THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME
Mitchell Kugler
This presentation has three key conclusions: 1) There need not be
friction between the intersection of the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) and international missile defense cooperation; 2) To
the extent such friction exists, it is being generated by some supporters
of the MTCR, though there are many people—myself included—
who regard themselves both as supporters of missile defense and
the MTCR; and, 3) To the extent a conflict between missile defense
and the MTCR is generated—needlessly, in my view—it will be the
MTCR that suffers.
Along with many others, I spent much time during the Clinton
presidency working in support of missile defense. In 1997 I was
given an opportunity to run a new subcommittee on the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee, whose principal focus was on
what we thought of as the “strategic basket” of issues: missile defense,
arms control, proliferation, export controls, and strategic deterrence.
Under Senator Thad Cochran’s chairmanship, we looked into each
of these areas, shifting our attention occasionally among the various
elements of the “strategic basket” while remaining faithful to the
overall outlines of the basket.
Senator Cochran quite consciously defined the elements of this
“strategic basket,” after reflection on why missile defense was not
making greater progress. Of course, the Clinton administration’s
absolute hostility to missile defense was a significant element of the
lack of progress, but the absence of a coherent strategy by missile
defense supporters allowed the administration to inhibit progress
unfettered by significant opposition.
So we began in 1997 with a string of hearings on missile
proliferation which, I should note, would not have been possible
without the work of Dennis Ward and a Legis Fellow whose services
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I was sharing with the office of Senator Jon Kyl, John Rood, whose
findings were captured in The Proliferation Primer, a 1998 majority
report of Senator Cochran’s subcommittee. We focused so much
on proliferation because missile defense proponents were in the
habit of giving lengthy speeches on the various missile defense
architectures they found attractive without explaining why they were
convinced of the need for missile defense. By failing to make clear
the fundamental need for missile defense, we were failing to attract
sufficient support.
In looking back at the Primer, it strikes me that so little has changed
in the nearly 8 years since it was published. Proliferation from Russia
and China continues. What was then emerging as a serious threat,
was noted as such in the Primer, and has now fully emerged—the
phenomenon of rogue to rogue proliferation—not only continues,
but shows little signs of abating.
And, of course, all of this has occurred under the regime of the
MTCR. In fact, more countries have ballistic missile technology now
than when the regime began. We could have an endless debate about
whether in the absence of the MTCR still more would have had such
technology, or whether those that possess missile technology would
have had even more advanced technology than they currently
possess, but that debate would miss the point: However wellintentioned and well-executed, the MTCR has not, and will not, stop
the spread of missile technology. At best, it can, on occasion, slow it
down; at worst, it can lull us into a false sense of security—that is,
a mindset of “as it is written, so it shall be,” with little regard to the
facts.
Consider what the Director of Central Intelligence’s (DCI) JulyDecember 1996 report, “The Acquisition of Technology Relating to
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Advanced Conventional
Munitions”, said then:
• Nonproliferation . . . regimes can be deceived by determined
proliferators.
• During the last half of 1996, China was the most significant
supplier of WMD-related goods and technology to foreign
countries. The Chinese provided a tremendous variety of
assistance to both Iran’s and Pakistan’s ballistic missile
programs.
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• Russia supplied a variety of ballistic missile-related goods to
foreign countries during the reporting period, especially to
Iran.
Now consider some of the missile-related points in the DCI’s
latest report covering the period January 1-June 30, 2002:
• Chinese entities continued to provide Pakistan with missilerelated technical and material assistance during the reporting
period . . . . In addition, firms in China have provided dualuse missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to
several other countries of proliferation concern—such as Iran,
Libya, and to a lesser extent, North Korea.
• Russian entities during the reporting period continued to
supply a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical
know-how to countries such as Iran, India, and China. Iran’s
earlier success in gaining technology and materials from
Russian entities has helped to accelerate Iranian development
of the Shaab-3 medium range ballistic missile (MRBM), and
continuing Russian entity assistance most likely supports
Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran’s
self-sufficiency in missile production.
• Throughout the first half of 2002, North Korea continued
to export significant ballistic missile-related equipment,
components, materials, and technical expertise to the Middle
East, South Asia, and North Africa. P’yongyang attaches high
priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles,
equipment, and related technology. Exports of ballistic missiles
and related technology are one of the North’s major sources
of hard currency, which fuel continued missile development
and production.
How much has actually changed? It is important to understand
just what the threat is and what it is not. Countries are not the threat;
they are simply the threat’s manifestation. The threat, in ballistic
missile terms, is proliferation. So while on occasion we will eliminate
a ballistic missile threat from one country or another, as has recently
been done so successfully in Iraq, over time we should expect other
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countries to emerge as ballistic missile successors. This will happen
despite the presence and best efforts of the MTCR. And it stands to
reason that this will occur as hostile states seek methods by which to
threaten—coerce, deter, call it what you will—the United States, its
deployed forces, allies, and friends.
And thus the need for missile defense—again, despite the best
efforts of the MTCR. More importantly, the need for international
cooperation on missile defense, particularly in light of the Bush
administration’s entirely new missile defense policy to protect
not only the United States and deployed forces, but also allies and
friends.
In fact, international cooperation already has begun. The United
States is—and has been—working with Israel on the Arrow interceptor
for quite some time, and enhanced co-production of the interceptor
is beginning in the United States. We are working with Japan on the
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), and Japan has noted publicly its interest
in working on a larger booster for the SM-3. We are working with
Italy and Germany on the Medium Extended Air Defense System
(MEADS) program, and with the United Kingdom on the upgrade
to the early warning radar at Fylingdales. It appears that a similar
upgrade, in cooperation with Denmark, will also soon begin on the
Thule early warning radar. The bilateral missile defense relationship
also appears to be proceeding quickly with Poland, as does the
multilateral missile defense work with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), which, in a recent major move forward, added
the protection of population centers to its considerations for missile
defense. So there is cooperation with six countries—Israel, England,
Japan, Germany, Italy, and Denmark; expanding cooperation with
NATO; and imminent cooperation with Poland, which is rapidly
emerging as one of America’s closest allies.
It is only with Israel, on Arrow cooperation, that there have been
MTCR issues. I will take a moment now to comment on the most
recent Arrow issue.
Israel is going to test the Arrow interceptor twice in the United
States in the near future. As conducting a test in the United States
is a difficult and expensive endeavor, Israel will ship four Arrow
interceptors here to ensure the availability of two spares, should
there be any problems with the test articles.
56

The Israelis were informed, however, that in the event their spares
were not used, they would not be able to return them to Israel because
the United States would, in sending them back, be transferring MTCR
“category 1” items. Transferring category 1 items, while permissible
under the MTCR, is considered anathema by most of the regime’s
supporters.
Now, consider for a moment a few relevant facts: Israel already
manufactures the Arrow interceptor. Israel has already deployed
the Arrow interceptor. The interceptors the United States would be
sending back to Israel were already in the possession of the Israelis
themselves. In sum, shipping the two spare Arrows back to Israel
would not in any way, shape, or form enhances the missile technology
of Israel. But, unfortunately, this most recent case has demonstrated
that oftentimes there exists little room for the intrusion of common
sense upon the MTCR.
After examining a variety of options—to include even storing
the spare Arrow interceptors at sea so they are not technically in the
United States before shipment back to Israel—the “solution” found
is for the Israelis to be in “possession” (whatever that means) of the
spare Arrows at all times when they are in the United States. So when
these spares are shipped back to Israel, it will be Israel shipping to
Israel, not the United States shipping to Israel.
This example is considered to be a “success” by many MTCR
supporters. Though there are others, myself included, who find this
to be the ultimate in form over substance. Indeed, I suspect this odd
example should be more than sufficient for other MTCR members
seeking to use U.S. actions as justification for their proliferation
activities, otherwise known as “exports.”
Surely supporters of the MTCR must acknowledge that this makes
no sense. Would it have not been better, not to mention honest, to
state simply that Israel already possesses the Arrow interceptor and
the spares being shipped back do nothing to enhance Israel’s missile
capabilities? That shipping another nation’s property hardly can be
construed reasonably as violating the MTCR? Not to mention the
fact that the United States has been supporting Israel, financially and
technologically, in building Arrow? Or even that the United States
doesn’t consider missile defense to be governed by the MTCR?
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Protecting the United States could, perhaps, be done only from
the territory of the United States. Anything is possible. But the truth
of the matter is that anything beyond a rudimentary defense requires
assets placed outside of the United States. Placing assets outside of
the United States, though, will not necessarily cause conflict with
the MTCR. Sensors in space or radars in other countries will not
conflict with the MTCR, nor will battle management or command
and control assets. But what about interceptors?
I will briefly survey examples of potential international missile
defense cooperation, some of which might be managed successfully
under the MTCR.
1. Interceptor cooperation falling below MTCR thresholds. It is hard
to imagine that the administration, having so recently divested
itself of the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty—which prohibited
substantive international cooperation—would now allow the
MTCR to substitute for portions (i.e., Articles IX and X) of that
defunct treaty. Or that the Bush administration would, in limiting
interceptor cooperation to that permitted by the MTCR, essentially
impose upon itself the kind of “demarcation” between permissible
and impermissible cooperation that was so bitterly opposed in years
past during the “theater/strategic demarcation” debates under the
ABM Treaty.
2. Basing U.S. interceptors on foreign soil but under the control of the
United States. Some of my friends with a different view than mine
insist that providing missile defense for host nations in exchange
for using their territory to base our interceptors should be more
than sufficient for the host nation. In some instances this may be a
reasonable trade. In many instances, the basing of interceptors will
protect not only foreign soil, but also deployed U.S. forces, while at
the same time enhancing protection for the United States itself.
3. Receiving technological assistance from our allies and friends. There
is no denying that the United States has done a tremendous amount
of research and development on missile defense, far more than any
other country. But to therefore assume that no other nation could
contribute its technological expertise usefully would be arrogant in
the extreme. In my current position, I spend a substantial amount of
time with defense companies in other countries, and I can assure you
that in every one of these companies, I work with people every bit
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as talented as the best in American industry. As hardware follows
know-how, without question the MTCR will be an impediment
here.
4. Transferring interceptors to others. Without question, the greatest
potential for missile defense/MTCR conflict comes from this option.
Some seem unwilling to accept the fact that many of our allies view
themselves as sovereign nations with a responsibility for their own
defense. As sovereigns, they may well object to continued U.S. control
of interceptors on their soil rather than transferring the interceptors
to them for their use—as we already do with so many other weapons
systems.
While currently the MTCR is inhibiting Arrow cooperation in
particular, the fact remains that Arrow is further along in terms of
international cooperation than most of our other programs. The time
for transferring other hardware will soon be upon us, along with the
choices that invariably will be faced if the MTCR is left as it is now.
There are two broad options to choose from, each obviously
having many permutations. We can:
1. Declare as a matter of policy that missile defense cooperation will be
excluded from the purview of the MTCR. The United States has, after
all, managed to export the D5 missile and cruise missiles despite the
MTCR. Has this brought the regime to its knees? Of course it has not.
But the regime has managed to continue, even though the United
States is transferring an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM)
capable of being nuclear-armed to the United Kingdom. Why, then,
should transferring missile defense to the United Kingdom, or, for
that matter, any other ally, pose a problem? The simple fact is that
the object of the MTCR is to reduce as much as possible the flow
of missile technology to those we don’t want to have such technology.
The purpose of missile defense is, among other things, for protection
from the failures of the MTCR. These purposes are complementary
and should not be set in opposition.
2. Restrict cooperation to that permitted by the MTCR. In so doing,
we would occupy vast amounts of the bureaucracy’s time and effort
in what would be a “Groundhog Day” of missile defense fights.
On each and every occasion that some form of cooperation was
proposed, proponents would line up their arguments and opponents
would be energized by having another opportunity to draw the line
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on the primacy of the MTCR over missile defense cooperation. In
some cases, cooperation would be denied; in others, as has already
been the case, we would see cooperation reduced. Of course, as cited
already on Arrow, in still other cases, some cute interpretation of the
MTCR might be found such that we remain “compliant” with the
regime. But I wonder of what value such a regime would be if its
ideas are to be made as infinitely elastic as the government’s lexicon
in George Orwell’s 1984?
Colleagues of mine with opposing views frequently insist that a
unilateral policy decision on the part of the United States to interpret
the MTCR as permitting international missile defense cooperation
will only throw open the door for any country—and these colleagues
always stress “any”—to act however it pleases in exporting missile
technology. Perhaps that is true. But I do not think so.
The menace of WMD delivered by ballistic missiles is well known
today. It is more than a theory; we have seen ballistic missiles used
just as we have witnessed the actions of several nations in pursuing
WMD to seat atop their missiles. Countries today know—without
needing the MTCR to inform them—of the danger of exporting missile
technology and know-how without regard for the consequences.
Even if there were no MTCR, the United States—and like-minded
nations—would be perfectly capable of doing their utmost to stem
missile proliferation. So it is entirely possible that leaders of some
nations will suggest that their missile proliferation is no different from
that practiced by the United States, albeit ours under the “guise” of
“missile defense cooperation.” The United States should not accept
this type of statement as having even a shred of legitimacy.
Nations may well seek to justify their missile proliferation in this
manner. But in so doing, they will be offering an excuse for actions
they otherwise would have taken anyway. At most, the United States
will be providing a new excuse for old and illegitimate actions on the
part of proliferators.
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CHAPTER 5
A FRESH EXAMINATION OF THE PROLIFERATION
DANGERS OF LIGHT WATER REACTORS
Victor Gilinsky
LWRs Become the Nuclear Power Workhorse around the World.
From the beginning of the nuclear age, American efforts to shape
the worldwide development of nuclear energy were driven, in part,
by U.S. interest in limiting the possibilities for diversion of civilian
facilities to military purposes. U.S. policy went through stages, at
each one of which it appeared as if a particular technological or
institutional approach to nuclear energy could tame it sufficiently
to allow worldwide commercial use without spreading access to
nuclear weapons. But in time, the real world poked holes in one
rationale after another. The subject of this chapter involves one of
these technological policy initiatives, the consequences of which we
are living with today—encouraging the spread, starting in the 1960s,
of U.S. light water reactor (LWR) technology as the basic nuclear
power workhorse throughout the world.1
In the 1950s, before the advent of nuclear power plants, the
United States tried to control the uranium market by buying up
uranium at high prices. This naturally encouraged exploration that
demonstrated that uranium was plentiful and negated the U.S. effort
at control. With easy access to uranium but lacking indigenous
uranium enrichment facilities, Britain, France, and Canada opted for
reactor designs that utilized natural uranium fuel and heavy water or
graphite as the neutron moderator. In the late 1950s and early 1960s,
they interested Italy, Japan, India, and other countries in heading
in this direction. Not only did this threaten America’s competitive
position, but it also threatened to spread a type of reactor that lent
itself easily to production of plutonium. In fact, the first British
and French power reactors were based on their military plutonium
production reactors.
America’s advantage was two-fold. The United States had
developed a compact, and therefore relatively low-cost, LWR design
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based on a naval propulsion reactor design. And the United States
had invested heavily in gaseous diffusion plants in Tennessee,
Kentucky, and Ohio to enrich uranium for weapons.
The LWR could only operate on enriched uranium, that is,
uranium more concentrated in the active uranium-235 isotope than
natural uranium.2 By virtue of its huge enrichment capacity, the
United States had an effective monopoly on the production of this
fuel. Moreover, as the cost of the plants had been largely assigned to
the military budget, the United States decided to sell the stuff at low
prices that did not defray the massive investment. It was a price that
at the time no other country could even hope to offer in the future.
From the point of view of customers, it was a deal that was hard
to refuse, even if it came with U.S. control conditions. Ultimately,
the amount of engineering invested in these designs and the depth
of experience with them overwhelmed any conceptual advantages
other reactor types may have had. While not the exclusive choice—
Canada and India continued developing the natural uranium/heavy
water designs that evolved into the CANDU reactor—the LWR
became the standard reactor type around the world. In the late 1960s,
France switched to LWRs, and Britain did later. Other European
manufacturers in Germany and Sweden chose LWRs. The Soviets
eventually did, too. There are now over 350 LWRs in operation in the
world today.3
From the point of view of proliferation, the advantages of the
LWR were considerable as compared with natural uranium-fueled
reactors. U.S. policymakers thought that the most important security
advantage of LWRs was that the LWR customers knew that they
risked losing their reactor fuel supply if they misused the reactors
for military purposes. There appeared to be detailed technical
advantages, as well. For a given size of reactor, the LWRs produced less
plutonium. The plutonium was, generally speaking, more difficult to
extract from the LWR fuel by chemical reprocessing because the fuel
is irradiated for a longer period of time, i.e., it has a higher fuel burnup, and hence is more radioactive, necessitating more shielding of
the separation process. LWRs also had to be shut down for refueling
which makes for easier oversight of the fuel, whereas most natural
uranium reactors are refueled online and continually, so it is harder
to keep track of the fuel elements. It was widely believed through the
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1970s—even by the top people in the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in Vienna—that it was not usable at all.
It is important to correct one widely held belief about LWR spent
fuel. The isotopic characteristics of spent fuel from LWRs are about
the same as that of spent fuel from heavy water reactors such as
the CANDU, even though the LWR burn-up is much higher. This
is because of the differences in the enrichment levels of the two
types of fuel. The weapons usability of plutonium from either fully
irradiated LWR spent fuel or fully irradiated CANDU spent fuel
would be comparable.4
Even the intrinsic technical advantages of the LWRs themselves
do not now appear as significant as they once did. While LWRs do
not produce as much plutonium as natural uranium-fueled reactors
of the same size, the modern LWRs are so much bigger than the
older natural uranium plants that they are also prolific plutonium
producers.5 A standard size LWR with an electrical generating
capacity of about 1,000 megawatts produces about 250 kilograms of
plutonium per year. (That has to be compared with the nominal five
kilograms of plutonium per warhead.)
Worldwide Spread of Enrichment Technology Eases
Access to Nuclear Weapons.
In any case, the proliferation benefits of worldwide deployment
of LWRs gradually attenuated. Just as the market for uranium
encouraged exploration that negated U.S. control, so the spread of
LWRs and the consequent market for enrichment encouraged the
reinvention by others of the gaseous diffusion enrichment process—
originally developed by the United States during World War II—as
well as the development of the gas centrifuge enrichment process.
Together, these developments broke the U.S. monopoly on the
supply of enrichment for LWRs.
In particular, France built a large gaseous diffusion plant, and
the United Kingdom (UK), West Germany, and the Netherlands
established the Urenco consortium which supplies enrichment
services from gas centrifuge plants in each of these countries. While
the gaseous diffusion plants in France and the United States continue
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to operate, both countries have announced plans to replace them with
new gas centrifuge plants. Moreover, Russia long ago abandoned
the gaseous diffusion process in favor of gas centrifuge and is now a
major competitor for enrichment supply on the international market.
Other countries which already rely or plan to rely on nuclear power
to a significant extent—notably Japan and China,respectively—also
have built gas centrifuge plants, although at present they do not
supply enrichment services to the international market.
Global attention has been focused recently on the proliferation
implications of centrifuge enrichment as a consequence of the
revelations about Pakistan’s role in spreading this technology. The
activities of A. Q. Khan and his associates in trading the centrifuge
technology he stole from Urenco to Iran, North Korea, Libya, and
possibly other countries has underlined the “front-end” vulnerability
of the LWR once-through fuel cycle.
An important advantage of the gas centrifuge process is that
it is much less energy intensive than gaseous diffusion. The trend
towards using gas centrifuge instead of gaseous diffusion for
commercial enrichment also has been driven by improvements in
centrifuge performance. The newer models are much more reliable
and have a larger unit enrichment capacity. Gas centrifuge plants
also are inherently much more flexible than gaseous diffusion plants
to accommodate different combinations of feed enrichment, tails
(waste) concentration, and product enrichment. Large centrifuge
enrichment plants can be thought of as many smaller centrifuge
plants in parallel, so the small modular units can be shifted around
fairly easily, or one can stand by itself. In other words, gas centrifuge
technology lends itself to small-scale operation.
Unfortunately, these characteristics also make the gas centrifuge
process a much bigger proliferation risk than, say, gaseous diffusion
technology. That applies both to (1) the possibility that the owner
of an existing declared low enriched uranium (LEU) plant would
modify it to also produce heavy enriched uranium (HEU), and (2)
that someone would construct a small clandestine HEU plant.
It is now generally appreciated that gas centrifuge plants for LEU
can fairly easily be turned into plants for HEU. It is less appreciated
that LEU at, say, 4 percent enrichment, is about 80 percent of the way
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to HEU. It takes comparatively little additional “separative work” to
upgrade LEU to HEU. It would be difficult for the IAEA to keep close
enough track of all the LEU to stay ahead of any such conversion.
Having a gas centrifuge plants producing LEU makes it much
easier to construct and operate a clandestine one. The presence of
the larger plant would mask many of the intelligence indicators and
environmental indications of a clandestine one so it would harder to
find.
But even in the absence of any commercial enrichment—in the
case of a country with one or more stand alone LWRs—the presence
of LWRs means that a substantial supply of fresh LWR fuel would
also be present at times. That such fresh fuel can provide a source
of uranium for clandestine enrichment is another possibility that
has received essentially no attention in proliferation writings. Since
the fuel is already LEU, a much smaller gas centrifuge plant would
suffice to raise the enrichment to bomb levels than would be the case
if the starting point was natural uranium. By starting with such LEU
fuel pellets, which are uranium oxide (UO2), the enricher would
be able to skip the first five processes required to go from uranium
ore to uranium hexafluoride gas, the material on which the gas
centrifuge operate. To go from the uranium oxide pellets to uranium
hexafluoride, the would-be bombmaker would crush the pellets and
react the powder with fluorine gas. Suitably processed, the LEU
pellets could provide feed for clandestine enrichment.
Worldwide Spread of Reprocessing Technology
for Plutonium Separation.
By contrast to the heavy attention recently directed at the
possibility of clandestine uranium enrichment, there has been
relatively little attention directed at the possibility of clandestine
reprocessing to separate plutonium from LWR spent fuel. It is a
principal concentration of this chapter.
In previous debates on the subject, the point was made that (1)
plutonium contained in LWR spent fuel is unsuitable for weapons;
that anyhow (2) anything short of a high-investment commercial
reprocessing plant—beyond the means and capabilities of most
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countries—would not provide access to the plutonium contained in
the LWR spent fuel; and (3) such reprocessing would be detected by
international inspectors. We believe these bars to using LWRs as a
source of plutonium for weapons are very much exaggerated.
Partial cores removed from an LWR after one fuel cycle (rather
than the conventional three) have lower burnup and hence contain
plutonium with a higher Pu-239 content than the plutonium in
spent fuel of the full design burnup. Such plutonium is sometime
called fuel grade, as distinguished from weapons grade at one end
and reactor grade at the other. In practical effect, such plutonium is
near-weapons grade. The characteristics of simple fission weapons
using this material are not very different from those using weapons
grade plutonium. The fuel grade plutonium is markedly superior
for weapons use than reactor grade plutonium from spent fuel of the
design burnup. The arguments surrounding the usability of LWR
plutonium for weapons deal with the high burnup reactor grade
material and so are irrelevant for the present discussion.
Reprocessing of LWR spent fuel is not particularly difficult for
a country with modest technological capabilities. Witness North
Korea’s reprocessing of its plutonium production reactor spent fuel.
While reprocessing LWR fuel is harder than reprocessing low burnup
natural uranium fuel, the feasibility of small-scale, and possibly
“quick and dirty” reprocessing of LWR fuel has been known for 30
years.
It is more difficult to make categorical statements regarding
the ability of IAEA inspectors to detect a hypothetical clandestine
reprocessing plant. Such a plant could likely remain hidden until it
is put to use—until spent fuel is withdrawn from a reactor, and the
reprocessing operation begins. Even if the start of operation would
be detected promptly, which is by no means sure, especially as to
location, it is possible that the operator of the clandestine plant could
manage to produce militarily significant quantities of plutonium and
weapons before the international system could react effectively. To
place these issues in context, we first summarize the evolution of U.S.
policy on the proliferation implications of commercial reprocessing.
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1974 Indian Nuclear Explosion Sparks Policy Debate
over LWRs and Reprocessing.
The reasons for addressing these matters now—the reason
for a fresh look—are that firmly held but erroneous views on the
facts underlie important U.S. policies on LWRs. Until 2001, the
State Department defended putting LWRs in North Korea as part
of the 1994 U.S.-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
Agreed Framework on the grounds that LWRs were “proliferation
resistant”—that North Korea would find it difficult, if not impossible,
to reprocess LWR spent fuel. Even now, that U.S.-supported project
is only suspended, not terminated.
The State Department’s Russian counterparts made similar
arguments, and continue to make them, in supporting the Russian
construction of Bushehr reactors in Iran. And even in arguing
against the Russian power reactor project at Bushehr on proliferation
grounds, the United States says only that the civilian project could
provide cover for a clandestine Iranian bomb effort, not that the plant
itself is inherently dangerous.
The LWR issues also have much wider significance. The idea
that plutonium from LWRs is unusable for bombs is an essential
underpinning of the commercial drive for worldwide deployment
of LWRs.
It has long been understood that the most difficult hurdle for a
country seeking nuclear weapons is getting the nuclear explosive
materials—either HEU or plutonium. By comparison, the design and
fabrication of the nuclear weapon itself poses a less difficult obstacle.
That is why the technologies that extract the nuclear explosive
material—uranium enrichment and reprocessing—are designated as
“sensitive” technologies in the polite international discussions over
nuclear controls against proliferation. In plain language, “sensitive”
means dangerous.
The 1974 Indian nuclear explosion alerted the United States to the
ease with which a country that had reactors and reprocessing could
progress to nuclear weapons.6 It also alerted those concerned with
the spread of nuclear weapons of the extent to which reprocessing
technology had spread and was spreading further. Even though
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it was equally dangerous, the United States had never restricted
its reprocessing technology the way it had restricted enrichment
technology. Perhaps this was because the United States could
hope to maintain a commercial monopoly on uranium enrichment
whereas that was unrealistic in the case of reprocessing. It was
assumed in the early days of nuclear power that uranium was scarce
and that reprocessing was an essential part of all reactor operation.
In the background was the near-universal notion that the future
of nuclear power lay in plutonium-fueled reactors, that uraniumburning reactors were just a transition phase, so cutting off access to
plutonium was thought tantamount to putting a lid on the expansion
of nuclear energy.7
The United States revealed extensive information on reprocessing
at the 1955 Geneva Atoms for Peace Conference. Under the Atoms
for Peace program, the United States trained many foreigners in
reprocessing technology at U.S. national laboratories, such as the Oak
Ridge National Laboratory and the Argonne National Laboratory
that did pioneering work in reprocessing. That is where the Indian
and Pakistani reprocessing experts got their start.8 The U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission, and later the Department of Energy, published
encyclopedic technical volumes on the subject as well as detailed
engineering reports that explicated reprocessing “know how.”9
None of this was in any way prohibited by the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as it was then universally interpreted,
even though it was at odds with the purpose of the treaty. According
to the prevailing interpretation of the treaty, nuclear technology
that was labeled by its owner as “peaceful,” had some possible
civilian application, and was subject to inspection by the IAEA, was
deemed to be legitimate. This was so even if the technology—say,
reprocessing or enrichment—brought the owner to the threshold of
nuclear weapons. At that time, the real role of the IAEA inspectors
was to legitimize trade rather than to find wrong-doing. The view
was that international nuclear gentlemen did not inquire too deeply
into the affairs of other nuclear gentlemen, and in any case, kept
what they learned to themselves.10
In its public pronouncements the U.S. Government more or less
stuck to the position that the NPT legitimized all “peaceful” nuclear
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activities. At the same time, the government could not ignore the
dire security implications—post-1974 Indian nuclear explosion—of
unrestricted commerce in nuclear technology, even if it was subject to
IAEA inspection. France was then negotiating with Pakistan for the
export of a reprocessing plant, and Germany was pursuing a package
deal with Brazil that involved both reprocessing and enrichment
technology.11 A complication at the time was that France was not yet
an NPT member. To help introduce a common set of export guidelines
that included “restraint” in the export of “sensitive” technology, the
United States organized the Nuclear Suppliers Group of nuclear
exporting countries, initially 15 of them. This group operated, and
continues to operate, as a kind of extra-treaty backstop for the NPT.
The main concern at the time of its founding was that technology
providing access to plutonium as uranium enrichment technology
was still tightly held.12 There were some important U.S. successes,
among them stopping the French sale of a reprocessing plant to
Pakistan, which France finally abandoned in 1978.13
What the United States should do about reprocessing and
plutonium use, both domestically and internationally, became an
election year issue in 1976. President Gerald Ford issued a nuclear
policy statement that plutonium was at the root of the security
problem associated with nuclear energy. Once separated from the
radioactive waste contained in spent fuel, the material could rapidly
be put to military use. President Ford stated that reprocessing—that
is, chemical separation of plutonium—”should not proceed unless
there is a sound reason to conclude that the world community
can effectively overcome the associated risks of proliferation.” In
perhaps his boldest step, he announced that the United States would
act domestically in a way that was consistent with what we asked of
others. The United States, in its energy planning, would no longer
assume future reliance on plutonium fuel. He said that he believed
that we could make use of nuclear energy, and even increase reliance
on it, with this security restriction. “We must be sure,” he said, “that
all nations recognize that the U.S. believes that nonproliferation
objectives must take precedence over economic and energy benefits,
if a choice must be made.” To this day, U.S. policy on spent fuel
assumes that it will be disposed of in a repository on a “once through”
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basis—that is, without reprocessing—although the current reason
for this probably has more to do with economics than with security.
Gerald Ford lost the 1976 election to Jimmy Carter, and, as
a consequence, it is Carter’s name that usually attaches to the
origin of a restrictive U.S. nonproliferation policy with respect to
plutonium. Unfortunately, President Carter’s erratic style and his
administration’s tendency to equate saying something with doing
it left U.S. nonproliferation policy in a confused state that did not
engender respect either at home or abroad.14 At first, Carter took a rigid
antiproliferation stance on a number of key issues, but abandoned
these positions one after another when they met with domestic and
international criticism, most particularly with respect to reprocessing
and future use of plutonium.15 Subsequent presidents watered down
further U.S. policy on disapproval of foreign reprocessing so that
it is now barely perceptible except as regards countries of direct
and near-term proliferation concern and which the United States
considers hostile.
What has remained, however, is the view—agreed to over the
entire spectrum of nuclear opinion—that if commercial reprocessing
is not present in a country, then the reactors themselves do not pose
a proliferation danger. Gerald Ford drew a sensible distinction
between what is too dangerous for the arteries of commerce (that
is, separated plutonium) and what in the circumstances was a
reasonably acceptable alternative (a once-through uranium fuel
cycle). Over time, the reasonably acceptable came to be described
as entirely satisfactory. This view, however, ignores some stubborn
technical facts that have been know for decades, but unfortunately
forgotten, about the ease and rapidity with which a country could
reprocess LWR spent fuel and about the usability of such plutonium
for bombs. That is the reason for a fresh look at this subject.
1976-1977 Ford-Carter Restrictive Policy on Commercial
Reprocessing Leads to Debate over Clandestine Reprocessing.
Generally speaking, the nuclear industry and the nuclear
bureaucracies in the Department of Energy and elsewhere did
not support the once-through nuclear fuel cycle that avoided
reprocessing. Ironically, industry saved a lot of money over the last
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nearly 30 years by adopting this approach, however reluctantly,
because commercial reprocessing and recycle of plutonium as
fuel is highly uneconomical.16 Mostly, the defense of commercial
reprocessing was based on the arguments that Ford and Carter had
exaggerated the dangers—that so long as the commercial activities
were subject to IAEA inspection (which went by, and continues to
go by, the misleading name of “safeguards”), there was nothing to
worry about. And, it was said in further defense of reprocessing,
that the plutonium from LWRs was unsuitable for bombs and was
therefore not a source of worry.17 Both of these points are wrong, and
we will devote special attention in this report to the latter one.
For the present, however, we are more interested in a different
line of argument against the Ford-Carter policy supporting a oncethrough fuel cycle. These critics argued that banning commercial
reprocessing would not provide any additional security because,
anyhow, it was easy to extract the plutonium from spent fuel using
small jerry-built plants that most countries could build quickly
and secretly. Although they did not put it that way, they argued,
in effect, that, if a country had nuclear power reactors, things were
much worse than the new Carter administration thought. 18 This line
of argument was based on an informal technical report written in
1977 by reprocessing experts at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory
that presented a design for a small, quickly-built simple reprocessing
plant that the designers thought could be hidden easily. 19 The
argument based on this report did not gain much traction because
the nuclear industry was reluctant to support an argument that, if
taken seriously, could lead to the conclusion that nuclear reactors
were, themselves, too dangerous to operate on a commercial basis.
And supporters of the once-through approach tended to write off the
significance of the Oak Ridge report in the context of the arguments
over allowing large-scale commercial reprocessing. The report may
have overstated to an extent the ease with which LWR spent fuel
could be reprocessed quickly and secretly, but it and a number of
other subsequent studies on small-scale and clandestine reprocessing
made an important point. It is that LWRs operating on a commercial
once-through fuel cycle—with no commercial reprocessing—are not
as safe a proposition from the point of view of proliferation as they
were made out to be.
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A Number of Studies on “Quick and Dirty” Clandestine
Reprocessing for Bombs Suggest This Is a Feasible Option.
There have been a number of studies on small-scale reprocessing,
but perhaps none that received comparable attention and none that
involved persons as prominent in the field as the 1977 Oak Ridge
study. The godfather of the study was Floyd Culler, then Oak Ridge
assistant director and a leading developer of PUREX technology. He
assembled a team to prove that a country with a minimal industrial
base could quickly and secretly build a small reprocessing plant
capable of extracting about a bomb’s worth of plutonium per day.
The response came in the previously-cited 1977 Oak Ridge
memorandum that presented a design for such a plant, together with
a flow sheet and equipment list with dimensions and specifications.
The main technical references were from standard textbooks and
handbooks.
The equipment is chosen with a several-month campaign in
mind rather than long-term operation so, for example, plastic pipe
can serve in places where steel pipe would be used in a commercial
plant. A plant diagram attached to the memorandum and keyed
to the equipment list shows the plant equipment layout from the
receiving pool for radioactive spent fuel to the metal reduction
furnaces for producing plutonium metal “buttons.”20 The structure
housing the entire operation would be about 130 feet long and much
less wide. Although they describe the plant as a “quick and dirty”
one, the designers went to some pains to contain the radioactive
wastes and to filter the effluents both for reasons of safety and to
avoid detection.
The study concluded the plant could be in operation 4 to 6
months from the start of construction, with the first 10 kilograms of
plutonium metal (about two bombs’ worth) produced about 1 week
after the start of operation. Once in operation, the small plant could
process about one PWR assembly per day, which translates into
production of about five kilograms of plutonium per day.
If one accepts this conclusion about the possible performance of
such a “quick and dirty plant” or something close to it, the implications
are very far-reaching concerning the risks posed by LWRs in
countries interested in obtaining nuclear weapons. There would be
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little chance of detecting such a plant until it was in operation and
spent fuel to be processed was missing from a power reactor storage
pool. Given the short process time—a few days from delivery of
spent fuel to plutonium metal—IAEA inspectors would have little
chance of detecting a diversion and start of reprocessing under the
current approach. From metal plutonium to weapon components is
a matter of days. The IAEA guidelines for LWR inspections assume
that from LWR spent fuel to metal weapons components takes about
1-3 months,21 but the Agency’s resource limitations and the resistance
of member countries keep the actual inspection frequency of LWR
inspections lower than once every 3 months. Therefore, if the Oak
Ridge design or something similar would work as planned—start
up quickly and then produce about a bomb’s worth of plutonium a
day—the operator could produce dozens of bombs before the IAEA
could count on detecting it, at least using the current inspection
approach.
This conclusion assumes, of course, that the reactor operator
cooperates with the would-be bombmakers. It also assumes that
weapon design and readiness for fabrication would be prepared in
advance. Both of the latter are difficult to detect and, when detected,
are often clouded in ambiguity. In any case, such detection in the
past has not led to drastic international action to halt nuclear activity
in the country. The history of nuclear activities in Iraq, North Korea,
and Iran suggests that the time-scale for international enforcement
actions is more typically on the order of years. The George W. Bush
administration’s tougher approach on “weapons of mass destruction”
and the preventive invasion of Iraq point in a different direction. But
what the lesson from that experience will be, and what policy will
emerge toward countries suspected of nuclear weapon ambitions,
is yet unclear. The difficulties of coping with post-invasion Iraq
suggest that the United States is likely to be slower on the trigger in
the future.
In view of the potentially far-reaching implications of the Oak
Ridge report, the General Accounting Office (GAO) prepared an
evaluation for Congress.22 The GAO examined reviews of the Oak
Ridge memorandum by five Federal agencies and a number of
individuals.23 It raised questions about how quickly the plant could
be built and to what extent it could be hidden, but concluded it
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was a credible possibility for an experienced group of reprocessing
engineers and operators. In other words, one cannot assume that a
country interested in nuclear weapons will be barred from extracting
militarily significant amounts of plutonium from its LWRs simply
because it lacks a commercial reprocessing capability.
On the question of detectability, since 1977 we have greatly
improved intelligence—for example, in the case of overhead
photography and chemical analysis of environmental samples. Yet
intelligence on Iraq’s nuclear program was caught flat-footed in 1991
(and, of course, the IAEA completely missed the weapons program)
and then was wildly off the mark in 2003. North Korea’s uranium
enrichment facilities have not been found. And Iran’s enrichment
plant was located only after a dissident Iranian group specified the
coordinates.24 There are probably more people around today skilled
in the arts of reprocessing, and they have more information to work
with. Additionally, we have learned that NPT membership does not
guarantee performance—Iraq and North Korea violated the Treaty,
and very likely Iran did as well.
Since the publication of the Oak Ridge report, other studies
have been published that also consider the issue of the credibility of
clandestine small-scale LWR reprocessing. The subject of clandestine
plutonium extraction was addressed in a 1995 Livermore report
which states that “plutonium can be separated from spent nuclear
fuel with modest facilities and equipment.”25 This tracks fairly closely
with the conclusions of the Oak Ridge study.
In 1996, a Sandia National Laboratories team produced a design
for a small plant for reprocessing LWR spent fuel quickly and
secretly.26 They characterized it as “. . . a relatively simple process
that might be operated by an adversarial group in makeshift or
temporary facilities such as a remotely located warehouse or a small
industrial plant.” The estimated preparation lead-time for producing
the first kilograms of plutonium employing a staff of six technicians
was about 8 months, which is even more optimistic than that of the
Oak Ridge team about 20 years earlier.
The Oak Ridge and Sandia proposals are both bare bones paper
designs about which some reservation is appropriate. Both processes
differ in some important respects from the standard PUREX process
flow sheet. Also, no information is provided on crucial matters such as
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control instrumentation. This is not a process that inexperienced, even
if competent, persons could handle easily. Spent fuel reprocessing is
among the most sophisticated chemical engineering processes and
making it work takes a good deal of know-how. But even the critics
of the practicality of the Oak Ridge design all thought that the highly
skilled and experienced Oak Ridge team could have made it work.
In this context, it is also worth mentioning a much earlier
commercial design that does not cut corners. In the late 1950s, the
Phillips Petroleum Company made a very detailed feasibility study
of a small PUREX plant designed to reprocess per day about onethird ton of LWR spent fuel. It was designed to handle spent fuel
whose burnup is roughly that of current LWR fuel after one refueling
cycle (as opposed to the normal three).27 The plant’s head end used
an underwater saw to free the fuel pins from the fuel assembly and
a mechanical shear to chop individual fuel pins into small pieces.
One of the striking features of the plant is its small size, about 65 feet
square.28
It is credible for states with an industrial base and nuclear
infrastructure needed to operate LWRs to construct and operate such
reprocessing plants “without cutting corners” to produce significant
quantities of plutonium as quickly as possible without detection.29
Whether or not a country might opt for a “quick and dirty design
facility,” it would have the possibility of building one with a lower
probability of malfunction and with smaller tell-tale releases.
Before we consider the policy implications of the possibility of
quick and dirty reprocessing for the use of LWRs, let us pursue the
question of the suitability of LWR plutonium for weapons.
Contrary to Conventional Wisdom, LWRs Can Be a Copious
Source of Near-Weapons Grade Plutonium Suitable for Bombs.
Since the beginning of the nuclear age, it has been difficult to
rationalize the widespread use of uranium-fueled reactors that—
inescapably—produce plutonium, which is one of the two key
nuclear explosives. The 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal plan, that required
“dangerous” nuclear activities to be used only under international
auspices, did contemplate that uranium-fueled reactors would be
in national hands. The authors’ rationale was that the plutonium
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produced by these reactors could be “denatured” to make it unusable
for military application. They did not spell out the scientific basis for
the denaturing they had in mind, but it appears to have been the idea
that the isotopic composition of plutonium formed in reactor fuel
that had been irradiated for an extended time would be unusable for
bombs. The notion is wrong, but it is understandable that it would
have appeared plausible at that early point.
During the World War II Manhattan Project, it was discovered
that just as a uranium-238 nucleus can absorb a neutron to form
plutonium-239, so the plutonium-239 can absorb a neutron to form
plutonium-240.30 The longer the uranium fuel is irradiated in a
reactor to form plutonium-239, the more of the plutonium-239 will
convert into plutonium-240. This isotope fissions spontaneously and
releases neutrons which tend to “pre-initiate” nuclear explosions as
soon as the mass of nuclear explosive is in a “critical” configuration.
It is this effect that made it impossible to use plutonium in a guntype nuclear device (as it is possible to do with uranium-235 and
was, in fact, the design used in the Hiroshima bomb). It was not
possible to use a gun to bring two pieces of plutonium together fast
enough. As soon as they got close enough to form a critical mass,
the spontaneous neutrons from plutonium-240 would set off a chain
reaction whose heat would blow the pieces apart before the nuclear
yield was significant.
It was this stumbling block that led to a focus on the implosion
design—using high explosives to drive the nuclear explosive rapidly
inward to form a dense super-critical mass. The speed of the process
reduces the chance of pre-initiation. Even so, an unwanted preinitiation that appears early in the compression can set off a premature
chain reaction and limit the yield to a “fizzle yield.” To reduce the
chance of this, the plutonium used in the first U.S. warheads was
produced in uranium fuel that had been lightly irradiated to keep
the fraction of plutonium-240 at about 1 percent. In an implosion
design, however, the fizzle yield, while not optimal, is still large—in
the case of the first Trinity explosion it was about 1 kiloton, which it
is useful to recall is one thousand tons of high explosives. In short,
the trouble with the idea that higher plutonium-240 content would
only produce a fizzle is that the fizzle yield is still pretty large.
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Since the time of the Acheson-Lilienthal report, weapons
designers have learned to work around the pre-initiation problem
to achieve high yields with the lower quality plutonium. In time, as
advanced weapon designs made the pre-initiation problem more or
less irrelevant, the U.S. weapons complex settled on plutonium with
a plutonium-240 content of about 7 percent (and thus a plutonium239 content of about 93 percent) as a reasonable compromise between
quality and production rate. Plutonium of this isotopic content,
or something close to it, say in the range of 90 percent, is termed
weapons-grade.
That the denaturing argument was not valid in technical terms
did not dissuade those who found it convenient for rationalizing
commercial plutonium activities from using it. The idea permeated
the technological permissiveness of the 1950s Atoms for Peace
program when it came to plutonium extraction and application. One
could say that the false security of denaturing plutonium underlay
the whole Atoms for Peace program.31
After the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 that used high isotopic
purity plutonium extracted from the spent fuel of a Canadiansupplied research reactor, the United States woke up to fact that
misinformation in the international nuclear community downplaying
the dangers of commercial plutonium was standing in the way of
effective security measures. By this time, commercial LWR fuels were
fairly highly irradiated during commercial operation, and the notion
gained currency that the plutonium in such fuel, “reactor-grade”
plutonium, was not usable at all for bombs. The Ford administration
felt compelled to brief foreign nuclear leaders to correct this view
and arranged for Dr. Robert Selden of the Livermore laboratory
to present the material. 32 Selden’s summary slide stated: “Reactor
grade plutonium is an entirely credible fissile material for nuclear
explosives.”33
But despite numerous reports and analyses that addressed the
issue and arrived at the same result, the controversy would not die
because so much was at stake commercially and bureaucratically in
the hundreds of LWRs deployed throughout the world and, in some
countries, in the reprocessing and recycle of LWR plutonium. 34
Rather than pursue this argument which seems to have reached a
stalemate, the approach we take here is to circumvent it by pointing
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out that LWRs can also be copious producers of near-weapons-grade
plutonium and even of weapons-grade plutonium itself. To explain
the difference between our point of view and the conventional one
regarding LWR plutonium, we have to say a few words about the
way an LWR is fueled.
A PWR core, to use a specific example, may contain about 75
tons of uranium.35 The operators refuel the reactor about every 18
months. The fuel elements normally stay in the reactor for three fuel
cycles, or about 60 months. But the refueling schedule is staggered
so that at each refueling, the operators take out one-third of the fuel
assemblies—the ones that have been in the core for three cycles—and
replace them with fresh fuel.
The conventional characterization of the isotopic composition of
the plutonium contained in LWR spent fuel—so-called reactor grade
plutonium—is of fuel that has been in the reactor for a full three
fuel cycles. This is the LWR plutonium over which arguments have
raged concerning its usability for weapons. Such fuel indeed has a
high content of isotopes other than the most desirable plutonium239. There is a certain logic in this characterization in that most of
the LWR spent fuel in storage pools at LWRs contains this type of
plutonium, and the LWR-bred plutonium that has been separated in
reprocessing plants is more-or-less of this composition, too.36
But an LWR operator seeking better plutonium for weapons is not
constrained to using the plutonium from irradiated fuel assemblies.
For example, if the operator of a newly operating LWR unloaded the
entire core after 8 months or so, the contained plutonium would be
weapons-grade—with a plutonium-239 content of about 90 percent.
The amount of plutonium produced would be about 2 kilograms per
ton of uranium, or about 150 kilograms per 8-month cycle.37 This comes
to about 30 bombs’ worth. Does a would-be nuclear weapons state
need more? If the short refueling cycles were continued, the annual
output of weapons-grade plutonium would be about 200 kilograms
(allowing for refueling time), but this would require a large amount
of fresh fuel. Such an progression involves a considerable departure
from commercial operation and, for an NPT member, would signal
treaty violation. Still, it illustrates what a standard LWR can do when
viewed as a plutonium production reactor.

78

The small Oak Ridge-designed reprocessing plant described
earlier would have difficulty keeping up with this kind of reactor
operation for long because it was not designed for reliable long-term
operation. But suppose we just consider one run of 8 months. The
small reprocessing plant was designed to handle about one assembly
per day. To reprocess the entire core of 177 fuel assemblies in our
example would take about 6 months of operating time plus some
realistic amount of down time. In less than a year, the would-be
nuclear weapons country would have about 30 bombs’ worth. That
is quite an arsenal.
Consider a mode of operation closer to commercial operation.
Because of the staggering of the refueling, at any refueling once the
reactor has been operating for a time, one-third of the core (about 25
tons in our example) will have been in the reactor for three cycles,
one-third will have been in the reactor for two cycles, and one-third
will have been in the reactor for one cycle. The plutonium in the onecycle fuel would have a much higher content of the most desirable
plutonium-239 isotope than the three-cycle fuel—over 80 percent as
opposed to about 55 percent. This plutonium is often called “fuelgrade” to distinguish it from the better weapons-grade stuff and the
less desirable reactor-grade.38 At each normal refueling, the operator
has available 25 tons of uranium containing about 5 kilograms
plutonium per ton, or about 125 kilograms of plutonium with about
80 percent plutonium-239—not bad material for bombs. (There is
more plutonium per ton than in the earlier example because the
irradiation time is longer.) In fact, this characterization understates
the usefulness of the one-cycle material for weapons because what
really counts is the amount fissile fraction—the sum of plutonium239 and plutonium-241—which, in the case of spent fuel removed
after one refueling cycle, is nearly 85 percent.
Even more interesting is an example we will consider in detail—
the situation at the start of operation. We shall examine the weapons
characteristics of the plutonium produced in the first core after the
start of operation and will compare that with the characteristics of
weapons-grade plutonium. At the end of the first refueling cycle, all
the fuel will have been irradiated for only one cycle. The first cycle
is also normally a bit shorter than the later ones, so the plutonium is
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even higher in plutonium-239 content—about 84 percent plutonium239. At the end of the first cycle, the 75-ton core will contain about 330
kilograms of plutonium, or more than 60 weapons’ worth. According
to its designers, it would take the Oak Ridge plant about 150 days of
operation to reprocess the entire core.
One might say that this kind of operation in violation of the
NPT would not be allowed, that the international community, or
perhaps some country, would step in to prevent it. Yet North Korea
is believed to have reprocessed the missing 8,000 fuel rods from
its small reactor, and there has been no world response. Suppose
they had by now had in operation the LWRs that the United States
promised them under the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework and
had operated them in the way outlined above. Can we be confident
that there would be international action to enforce the NPT rules?
How good would the first core plutonium be for weapons? The
usual standard of comparison is U.S. weapons-grade plutonium,
which is nominally taken to contain about 93 percent plutonium-239.
How different, then, are the weapons characteristics of the plutonium
in the fuel after the first cycle as compared with weapons-grade
plutonium? The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC)
asked Dr. Harmon W. Hubbard, an experienced physicist who
had worked on nuclear weapons at the Livermore Laboratory and
served for several years on the panel that evaluated foreign nuclear
explosions for the U.S. Government, to examine the issue relying on
publicly available information.
The subject of illegal construction of nuclear explosives also was
earlier reviewed in technical detail by J. Carson Mark, late T-Division
head at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), in a 1990 report.39
He concluded that the difficulties encountered in using reactor-grade
plutonium for explosive fabrication differ only in degree, but not in
kind, from the problems in using weapons grade plutonium.
In his 2003 paper, Hubbard develops the calculations for the better
grade of plutonium available in spent fuel after irradiation for the first
fuel cycle to see how this plutonium compares in weapons use with
weapons-grade plutonium. Hubbard assumes the simplest design for
a first effort explosive, one consisting of a solid plutonium spherical
core. This core is very nearly a critical mass when surrounded by a

80

high density tamping (that is, neutron reflecting) material which is
taken here to be uranium. This larger sphere is then encased in the
high explosive system which is designed to provide a converging
spherical shock wave that would compress the assembly for a few
microseconds before it flies apart from the force of the nuclear
explosion.
Then, based on the published Trinity data, Hubbard calculates
probabilities of yields to be expected from reactor grade plutonium.
He then extends these probabilistic yield estimates to improved
implosion technology by adjusting a parameter in the model. One
might think of these steps as increases in the speed with which
the core is compressed, although some other aspects of design are
involved as well. He carries out the yield calculations for first-cycle
LWR plutonium and for weapons-grade plutonium.
Although the weapons-grade plutonium has less of it, both
materials have some plutonium-240 that spontaneously emits
neutrons. These spontaneous neutrons can start the chain reaction
prematurely and cause the nuclear explosion to blow the bomb apart
before the plutonium core reaches maximum compression. Hubbard
takes weapons-grade material that contains 6 percent plutonium-240
(and thus 93.5 percent plutonium-239 and 0.5 percent plutonium241, which is more-or-less equivalent for explosive purposes) and
first cycle LWR plutonium that contains 14 percent plutonium-240
(and 84 percent plutonium-239 and 2 percent plutonium-241). In
both cases, there is some spread in resultant yields—more in the case
of first cycle LWR plutonium because it contains more plutonium240, but not dramatically so.
The following table sums up the results of the calculations. The
entries in the first three columns give the probabilities that the design
will achieve an explosive yield in the ranges: 1 to 5 kilotons, 5 to
20 kilotons, and greater than 20 kilotons (the nominal yield of the
1945 Trinity shot in the New Mexico desert). The first row gives the
probabilities for the Trinity design using the type of plutonium that
was actually used at the time. This might be termed “super-grade” as
the plutonium-240 content was only about 1 percent. The following
three rows provide the same estimates for three levels of bomb
technology: the 1945 Trinity technology, a two-fold (100 percent)
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improvement in that technology, and a three-fold improvement
(200 percent). In each case, the results are presented for weaponsgrade plutonium and for first-cycle LWR plutonium (bold). So, for
example, the probability that a bomb using 1945 Trinity technology
and first-cycle LWR plutonium would exceed 20 kilotons in yield is
12 percent. If we drop to the next row—that provides the probabilities
for a two-fold improvement in the 1945 technology—we find that the
probability of exceeding 20 kilotons becomes 34 percent, or about
one-third. And if we drop to the last row—that assumes a three-fold
technology improvement—the probability of exceeding 20 kilotons
with first cycle LWR plutonium is 49 percent, or almost one-half.
% Probability that
Yield is Between
1 and 5 Kilotons:
Percent

% Probability that
Yield is Between
5 and 20 Kilotons:
Percent

% Probability that
Yield is Not Less
Than 20 Kilotons:
Percent

6

88

19                 
                                 

23
23

44
12

13
5                 

12
25

14
25

66
34

15
10                           

8
18

12
22

76
49

16
12                  

1945 Trinity shot
1% plutonium-240
(actual)
4
Calculated:
                                                                       
Trinity technology
WGPu
21
1st cycle LWR
36
Trinity technology x 2
WGPu
1st cycle LWR
     
Trinity technology x 3
WGPu
1st cycle LWR

Estimated Average
Yield in Kilotons:
Percent

Table 1. Probability of Achieving Various Explosive Yields
and the Expected Yield for 1945 U.S. Technology and for Two
Improved Levels Using Weapons Grade Plutonium (WGPu) and
1st Cycle LWR Plutonium.
The last column is especially interesting. It provides rough
estimates of the average yield of the specific weapon design and
plutonium quality combinations listed on the left. Even though there
is some uncertainty in yield, the average yields are quite substantial,
and the differences between weapons-grade and first-cycle LWR
plutonium becomes very much less as technology is improved (that
is, moving down in Table 1).
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A country attempting to build nuclear weapons today could take
advantage of the wide availability of declassified nuclear weapons
information and the enormous increases in computing and other
technological aids since the 1945 Trinity shot. It seems reasonable
to attribute to a new group at least a doubling of the efficacy of the
Trinity implosion system through the use of advances in implosion
technology, initiators, and better core design.40 At this level of design,
a would-be nuclear state could use first-cycle LWR plutonium to
produce fission weapons with a modestly reliable yield around an
average of about 10 kilotons. A weapon of this design would have
about a 70 percent chance of exceeding five kilotons. It should be
remembered that the minimum, or fizzle, yields will likely be at
least as large as that of Trinity—around one kiloton—and that this
guaranteed yield already is quite destructive. Considering that the
destructive radius of the explosions varies roughly as the third root
of the yield, the differences between the performance of weapons
with first-cycle plutonium and those with weapons-grade plutonium
are not very great.
LWRS Are Less Proliferation-Resistant than Usually Assumed in
Policy Discussions and Are Dangerous in the Wrong Hands.
What emerges from this discussion is that LWRs are not the
proliferation-resistant technology they have been made out to be.
Forgotten from the earlier days of nuclear energy is that LWRs can
produce large quantities of near-weapons-grade plutonium, and
that a country bent on making bombs would not have much trouble
extracting it quickly in a small reprocessing operation, and possibly
even keeping the operation secret until it had an arsenal.
The possibility of clandestine centrifuge enrichment exists
even in the absence of a nuclear power program. Pakistan pursued
enrichment before it had any reactors that used enriched uranium fuel.
But a nuclear power program provides resources and makes it easier
to mask a clandestine enrichment program. There is, however, one
respect in which the presence of an LWR offers added opportunities
for clandestine enrichment. Fresh LWR fuel, which typically has an
enrichment level (uranium-235 concentration) of 4 percent, can, after
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crushing and fluorination, itself be used as feed for a clandestine gas
centrifuge enrichment operation. Use of such low enriched feed, as
opposed to natural uranium with a uranium-235 concentration of
less than 1 percent, can reduce the enrichment effort by a factor of
five.
In other words, LWRs themselves pose a large security issue if
they are in the wrong hands. It would be useful for informing U.S.
policy to gain a clearer understanding of the extent to which nearweapons grade plutonium is readily available from these reactors.
Two specific examples stand out of nuclear policy inadequately
informed by an understanding of the technical possibilities.
The first is the confused and inconsistent policy toward North
Korea which included promising, as part of a 1994 U.S.-DPRK
nuclear deal, two large LWRs whose plutonium production capacity
turned out to be larger than that of all the indigenous North Korean
reactors they were supposed to replace. When this came to light, the
State Department insisted that the North Koreans would not have
the technology to extract the LWR plutonium.
The second example involves Iran. The United States opposes
Russian supply of LWRs at Bushehr, but does so on the grounds
that the nuclear project can serve as a cover for clandestine nuclear
activities. There does not seem to be recognition yet that the LWRs
could themselves be a copious source of plutonium for weapons, or
their possible link with enrichment.
Altogether, underestimating the production capacity of LWRs
for weapons-grade and near weapons-grade plutonium and
overestimating the difficulty of “quick and dirty” reprocessing have
contributed to poor decisions.
Several broad policy implications of the weapons-grade
production capability of LWRs are:
1. Role of LWRs. The need to reassess the role of LWRs in
international programs. They are not for everyone, and we should be
cautious about promoting their construction in worrisome countries.
This is not a benign technology. At a minimum, we should not
support such technology where it is not clearly economic.
2. Clandestine enrichment and reprocessing. The IAEA and national
intelligence constantly has to be on the lookout for clandestine plants
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because they can rapidly change the security equation. There needs
to be much closer accounting of LEU fuel in view of its significance
as possible feed for clandestine enrichment.
3. IAEA inspection of LWRs. Increase IAEA inspection frequencies
for LWRs to check on fuel inventories and whether refueling
needs adjustment upward in countries of concern from the point
of view of potential bombmaking and to take account of possible
undiscovered clandestine reprocessing. Because of inevitable IAEA
resource limitations, it is necessary for the agency to concentrate
inspections where they are most important. It would help to gain
support for such a system if it were possible to develop some
objective way of defining “countries of concern.” The IAEA should
take greater account of the presence of weapons-grade plutonium
or near weapons-grade plutonium in spent fuel pools and storage in
devising its inspections.
4. Enforcement. The NPT members must enforce the IAEA
inspection system. An important purpose of IAEA safeguards is
to deter nuclear weapons activities—by would-be nuclear weapon
countries—by the threat of early detection. This assumes there will
be a strong reaction to such an early detection of illicit activity. If
would-be bombmakers conclude they have nothing to fear because
the international community is not likely to react to their violations,
the whole system of control falls apart.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5
1. As nearly every interested person knows by now, light water in this context
is just plain water, so called in the early days of the nuclear era to distinguish it
from heavy water, in which the hydrogen atom is replaced by deuterium. LWRs
come in two basic types—Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) and Boiling Water
Reactors (BWRs). In a PWR, the nuclear core heats a pressurized primary water
loop that passes through a steam generator that boils a secondary water loop to
provide steam to the electric turbines. In a BWR, the water boils in the nuclear
vessel and passes directly to the steam turbine. Most of the LWRs in the world
are PWRs. For our purposes, the differences between PWRs and BWRs are not
significant.
2. Natural uranium contains about 0.7 percent uranium-235 and 99.3 percent
uranium-238. LWR fuel is normally enriched to about 4 percent, while bomb
material is usually enriched to about 90 percent uranium-235.
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3. There are LWRs in Armenia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Czech
Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Japan, South Korea, Mexico,
Netherlands, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Taiwan, UK, and the United States.
4. The relevant figures for the percentage composition of plutonium in spent
LWR and HWR fuels are given in the chart below:
CANDU
Isotope
7,500 MWD/MT
Pu-238
0.1
Pu-239
68.4
Pu-240
25.6
Pu-241
4.6
Pu-242
1.4
Pu-238 + 240 + 242
27.1
Spontaneous Fission Rate
(Neutrons/sec/gm)
287

BWR
27,500 MWD/MT
1.0
57.2
25.7
11.5
4.5
31.2

PWR
33,000 MWD/MT
1.5
55.7
24.5
13.4
4.9
30.9

363

371

5. For example, the two LWRs promised North Korea in a 1994 U.S.-DPRK
agreement were nearly 10 times the size of the indigenous natural uranium reactors
they were supposed to replace and therefore had a plutonium production capacity
about twice that of the natural uranium reactors.
6. There was an additional cause for alarm and chagrin. India used American
heavy water in the reactor that produced the plutonium. The heavy water had
been sold under a 1956 contract that restricted its use to “peaceful uses.” India
claimed its explosion was “peaceful.”
7. This is still a common view in nuclear bureaucracies, not least in the U.S.
Department of Energy, where it underlies advanced plutonium-fueled reactor and
spent fuel reprocess research and development.
8. To cite one important example, Munir Khan, who, as head of the Pakistani
Atomic Energy Commission in the 1970s, launched the weapons program and
associated fuel cycle activities, studied in the United States on a Fullbright Grant
and received an MSc in nuclear engineering from Argonne National Laboratories
as part of the Atoms for Peace Program. See www.hipakistan.com/en/detail.
php?newsId=en62190&F_catID=17&f_type=source&day=.
9. See Justin T. Long, Engineering for Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing, American
Nuclear Society, 1978. This volume of over 1,000 pages was published by the
Atomic Energy Commission in 1967 and republished in 1978 for the Department
of Energy. The 1967 Forward by Floyd Culler, Assistant Director of the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory and one of the foremost experts on reprocessing, states:
This book presents the engineering aspects of the reprocessing of powerreactor fuels. From many diverse sources of information, an attempt
has been made to summarize the basic approaches to the engineering
of a chemical separation plant. The book does not offer engineering
information only; it also reviews the processes most widely used and
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most of those under development. Particular attention has been given to
describing the equipment used in reprocessing fuel. Shielding, criticality
control, liquid and gaseous waste disposal, safety, ventilation, fuelelement storage and handling, materials accountability, and maintenance
are covered in summary form, and the information given is supplemented
by extensive and selected references to reports that are available from
the rather specific domain of atomic energy literature. The information
is presented in such a way that the book, either as a whole or in part,
can be used as a text for instruction in a course on radiochemical course
design. The process data and the underlying engineering principles make
the book useful either as a textbook or a handbook. . . . We hope, too,
that it will serve as a reasonably accurate introduction to reprocessing
technology for those who are now entering the field.
10. The IAEA continued in this mode for many years. After the embarrassment
of the discoveries after the first Gulf War that Iraq had run a weapons program
under the noses of the IAEA inspectors, the Agency carried out important
improvements in its mode of operation. In recent years the IAEA has become a
first-rate international inspection agency limited principally by what its Board of
Governors will permit.
11. The Germans sought to sell the Brazilians a type of enrichment technology
that did not offer much promise. The Brazilians later got involved in centrifuge
technology and are now constructing a centrifuge enrichment plant that would
supply more or less the fuel needs of one of their two reactors. They have been
reluctant, however, to allow the IAEA inspectors to see the centrifuges, presumably
because the inspectors would then know the source of the technology. The U.S.
Government has so far not reacted to this very suspicious and worrisome state of
affairs.
12. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say, “was thought to be tightly held,”
as the industrial spy A. Q. Khan was already delivering to Pakistan centrifuge
plans and contractor lists that he had stolen from Urenco while he worked there.
13. Although it now appears that Pakistan may be trying to revive the plant,
possibly with Chinese help.
14. Just before the Shah was overthrown in 1979, as part of a reactor sale
agreement, Jimmy Carter had agreed to grant Iran “most favored nation” status
for reprocessing so that Iran would not be discriminated against when seeking
permission to reprocess U.S.-origin fuel. That meant Iran would now have the
same right as Japan to reprocess U.S.-enriched power reactor fuel. The Shah left
Iran before the negotiations were concluded. See Nucleonics Week, January 12, 1978,
pp. 2-3; in Daniel Poneman, Nuclear Power in the Developing World, George Allen
& Unwin: London, 1982, p. 88, at www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1825.
html.
15. Carter rapidly reversed himself on the issue of Japanese reprocessing of
U.S.-supplied fuel (over which the United States had reprocessing control) after
his proliferation policy advisor, Gerard Smith, reminded him that World War II
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started after the United States cut off Japan’s oil supply. In the case of Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons program, then in its early stages, the United States looked the
other way after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan so as to promote Pakistani help
in opposing the Soviets.
16. In spite of the unfavorable economics, support for plutonium recycle
continues, including in high places in the current administration as witnessed
by comments on this issue in the President’s National Energy Plan of May 2000.
Such support is based in part on ideology (on the part of nuclear true believers)
but mainly on commercial opportunism (on the part of nuclear fuel firms looking
for subsidies). Nuclear fuel firms providing reprocessing and plutonium services
have discovered that a process does not have to be economical in order to be
profitable.
17. That is what Sigvard Eklund, the IAEA Director General, told one of the
authors in conversation in 1976. To correct this view, the U.S. Government offered
Mr. Eklund a briefing on the subject. At that briefing. his jaw literally dropped
when presented with a slide that refuted his earlier view. The new facts had farreaching implications for the IAEA inspection system.
18. One needs to reemphasize, because it is so frequently forgotten, that the
initial rejection of U.S. reprocessing was done by President Ford. But he lost the
election a few days after announcing his policy, and so the focus turned to Jimmy
Carter.
19. D. E. Ferguson to F. L Culler, Intra-Laboratory Correspondence, Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, “Simple, Quick Processing Plant,” August 30, 1977, 22 pp.
This is the same Mr. Culler whose Forward to a USAEC volume on reprocessing
was cited earlier.
20. The diagram appears in the Washington Post, August 4, 2002, to illustrate an
article, “Those N. Korean Reactors Light Up Danger Signals,” by Victor Gilinsky
and Henry Sokolski. The Oak Ridge report does not see the initial mechanical
disassembly of the LWR spent fuel as a particularly difficult step. This issue came
up in arguments over the risks posed by the two LWRs that the United States
had promised North Korea as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework. The State
Department insisted that, while North Korea had experience with reprocessing, it
would not be able to reprocess LWR fuel because of the difficulty of cutting up the
fuel rods, a part of the process with which a high-capacity French commercial plant
had difficulty. The Oak Ridge design proposed abrasive saw cutting underwater,
and it refers for the details to the 1967 Long volume which has a section on the
subject.
21. IAEA 2001 Safeguards Glossary, p. 22, available on the IAEA web site,
www.iaea.org.
22. Report by the Comptroller General of the United States, “Quick and Secret
Construction of Plutonium Reprocessing Plants: A Way To Nuclear Weapons
Proliferation?,” EMD-78-104, October 6, 1978. Senator John Glenn, then Chairman
of the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services,
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Committee on Government Affairs, and very active on nuclear proliferation
issues, made the request. (Throughout, we do not distinguish between the Oak
Ridge report and the Oak Ridge memorandum.)
23. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Department of
Energy (DOE), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Congressional
Research Service (CRS). In terms of his knowledge of reprocessing, the most
imposing of the 11 individuals consulted was Manson Benedict, Institute Professor
Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The CRS review in its entirety
was published separately several days later. Warren Donnelly, “A Preliminary
Analysis of the ORNL Memorandum on a Crude Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing
Plant,” November 4, 1977.
24. According to rumor, they served as a conduit for Israeli intelligence.
25. W. G. Sutcliffe and T. J. Trapp, eds., Extraction and Utility of Reactor-Grade
Plutonium for Weapons (U), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, April 27,
1995. The report is based on briefings given to the National Academy of Sciences’
Committee on International Security and Arms Control during its study of the
management and disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The full report is
classified. The material used here is taken from an unclassified summary.
26. J. P. Hinton, et al., Proliferation Resistance of Fissile Material Disposition Program
(FMDP) Plutonium Disposition Alternatives: Report of the Proliferation Vulnerability
Red Team, Sandia National Laboratories, Report No. SAND97-8201, October 1996,
Section 4.1.1.3, “Recovery Process for LWR or MOX Spent Fuel,” pp. 4-3 – 4-9. The
work was done in the context of assessing the proliferation resistance of various
alternatives for the disposition of stocks of weapons-grade plutonium that have
been declared excess to national security needs by the United States and Russia.
27. The Phillips design was for spent fuel with an average burnup of 10,000
MWd/t.
28. H. Schneider, et al., “A Study of the Feasibility of a Small Scale Reprocessing
Plant for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station,” Report IDO-14521, Phillips
Petroleum Company, April 28, 1961. Available from the National Technical
Information Service (NTIS), Washington, DC.
29. In our judgment, it is not credible that a sub-national group with the type
of skills enumerated in the Sandia report could construct and operate even the
simplified plants outlined in the Oak Ridge and Sandia reports.
30. In turn, the plutonium-240 absorbs neutrons to form plutonium-241.
Plutonium-240 is not fissionable by neutrons in an LWR core but plutonium-241
is.
31. In time, the Atoms for Peace program permitted the U.S. export of large
quantities of HEU to fuel foreign research reactors. There was no question about
the dangers of HEU as a bomb explosive. As Albert Wohlstetter once said, “The
nuclear bureaucracy knew what they were saying about denaturing plutonium
was false, so they didn’t think it mattered if they exported HEU, too.”
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32. The author returned from a 1976 European trip and reported to the
National Security Council (NSC) staff that the IAEA Director General and his
staff believed plutonium from commercial LWR fuel was not usable for weapons,
and that the top German officials, then negotiating a nuclear sale to Brazil that
involved reprocessing technology, were adamant in this view. They thought that
U.S. statements to the contrary were made for commercial, rather than security,
reasons. This report to the NSC led to the November 1976 Selden briefings for
select top international nuclear figures that included Sir John Hill, head of the
UK Atomic Energy Authority; M. Andre Giraud, the head of the French Atomic
Energy Commission (CEA); Dr. Eklund, Director General of the IAEA; and Mr.
Ryukichi Imai, a senior advisor on nuclear affairs to the Japanese Foreign Ministry.
Shortly before this, the author, then a commissioner of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, gave a speech at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in which
he said the following: “Of course, when reactor-grade plutonium is used, there
may be a penalty in performance that is considerable or insignificant, depending
on the weapon design. But whatever we once might have thought, we now know
that even simple designs, albeit with some uncertainty in yield, can serve as
effective, highly powerful weapons—reliably in the kiloton range.” Victor Gilinsky,
“Plutonium, Proliferation, and Policy,” Remarks given at MIT, November 1, 1976
(NRC Press Release No. S-14-76).
33. See Robert W. Selden, “Reactor Plutonium and Nuclear Explosives,”
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, undated slides.
34. See, for example, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium,
National Academy of Sciences, National Academy Press, Washington, 1994. The
Executive Summary, p. 4, states:
Plutonium of virtually any isotopic composition, however, can be used to
make nuclear weapons. Using reactor-grade rather than weapon-grade
plutonium would present some complications. But even with relatively
simple designs such as that used in the Nagasaki weapon—which are
within the capabilities of many nations and possibly some subnational
groups—nuclear explosives could be constructed that would be assured
of having yields of at least 1 or 2 kilotons. Using more sophisticated
designs, reactor-grade plutonium could be used for weapons having
considerably higher yields.
A report of a U.S.-Japanese arms control study group arrived at the following
statement: “The participants agreed that as a technical matter, with some additional
efforts, a country can produce nuclear weapons using any kind of plutonium,
using well-known technologies.” The members of the working group on reactorgrade plutonium included Hiroyoshi Kurihara, former Executive Director of the
Japanese Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation; Atsuyuki
Suzuki, Professor of Nuclear Engineering at the University of Tokyo; and Victor
Gilinsky. The overall report was published as Next Steps in Arms Control and
Non-Proliferation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996. See also
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Richard L. Garwin, “Reactor-Grade Plutonium Can be Used to Make Powerful
and Reliable Nuclear Weapons: Separated Plutonium in the Fuel-Cycle Must Be
Protected As If It Were Nuclear Weapons,” August 26, 1998, available on www.
fas.org.
35. In nearly 200 fuel assemblies containing over 40,000 fuel rods.
36. There is an exception worth noting. Some fuel is removed early from a reactor,
generally because it is not performing properly, possibly because it is leaking
radioactive material. The plutonium is such a fuel and will have a composition
higher in plutonium-239 than the fuel that remains in the reactor longer.
37. The details come from a chart, “Trends in LWR Pu Production,” in a
set of briefing slides, Light-Water Reactor Fueling Handling and Spent Fuel
Characteristics, J.A. Hassberger, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
February 26, 1999. The briefing was presented to a Stanford University/Livermore
Laboratory group preparing a report on the problems of safeguarding the LWRs
to be supplied to North Korea under the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework,
“Verifying the Agreed Framework,” Michael May, General Editor, UCRL-ID142936/CGSR-2001-001, April 2001.
38. The distinction is made in a useful paper by Bruno Pellaud, a former deputy
director general of the IAEA and head of the IAEA Department of Safeguards.
Bruno Pellaud, “Proliferation Aspects of Plutonium Recycling,” Journal of Nuclear
Materials Management, Fall 2002, Volume XXXI, No. 1, p. 30. He provides the
following table:
Grades
Super grade (SG)
Weapon grade (WG)
Fuel grade (FG)
Reactor grade (RG)
MOX grade

Pu-240

Usability

<3 percent
3-7 percent
7-18 percent
18-30 percent
>30 percent

Best quality
Standard material
Practically usable
Conceivably usable
Practically unusable

Table. Plutonium Mixtures for Explosive Purposes.
The categories are, to some extent, arbitrary, but they make for useful peg
points. Pellaud’s aim is obviously to vindicate the use of MOX grade fuel. Still, he
makes helpful points along the way.
39. J. Carson Mark, “Reactor Grade Plutonium’s Explosive Properties”, Nuclear
Control Institute, 1990.
40. An initiator is a contrivance that injects neutrons into the device at the
proper moment—when the nuclear explosive has been compressed to a supercritical state—to start the explosive chain reaction. If the neutrons arrive too early,
we get a reduction in yield, at worst, a fizzle. If the neutrons come too late, there
may be no nuclear explosion at all.
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CHAPTER 6
COPING WITH BIOLOGICAL THREATS AFTER SARS
Alan P. Zelicoff
The outbreak of an often fatal lung disease, initially called “Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome” (SARS)1 took the international public
health community by surprise. Denoted with the typical medical
nomenclature of a syndrome—a combination of symptoms and
signs—SARS occurred at a time of extraordinary tension among
public health practitioners. The not-too-distant memories of the
anthrax bioterror event in the United States in the fall of 2001 and the
rapid downhill course of dozens of SARS victims captured headlines
and invited endless speculation as to the source of the SARS illness
(natural vs. sinister), its cause (infectious agent vs. toxic chemical),
and the real rate of growth of the epidemic. Because of sketchy
reporting from China, the probable initial focus of the outbreak
only added to confusion and fear. Travel to China, Southeast Asia,
and Singapore plummeted, and passengers disembarking from
ships and airplanes from those same areas were screened carefully
for respiratory symptoms when they arrived at destinations in the
West and Europe. Passengers waiting to board airplanes also were
screened carefully, while millions of Chinese and Singaporeans took
their own initiatives against the presumed infection by wearing
surgical masks and staying out of circulation on crowded streets and
public transport. Even into the fall of 2003, some parts of China still
were visited infrequently by domestic and international travelers for
fear of continuing contagion.
At the time of the writing of this chapter, it is far too soon to
enumerate the lessons of the SARS outbreak for national security
(and indeed, international security) in a comprehensive way.
However, several observations may be instructive to both policy
decisionmakers and public health planners.
First, it is abundantly clear that rapid, uncensored information
from physicians and hospitals is essential in managing this—or
any—infectious disease outbreak, whether it is naturally occurring
(as SARS turned out to be) or resulting from bio-terrorism (as
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initially was feared in the SARS outbreak). There is little question
that the “quality” of the information, coming as it does from expert
clinicians and infectious disease specialists, is good enough in its raw
form to provide “actionable” data. Indeed, once the World Health
Organization (WHO) heard from a few isolated clinicians that an
apparently severe form of respiratory illness had appeared in just
a small handful of patients, it was sufficient to organize teams of
epidemiologists and virologists to travel to widely separated parts of
the globe to begin to nail down the source of the disease, isolate the
causal agent and even divine its mechanism of spread. Transmission
of the data in near-real time via the Internet (and with only minimal
review and proofing) probably saved tens of thousands of lives in
this epidemic.
Second, it is equally clear that a forced absence of information
in the midst of an outbreak is devastating for individuals and for
the local economy. The Chinese government, in particular, actively
suppressed the exchange of data internally and shared nothing
with foreign or WHO public health officers until embarrassed into
doing so by international outcry. No one can doubt any longer
the magnification of fear and panic—and thus loss of reason and
reasonable behavior of masses of people—when physicians and local
public health officials are operating in a scientific vacuum. I return to
this point about information in the text of this chapter several times
as I think it may be the most important lesson of all from the SARS
outbreak of 2003.
Third, even when a severe and novel disease entity emerges,
with open flow of information it is possible to effectively “rule out”
a biological weapons attack. This lesson is, of course, tenuous, but
when the SARS experience is combined with previous outbreaks
of mysterious, fatal respiratory disease—such as the Hantavirus
pulmonary syndrome in New Mexico in 1991—decisionmakers
can take great comfort in the ability of epidemiologic sleuthing to
distinguish between nefarious activities and acts of nature. Needless
to say, a misstep in the face of possible bioterrorism could result in a
catastrophe.
Fourth, the tools of modern molecular biology are now so widely
spread that it is possible, even easy, for investigators working
simultaneously in multiple laboratories to, in effect, independently
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validate each others’ work. In the earliest days of the SARS outbreak,
there was some confusion over what organism might be causing
the disease. But for the use of gene sequencing in two separate
laboratories, this confusion could have undermined an understanding
of the source and nature of the pathogen for many weeks. Molecular
biology is, unfortunately, a two-edged sword and can certainly be
used for illicit purposes, but, in this case, the needed knowledge was
discovered swiftly and verified collaboratively. It is hard to overstate
the profound power of biological science to do good.
These lessons certainly will affect the response of the public
health community to future outbreaks. New outbreaks have always
been inevitable, but one could not be nearly so certain about the
effectiveness of public health actions. Past successes have been
realized much more slowly (for example, with the eradication of
smallpox in the wild) or depended on a considerable amount of
luck (Hantavirus did not, thank Providence, spread from person-toperson by any route, nor did anthrax in Washington, DC). We will
have to do as well in the next outbreak as we did during the SARS
epidemic—even better, if our luck runs out, and we face a highly
communicable, fatal disease such as a new strain of influenza. I will
expand on this requirement more in the text.
While the pathogen responsible for the illness—a novel Coxsackie
Virus—seems clear, the economic costs, lives interrupted, and the
effectiveness of the public health response still are being tallied. This
much appears certain: The virus does not seem to transmit easily as
an aerosol as does influenza, but rather as a heavier-than-air droplet
that falls onto surfaces or the host’s face and hands. These surfaces are
then contaminated, and an unwitting individual who touches those
surfaces and then touches his nose or mouth provides the transmission
mechanism for infection. Had SARS spread by an airborne route,
one person coughing or sneezing might well have been able to infect
dozens of other people who had no immunity to the virus (and most
probably do not). An infectious disease catastrophe might have
resulted, reminiscent of the world “pandemic” of influenza in 191819 that killed about 10 percent of the world’s population, including
most prominently young, otherwise healthy adults.
It is not possible to extract the instructive lessons of SARS without
some understanding of the fundamental scientific facts. Thus, I will
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summarize briefly the medical aspects of SARS (including short-term
and long-term prognosis in patients) and review the history of the
SARS epidemic to date, while highlighting the early dynamics and
often frightening spread of the disease. Virologists around the world
quickly responded to the need for identification of the pathogen
and developed a diagnostic test within a few weeks of the earliest
indications of the outbreak—a phenomenal set of accomplishments.
Rapid communication of results between several centers in Europe,
Asia, and the United States permitted confirmation of laboratory
findings; this not only dramatically facilitated an understanding of
the fundamental biology of the organism and its interaction with
nonimmune human hosts, but also enabled public health officials to
define a likely epidemiologic model for the spread of the disease.
I will also speculate as to how the international community
might do better when the next new epidemic makes its appearance,
as it most assuredly will. Speculation is a dangerous exercise in
medicine and biology where rarely, if ever, do the complexities of
disease spread fit into compact mathematical expression like the
equations of motion in physics, but there is little doubt that the SARS
epidemic underscored, yet again, the unfortunate triumph of politics
over reason in many aspects of the collaborative management of
communicable disease. It seems that high-ranking officials in the
Chinese health establishment, and even Chinese government leaders,
sought to hide the extent of the epidemic, as they hoped that microorganisms would respect borders, political decisions, and national
sovereignty. Even in the short-run, this was a bankrupt policy. The
Chinese economy suffered severe losses—even more than the rest of
eastern and southern Asia, struggling to recover from an economic
recession made all the worse by the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks and subsequent war in Afghanistan and the Middle East.
After the passage of nearly a year, the full extent of the epidemic on
the Chinese mainland was still uncertain, with incomplete accounting
of even the total number of victims and their location. The reservoir
of origin for the disease remains a mystery.
In addition, I believe that the SARS epidemic is instructive for the
arms control community currently debating the utility of monitoring
and verification proposals for treaties such as the Biological and
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Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and trying to uncover the
trail of physical and documentary evidence of the Hussein regime’s
biological weapons program in Iraq. Here the lessons are not
so pleasant. It perhaps is obvious that the illicit, intentional use
of a biological weapon, or an accident that might occur in their
development, would engender even tighter control of information
and greater volume of denials than what we witnessed in China in
the early days of the SARS outbreak. That the Chinese government
could cover up a serious outbreak for months is sobering; it is much
easier to cover up illicit work on biological agents for weapons
purposes as the latter occur almost exclusively in laboratories or in
other highly controlled facilities.
Tracking disease—especially when the disease causes severe
symptoms and spreads in ways not previously seen—is problematic
even under the best of circumstances. When there is a deeper
political agenda designed to obfuscate the data and deny access to
time-sensitive information, the outcome can be disastrous, as might
well occur if a state or terrorist organization employed biological
weapons. We were fortunate that the SARS agent’s mechanism of
spread was inefficient, for had transmission been like that of other
viral diseases such as measles or influenza, many more people would
have died for lack of easily obtained pieces of data, let alone the
enormous strain on limited medical resources such as intensive-care
unit beds that were needed to save the lives of the most ill patients.
We will not necessarily be so lucky the next time.
Medical Aspects of SARS: Diagnosis, Treatment and Outcome.
As of early August 2003, WHO reported2 that there had been
approximately 8,500 cases of SARS in 32 countries and territories. The
median age of SARS patients was about 40 years (although patients
as young as 1 and as old as 90 have been confirmed as SARS victims).
About 20 percent of patients were health-care workers, indicating
that, despite reasonable precautions from the outset of the epidemic,
close contact with patients confers a high risk for transmission. SARS
has a high mortality: about 11 percent of patients die. More than half
of the currently known SARS cases are from China where reporting
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remains incomplete; there will probably be more patients among
survivors of SARS in China, and certainly among those who have
died in recent months. We now know that older patients fare badly,
as about 45 percent of all patients over age 60 die. The combination
of advanced age, intensive care unit (ICU) admission, and the need
for mechanical ventilation is associated with an 80 percent mortality
rate.
WHO believes that the first case of SARS occurred in November
2002 in southeastern China, some 2 months before the first case
occurred outside of the country—as it happens, in the United States
on January 9, 2003. The vast majority of nonmainland Chinese cases
have occurred in just four countries or territories: Hong Kong (now
a Special Administrative Region of China), Taiwan, Singapore, and
Canada accounting for approximately 3,000 cases. In the United
States, there have been 33 cases of SARS, though it should be noted
that, because of the similarities between SARS and other causes
of acute respiratory illness, the diagnosis of some of the initial
“suspected SARS” cases, will doubtless turn out to have been due to
other causes, both infectious and noninfectious.
Medical school professors are fond of saying that “the human
body has only so many ways of responding to assault from toxic or
infectious agents.” What they mean is that the symptoms that patients
experience—including severe symptoms such as shortness of breath
and high fever—can be caused by a large number of agents. Indeed,
SARS initially begins like most respiratory viruses with fever, dry
cough, muscle aches, and headache. The changes in the levels of
white blood cells mirrors those of influenza and even the common
cold virus. SARS is one more in a long list of “flu-like” illnesses, but
the emerging picture is one of much higher than “flu-like” mortality.
Fortunately, as already noted, SARS is much harder to transmit and
catch than influenza.
A large series of SARS patients from Canada—the country with
the most SARS cases outside of Asia—points to the severity of the
clinical disease.3 About one out of five SARS victims are admitted to
an ICU, and almost all of these patients require mechanical ventilation
due to respiratory failure, with low blood oxygen saturation, severe
fatigue from increased work of respiration, and accumulation of large
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amounts fluid in the air sacs (alveoli) of the lungs. Significantly, half
of the mechanically ventilated patients die despite the most advanced
care. Thus, when respiratory failure occurs in SARS, it is an ominous
prognostic indicator. A similar experience has been reported from
Singapore.4
SARS, then, is best thought of as one form of Adult Respiratory
Distress Syndrome (ARDS), defined as a clinical condition in which
there is shortness of breath, abnormal findings in chest x-ray, and
low oxygen levels in the blood. ARDS usually is associated with
injury to the lung and may be preceded by a variety of contributory
actors including trauma, infection, and shock, among many others.
The mechanisms leading to ARDS in patients with otherwise
uncomplicated infection from the SARS virus or other microorganisms remain obscure. Whatever the underlying cause of
disturbance of normal lung function, all cases of ARDS necessitate
ICU management. Treatment is supportive, meaning that patients
are provided with oxygen, fluids, nutrition via gastric tubes or
intravenously, and aggressive respiratory toilet, while one hopes for
the lung physiology to return to normal.
At autopsy, microscopic examination of the lung shows fluid
accumulation in the alveolar sacs, loss of the normal cilia of the
bronchial tubes that clear secretions from the lungs, and occasionally
secondary bacterial pneumonia.5 Interestingly, at the time of
death, little or no virus is identified in the lung, even in the most
severely affected portions of the organ. However, antibodies against
Coronavirus almost always are found in the bloodstream, indicating
a recent infection with this organism. The absence of organisms is
not unusual. When influenza leads to ARDS (as it does on very rare
occasion), it is the rule that the virus can not be recovered or grown
from lung tissue.
The organism believed to be causal in most cases of SARS is a
variety of Coronavirus (officially, “SARS-associated Coronavirus”
[SARS-CoV]). It was identified by a remarkable collaboration among
scientists from Vietnam, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, and the
United States6 and simultaneously by investigators in Germany,
France, and the Netherlands.7 It is probably fair to say that never
before has a previously unrecognized disease been characterized so
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quickly, and against the current of mainstream virologic thought.
Coronavirses have been well-described as the cause of illness in
humans, but never had there been fatalities from this viral family.
About one-third of all cases of the common cold are caused by the
Coronavirus, and it also occasionally may cause diarrhea in young
children. Death from Coronavirus sub-types was unknown.
The isolation of the organism led almost immediately to a
diagnostic test based on the presence of antibodies in patients who
were recovering from the illness, which was invaluable for broad
population studies to establish the means of transmission, as well
as the overall susceptibility to and incidence of the disease. In some
cases, the antibody test also could be used to make the diagnosis
of SARS when it was unclear if the patient was suffering from the
Coronavirus or not.
Currently, there is little information on the value of anti-viral
drugs, even though it appears that the SARS-CoV is sensitive to
ribavarin (a well known anti-microbial agent) in tissue culture. Based
on all of the clinical studies published to date, there is almost no
evidence that treatment with ribavirin alters the outcome of patients
with SARS. This, too, is not unusual for virus-caused diseases,
although it may be that in the known cases of SARS, the diagnosis
was made after a narrow therapeutic window—between the time
of initial infection and onset of the most severe symptoms—had
passed. In addition, it is possible that the respiratory failure relates
to an individual host’s immune system response to the virus rather
than to the damage caused by the infection itself.
Because there has been limited time to follow SARS survivors,
it is not known if chronic lung problems will plague these patients.
However, in ARDS from other causes, patients who have been
ventilated mechanically have been shown to have residual functional
abnormalities8 and a generally poor quality of life9 for many months
after hospital discharge. It is unlikely that the experience of survivors
of SARS will be much different.
Compared to influenza A and each of its subtypes, SARS-CoV
is a highly mortal disease. However, because of the much higher
prevalence of influenza worldwide and in the United States, the
number of deaths attributed to influenza is many times that of
SARS. Between 1976 and 1997, the Center for Disease Control in the
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United States estimates that, on average, more than 50,000 people
died each year, and influenza is estimated to be involved (either as a
direct cause of death or contributing to death in patients with other
ailments) in a bit more than 2 percent of all deaths. In 1996, about
14,000 people in the United States died as a direct result of influenza,
and another 54,000 with chronic circulatory or respiratory disease
died from complications of influenza. It is difficult to know the
overall mortality rate from influenza as statistics on the incidence of
the disease are not available, but it is probably less than 1 percent. As
with SARS, patients over age 65 have the highest mortality among
age groups.
Finally, it is likely that SARS has been under diagnosed, with
many mildly symptomatic individuals unrecognized. WHO criteria
for SARS have been shown to be very specific (that is, resulting in
few false positives) but not very sensitive (that is, a large number
of false negatives).10 Future population-based serologic surveys may
define the actual incidence of the disease. For now, our description of
SARS illness is largely limited to the population that is sick enough
to seek medical care.
Thus, SARS-CoV is a significant cause of morbidity but, in total,
has involved a tiny fraction of the number of people who contract
influenza in any given year. The mortality from SARS in those
infected is much higher than influenza, but because of the millions
of infections with influenza every year in the United States alone, the
number of deaths from influenza exceed those from SARS by at least
three or four orders of magnitude.
SARS: History, Epidemiology, and Isolation of Causal Organism.
It is now reasonably certain that the first cases of SARS occurred in
early November 2002 in Guangdong Province in southeastern China
(see Map 1). The patient was a businessman, but the significance
of his disease was recognized only in retrospect, and his illness,
along with those of hundreds of other individuals with the same
severe respiratory symptoms in the same province, was unknown
outside China for some months. By early 2003, there were four
major foci of life-threatening respiratory disease beyond mainland
China: Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and Canada (Toronto).
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Map 1.
It is not yet clear how many people in Guangdong the businessman
infected in November 2002. The first patient outside of China to
become ill with SARS was a 64-year-old physician from Guangdong
Province who became symptomatic while visiting relatives in
Hong Kong (now commonly referred to as the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of China).11 When he arrived in Hong Kong
on February 21, 2003, he had been mildly ill for about 5 days, but
felt well enough to go sightseeing and shopping with relatives.12 He
was admitted to the hospital the following day. About 3 days later,
a 53-year-old male who accompanied the physician on his excursion
around Hong Kong then became ill, and he was hospitalized 2 days
later on February 26. Over the next 17 days, eight other people became
ill with identical symptoms, all of them either staying at the same
hotel as the physician index case, or who had contact with him in
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the hospital or with other patients with respiratory disease recently
hospitalized.
At about the same time, on February 28, a patient presented to
the Vietnamese French Hospital of Hanoi with an influenza-like
illness. Because of recent small outbreaks over the past 2 years in
Southeast Asia of influenza transmitted directly from humans to
birds, physicians in Hanoi became concerned that they were seeing
another similar outbreak. Mortality in previous human avian
influenza (“bird flu”) cases was extremely high, and because of the
fear that avian influenza had once again jumped into humans, WHO
was contacted. Dr. Carlo Urbani, an infectious disease expert, was
dispatched, and, within a few days, he and a small team of virologists
and epidemiologists arrived in Hanoi. With in a few weeks, Dr.
Urbani and at least five other health care workers would also be
dead, all from the mysterious new disease contracted from patients
they cared for.
Urbani and his colleagues set to work immediately collecting
specimens, reviewing patient histories, and assisting hospital
workers with infection control and patient isolation procedures. By
March 9—just 10 days after the first patient in Vietnam appeared at
the French Hospital—WHO was worried enough by Dr. Urbani’s
data to request an emergency meeting with high ranking health
ministers in Hanoi, and recommended strict enforcement of patient
isolation and barrier protection for all healthcare workers in Hanoi
hospitals caring for patients with respiratory symptoms. Medecins
sans Frontiers (Doctors without Borders), an international medical
aid agency, provided additional physicians and personal protective
equipment. More infection control specialists were dispatched to
Hanoi.
Also on March 9, a 32-year-old Singaporean physician became ill
with a high fever while in New York City on a visit. The previous
week while in Singapore, he had cared for a patient from Hong Kong
who presented “atypical pneumonia” on March 3. Four days later
the doctor developed a dry cough and a rash. On March 16, while
in Frankfurt on his way back to Singapore, he became so short of
breath that he was sent to Frankfurt University Hospital and was
admitted to the ICU. Subsequently, two people in close contact with
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this physician—his wife and his mother—became ill about the time
the doctor was admitted to the hospital.
Unknown to physicians in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Frankfurt,
on February 25, 2003, in Toronto, Canada, a 78-year-old woman
developed fever, sore throat, and a dry cough 2 days after returning
from a 10-day visit to Hong Kong. She was given an oral anti-bacterial
antibiotic but became progressively more ill. She died on March
5 while at home. Her 43-year-old son became ill with symptoms
essentially identical to those of his mother on February 27, and
on March 2 was admitted to the hospital. Progressive respiratory
difficulties supervened, and he was placed on a mechanical ventilator
on March 3. Despite careful intensive treatment, he died on March
13, roughly 2 weeks after becoming ill. An autopsy was performed,
which revealed changes typical of the Adult Respiratory Distress
Syndrome, but no evidence of viral infection was identified.13
By the end of March, there would be more than 100 cases of SARS
in Canada, 156 in Hong Kong, and at least 40 in Vietnam. Many other
countries would go on to identify cases of what became known as SARS
within weeks. But, there was little, if any, information forthcoming
from China. The Chinese government reported 305 cases of “atypical
pneumonia” with at least five deaths to WHO on February 11, 2003
(even though an unusual disease outbreak had first been recognized
in November 2002), but initially the disease was attributed to a rare
cause of pneumonia, Chlamydia pneumonae.
WHO first alerted public health officials to the presence of a
“severe form of pneumonia” on March 12, 2003,14 after connecting
the illnesses described above. A case definition was established
and promulgated via the Internet and WHO bulletins. This case
definition consisted of a set of symptoms (patient complaints) and
signs (physicians’ findings at the time of physical examination and
also laboratory tests and X-ray results). The combination of signs and
symptoms—a “syndrome”—is not to be confused with a diagnosis
based on a specific, known cause (such as an infectious organism)
and was called “Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome” (SARS).
The first summary of the epidemiology of SARS—the patterns
of disease by age, sex, and travel history of victims—appeared on
March 31, published on the Web page of the New England Journal of
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Medicine (NEJM). Never before had information about a completely
new syndrome been categorized, collated, analyzed, checked, and
distributed so quickly, nor had multicountry peer review ever
before been marshaled so expeditiously. NEJM has an international
reputation for high standards, and its requirements for publication,
even in electronic form, are as stringent as any scientific journal
anywhere in the world.
Then, remarkably on March 24, scientists at the CDC working
closing with researchers in Hong Kong isolated and identified a
virus of the family of viruses called Coronavirus (CoV) from the
first patients with SARS (see Figure 1). They had taken respiratory
secretions, blood samples, and other body fluids from SARS victims
and plated the material out on a wide variety of animal cells growing
in tissue culture vats. Within a few days of starting these experiments,
investigators noted that in one particular cell culture—monkey
kidney cells—were dying. Inspection of the cells under the electron
microscope showed that they were filled with viral particles.

Figure 1: Coronavirus Urbani as Seen
in the Electron Microscope (NEJM 348:
1954-66, 2003).
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Within a week, a key portion of the genome of CoV had been
completely sequenced and compared with all other known
Coronavirus strains. It was found to be different not only from all
other strains of Coronavirus that cause disease in humans, but from
those strains that cause disease in a multitude of animal species:
birds, cattle, pigs, and cats (both wild and domesticated). A group of
investigators in Germany did the same, and proved that their gene
sequencing was completely consistent with the CDC-Hong Kong
group. Their results, along with a detailed description of clinical
and autopsy findings, laboratory studies, and even a highly-specific
prototype antibody test were described and published on the New
England Journal web site on April 10, less than 7 weeks after the first
cases of SARS appeared in Canada and Hong Kong. In honor of Dr.
Urbani, the proposed name of the novel Coronavirus is the “Urbani
strain of SARS-associated coronavirus).
How Do We Know That C. Urbani Causes SARS?
In response to any infection, mammalian immune systems
produce a panoply of responses. At least a dozen different cells
capture and degrade the invading organism, and some of these cells
engulf and kill the virus directly. Other cells dismember the outer
membrane constituents of the virus and deliver selected pieces to
other cells that, after the passage of a few days, begin to generate
antibodies that bind more-or-less specifically to the infectious agent.
The quantity (called “titer”) of antibodies (of several subtypes)
slowly rises, usually over the course of 3 to 8 weeks. The presence
and quantity of these antibodies can be identified by using antibodies
from other animals (goats are a typical source) that bind to human
antibodies—caprine anti-human antibodies—that are tagged further
with fluorescent markers. If human anti-Coronavirus antibodies are
obtained from an individual patient’s blood and exposed to cells on a
microscope slide containing the offending viral particles growing in
them, the antibodies will bind to the cells. When the tagged caprine
anti-human antibodies then are applied to the microscope slide, the
cells become dotted with brightly fluorescing material (easily seen
when illuminated with ultraviolet light source) and quantified. This
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process is called “indirect-immunoflourescence,” so named because
the binding of the patient’s own antibodies against the infectious agent
is seen “indirectly” via the fluorescence of the tagged antibodies that,
in turn, are bound tightly to target sites on the virus on a microscope
slide, rather than by visualizing the antibodies themselves (which
are too small to be seen with ordinary microscopes).
The case for Coronavirus Urbani as the cause of SARS was capped
with the demonstration of increasing titer of antibodies in patients
who recovered from SARS during 3 or 4 weeks of convalescence and
a survey of hundreds of old (pre-SARS) blood-bank samples that
failed to reveal any antibodies against C. Urbani. Thus, not only were
patients who recovered from SARS generating specific antibodies to
the virus, the virus had to be novel for, if it were ever in circulation
previously in the human population, at least some blood donors
would be expected to show evidence of past infection.
To date, Coronavirus Urbani has been found in respiratory
secretions and fecal matter, but rarely in the bloodstream of patients
suffering with disease. In animals, various strains of Coronavirus
are isolated from the same sources. Most virologists believe that all
of these materials are infectious.
Origin of Coronavirus Strain Urbani.
The family of Coronavirus is known to mutate frequently, that
is, the genome of the virus may change suddenly, resulting in a new
species of Coronavirus that may have a different host range or result
in more severe disease. One way this mutation can occur is via the
process of recombination, wherein two (or perhaps more) Coronavirus
species that happen to infect a given animal at the same time shuffle
and exchange their DNA within animal host cells. The daughter
virus types that emerge from the animal cell then may contain an
entirely new DNA construct (or, multiple types may result each with
a unique and novel genome). A similar process occurs from time
to time with the influenza virus, and when it does, a never-before
seen strain of the virus may begin to circulate in the population.
In addition, close and repeated contact between animals that carry
these reassorted strains of influenza and humans—as occurs often in
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crowded live-animal markets in Asia and on farms—seems to create
a perfect niche for the passage of novel influenza strain to humans.
It is not surprising that new varieties of influenza in recent decades
have first appeared in Asia, particularly in China and Hong Kong.
Since Coronavirus species are the cause of a multitude of
animal diseases (usually presenting as fatal respiratory disease or
dehydration from diarrhea), and since agricultural animals tend
to live in close quarters, spread from animal to animal is the rule,
thereby permitting enormous numbers of reassortment variants.15
Human farmers or customers in crowded animal markets are
potential targets for novel strains that may have surprising changes
in their host range. All of the known human Coronavirus species
characterized to date cause mild illnesses: about 30 percent of “colds”
(technically upper respiratory infections, not involving the lungs or
interfering with respiration) are caused by a Coronavirus. On rare
occasion, mild diarrhea in humans also results from Coronavirus.
Thus, it appears that an unwitting human in southern China
acquired a novel strain of Coronavirus sometime in the fall of 2002.
The source has not been identified yet. Some virologists believe
that the organism was transmitted to humans from the civet cat, a
gastronomic delicacy in China. However, human consumption of
this animal, a 5,000 year tradition in China, casts doubt on the civet
as the primary source of the disease;16 nonetheless, Chinese officials
banned the sale of wild animals in Guangdong. Dr. David Heyman,
WHO’s executive director for communicable disease, cautioned that
the source of the virus remains speculative, and that it is possible that
a seasonal pattern may emerge over time, suggesting environmental
niches that might provide alternative paths of transmission beyond
consumption of wild animals17 or direct contact with Coronavirusinfected humans.
Transmission and Response:
Should SARS Have Caused such a Fuss?
In the early stages of a disease outbreak involving a manifestly
novel agent, many uncertainties arise in predicting the speed of
transmission of disease. As with SARS, the mode of transmission
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is not immediately apparent early in many epidemics. Among the
questions that epidemiologists try to answer are:
• Are there animal and/or insect vectors?
• Do infected individuals spread the micro-organism via
aerosolization during coughing or sneezing? If individuals
are infectious to others, how long do they remain so?
• What is the rate of new cases (sometimes called the “incidence”)
of disease?
• Are quarantine and travel restrictions necessary?
After establishing a “case definition,” the primary data that
public health officials need to answer these questions comes from
the simple reporting of the time of onset of each case, location of the
individual, and demographic information such as sex, approximate
age, recent travel, and perhaps the individual’s employment. With
statistical tests to determine the degree of confidence in the data,
epidemiologists can plot the data in a variety of ways to determine
trends and thus infer the “behavior” of the epidemic. Needless to say,
in the absence of routine information flow—as occurred in mainland
China—even this simple analysis is impossible.
In March and April 2003, during the first few weeks of the SARS
epidemic outside of mainland China, reporting was timely and
generally complete. Although the media tended to focus on the fear
(even panic) attendant to the unknown cause of the syndrome, it was
possible to discern that the epidemic was growing slowly, and not at
all what one might expect from an influenza-like virus that spread via
aerosol from person-to-person. Simply by plotting the total number
of reported cases by country over time, a benign picture emerged:18
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SARS Cases and Deaths

Figure 2.
Note that, the China mainland aside, the growth in the number
of cases is approximately linear. Indeed, using basic statistical tools,
it was possible to postulate a linear growth model, and test this
hypothesis against actual number of cases:

Figure 3.
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Influenza (or closely related virus strains) almost certainly would
have caused an exponential increase in the number of cases. As the
epidemic proceeded and more cases were reported, public health
personnel increasingly were confident that spread of the virus
depended on close contact with infected individuals or contaminated
surfaces.
With the exception of mainland China, exchange of data in the
SARS epidemic was unprecedented.
Early Lessons from the SARS Epidemic for Public Health
and Counterterrorism.
The tools of molecular biology, epidemiology with contact
tracing, and modern communications via the Internet resulted in an
unprecedented public health triumph: Within a few days of the first
cases, WHO was able to organize collaborating teams of virologists,
epidemiologists, and infectious disease experts, each critical to
the isolation, identification, and containment of the disease. That
the organism responsible for SARS was never before described
underscores the profound importance of the global response and the
value of independent groups working simultaneously. Indeed, the
contemporaneous sequencing of the viral genome in the United States
and Germany provided at once the identification of the organism
and verification thereof. Further, the results along with expert
interpretation in the context of the epidemic were communicated
worldwide within days. As has been noted by others, if “business
as usual” had applied in SARS, we might still be trying to identify
the causal organism, and the disease might have been much more
widely spread.
At the same time, the response to SARS might have been quicker—
with fewer attendant deaths and fewer cases—had international
public health workers been aware of the “atypical pneumonia”
cases in China that began in November 2002. More than ever before,
the management of novel infectious disease outbreaks is highly
dependent on timely information. Transportation and commerce
virtually assure that microbial pathogens in one part of the globe will
be in major transport hubs within days or even hours, increasing the
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likelihood of multipoint outbreaks and adding to the bewilderment
of infectious disease experts trying to unravel the origin and modes
of spread of the agent. The key, of course, is open dissemination of
information; it appears that the Chinese public health infrastructure
failed to do its part in what we now know to be the first days of SARSCoV. Indeed, it was not until July 2005 that Chinese investigators
published substantive information on their experience with SARS,19
when an entire issue of the most widely read Chinese medical journal
was devoted to SARS. An editorial accompanying the scientific
papers mentioned nothing about reporting delays nor interrupted
information flow as contributors to both domestic and international
spread of SARS.
The ingress of human activity into previously unexplored regions
and the close contact between humans and hundreds of animal species
guarantees the exchange of countless organisms. Mercifully, most of
them will not result in disease (in either humans or animals).
SARS is but the latest in a series of “emerging” diseases—illnesses
due to infectious agents that were not described previously—that
have begun to affect humans. In just the past few decades, medical
journals and newspaper headlines have been filled with articles about
these new disease entities: Ebola hemorrhagic fever (from squirrels
and perhaps monkeys), Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome (from
mice), Spongioform encephalopathy (from cows), and monkeypox
(transmitted by prairie dogs), all occurring in people. Although
this list is incomplete and doubtless other novel diseases await us,
similarities can be identified readily. All of the organisms originate
in nonhuman species and have occurred when humans and the
natural animal hosts come in close contact (indeed, in the case of both
Ebola and Spongioform encephalopathy, consumption of infected
animal tissue seems to be required). Each of the organisms causes
diseases with high mortality (in the case of Ebola and Spongioform
encephalopathy, nearly 100 percent), and none can be treated
successfully yet. Finally, while treatment is elusive, prevention
generally is simple, with either avoidance of contact or, in the case of
SARS-CoV, careful isolation of infectious patients until their disease
resolves.
Given the characteristics of emerging disease pathogens, rapid
identification of disease foci is essential. Remarkably enough,
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having a pathogen in hand (or surrogate diagnostic test results) is
not necessary in order to recognize that a problem may be brewing.
Syndrome-based surveillance (SBS), depending only on the signs
and symptoms in seriously ill people or animals, may be sufficient
to mobilize international action—first with quarantine, followed by
the application of new techniques in genomics, molecular biology,
immunology and cell culture to identify causal organisms combined
with the sharing of results so that they may be independently verified.
The power of SBS to give early warning to public health officials
and government decisionmakers has been described recently,20 and
at least two systems, ESSENCE II and the Syndrome Reporting
Information System (SYRIS),21 have been in operation in several U.S.
states for the past 2 years,22 and SYRIS has been used in Singapore
to help manage the SARS epidemic there. Each system draws on the
basic tenants of epidemiology: establishing what kind of illness a
patient (or animal) has; when the illness began; and where the patient
is located or has traveled.
Approaches to SBS fall into two broad categories: “passive”
systems that utilize data commonly gathered in the care of patients
such as emergency room records, ambulance flowsheets, and even
billing from physician offices; and “active” systems that depend
on health care providers to identify the case and describe the signs
and symptoms observed. There are advantages and disadvantages
to each. Passive systems are nonspecific, depend on availability of
sensitive patient data via electronic means, and assume that the kind
of information cataloged in western medical systems is similar to that
gathered elsewhere. Analysis therefore may be difficult, and false
alarms may occur. However, passive systems do not require specific
input from busy healthcare providers; clerks or administrators (and
automated billing systems) can provide much of the needed data.
Active systems exploit physician judgment, depending on doctors
to enter required information (preferably via a computer interface
with immediate dissemination of reports). In any surveillance
system, there is a trade-off between the quantity of data and its quality,
often referred to as the “signal to noise” ratio in scientific disciplines.
Active systems operate on the hypothesis that physician are able to
determine quickly the severity of illness, even though the underlying
etiology is unknown. It may be the case that nonspecific indicators—
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such as the raw number of patients ill with mild symptoms (generally
not captured in billing statements or “chief complaints” recorded
by nursing or ambulance personnel)—will lead to false alarms,
triggering costly investigations or preventive measures that are
unwarranted. On the other hand, the sudden appearance of even a
small number of patients with severe constitutional symptoms (high
fever and prostration, for example), along with certain clinical signs
such as rash or pneumonia, may be indicative of the earliest stages
of an epidemic, including one caused by terrorist use of biological
weapons.23
Active and passive surveillance systems have not demonstrated
their cost-effectiveness yet. However, in at least one important case,
syndrome surveillance enabled public health officials to determine
rapidly that a report of stolen samples of virulent plague organisms
from a medical school in Texas was a hoax.24 By noting the absence
of respiratory disease at a time when a high incidence of seasonallyrelated respiratory symptoms was expected, local officials could
assure physicians and the public that there was no reason for worry.
In addition, public health officials used the syndrome surveillance
system to communicate new information and all-important diagnostic
criteria for plague to physicians in the community who, by and large,
had never seen a case of this disease.
Conclusions.
The management of the SARS-CoV epidemic of 2003 was, for
the most part, a victory for scientists working in epidemiology
and molecular biology. Within weeks, the organism was isolated
and identified, and a diagnostic test was perfected. Perhaps more
important, by careful reporting and contact tracing, it was possible
to determine that the disease spread slowly, implying that there was
little likelihood of aerosol transmission from person-to-person, a
key discovery that changed travel recommendations and even trade
dramatically.25 While there is no question that there were serious
economic consequences from the epidemic and nearly 1000 people
have died to date, the impact would have been much more severe in
the presence of greater uncertainty about the behavior of the virus
and the disease it caused.
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SARS provides decisionmakers and public health officials with
a model that generates valuable lessons for the response to future
disease outbreaks, including those that are introduced intentionally
into the human or animal population by terrorists. The key to
the successful management of SARS was the rapid sharing of
information. Countries that openly reported information benefited
both themselves and other nations. Mortality, though substantial,
was modest when compared to the yearly toll from influenza, and
economic catastrophe via draconian travel and trade restrictions was
avoided.
The international community may be poised to adopt a formal
system of routine data sharing via the Internet, overcoming the time
delays inherent in traditional reporting hierarchies. Several promising
Internet-based applications operating in the United States, Europe,
and Asia can provide invaluable information to public health officials
trying to limit the spread of infection and to the physicians who care
for those who become ill during epidemics. A modest amount of
political will is all that is required. Since infectious disease respects no
border, people living in countries whose leaders choose to suppress
information or subvert open reporting may suffer immeasurably in
future outbreaks that are certain to occur.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6
1. I will use the abbreviation “SARS” when referring to the syndrome and SARSCoV when discussing the disease caused by the newly discovered Coronavirus.
More detail is provided in the text.
2. See www.who.int/csr/sars/country/2003_08_15/en/.
3. R. A. Fowler, S. E. Lapinsky, D. Hallett, A. S. Detsky, W. J. Sibbald, A. S.
Slutsky, and T. E. Stewart, “Critically Ill Patients with Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome,” Journal Of The American Medical Association (JAMA), Vol. 290, No. 3,
July 16, 2003, pp. 367-373.
4. T. W. K. Lew, T. K. Kwek, D. Tai, A. Earnest, S. Loo, K. Singh, K. M. Kwan,
Y Chan, C. F. Yim, S. L. Bek, A. C. Kor, W. S. Yap, Y. R. Chelliah, Y. C. Lai, and S.
K. Goh, idem., pp. 374-380.
5. J. M. Nicholls, L. L. M. Poon, K. C. Lee, W. F. Ng, S. T. Lai, C. Y. Leung, C. M.
Chu, P. K. Hui, K. L. Mak, W. Lim, K. W. Yan, K. H. Chan, N. C. Tsang, Y Guan,
K. Y. Yuen, and J. S. M. Peiris, “Lung Pathology of Fatal Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome,” Lancet, Vol. 361, No. 9371, May 24, 2003; pp.1773-1778.
115

6. Christian Drosten, Stephan Gunther, Wolfgang Preiser, Sylvie van der Werf,
Hans-Reinhard Brodt, Stephan Becker, Holger Rabenau, Marcus Panning, Larissa
Kolesnikova, Ron A. M. Fouchier, Annemarie Berger, et al., “Identification of a
Novel Coronavirus in Patients with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome,” New
England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 348, 2003, pp. 1967-1976.
7. Thomas G. Ksiazek, Dean Erdman, Cynthia S. Goldsmith, Sherif R. Zaki,
Teresa Peret, Shannon Emery, Suziang Tong, Carlo Urbani, James A. Comer,
Wilina Lim, Pierre E. Rollin, Dowell, et al., the SARS Working Group, “A Novel
Coronavirus Associated with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome,” ibid., pp 19531966.
8. T. A. Neff, R. Stocker, H. R. Frey, S. Stein, and E. W. Russi, “Long-term
Assessment of Lung Function in Survivors of Severe ARDS, Chest, Vol. 123, No. 3,
March 2003, pp. 845-853.
9. G. Schelling, C. Stoll, C. Vogelmeier, T. Hummel, J. Behr, H. P. Kapfhammer,
H. B. Rothenhausler, M. Haller, K. Durst, T. Krauseneck, and J. Briegel, “Pulmonary
Function and Health-Related Quality of Life in a Sample of Long-term Survivors
of the Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome,” Intensive Care Medicine, Vol. 26, No.
9, September 2000, pp. 1304-1311.
10. T. H. Rainer, P. A. Cameron, D. Smit, K. L. Ong, A. N. W. Hung, D. C. P.
Nin, A. T. Ahuja, L. C. Y. Si, and J. J. Y. Sung, “Evaluation of WHO Criteria for
Identifying Patients with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Out of Hospital:
Prospective Observational Study,” British Medical Journal, Vol. 326, No. 7403, June
21, 2003, pp. 1354-1358.
11. R. P. Wenzel, and M. B. Edmond, New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 348,
2003, pp. 1947-1949.
12. K. W. Tsang, P. L. Ho, G. C. Ooi, et al., “Cluster of Cases of Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome in Hong Kong,” New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 348,
2003, pp. 1977-1985.
13. S. M. Poutanen, D. E. Low, Henry B., S. Finkelstein, et al., “Identification of
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in Canada,” New England Journal of Medicine,
Vol. 348, 2003, pp. 1995-2005.
14. See www.who.int/csr/sars/archive/2003_03_12/en/. The WHO on-line archives
serve as the single most comprehensive source of information about SARS.
15. It is believed that the vast majority of recombinant strains of virus are
nonviable because their DNA does not contain the necessary codes to produce
functioning daughter virus particles.
16. British Medical Journal, Vol. 326, June 7, 2003, p. 1232.
17. Ibid., June 21, 2003, p. 1350.
18. The graphs are taken from an informal paper that I circulated among public
health officials in Switzerland, the United States, and Singapore, updated twice
weekly in the early weeks of the SARS outbreak. This work was not peer-reviewed,
but was reported in Science, Vol. 300, April 25, 2003, pp. 558-559.
116

19. The June 2003 issue of the Chinese Medical Journal (Vol. 116, No. 7) and the
July 2003 Chinese Science Bulletin (Vol 48, No. 13) contain the first publications
authored in the People’s Republic of China, not including the Hong Kong SAR.
20. M. D. Lewis, J. A. Pavlin, J. L. Mansfield, S. O’Brien, L. G. Boomsma, Y. Elbert,
and P. W. Kelley, “Disease Outbreak Detection System Using Syndromic Data in
the Greater Washington, DC, Area,” American Journal Of Preventive Medicine, Vol.
23, No. 3, October 2002 pp. 180-186.
21. For more information on SYRIS, see syris,arescorporation.com/demo.
22. Mary Beth Nierengarten, Larry Lutwick, and Suzanne Lutwick, “SyndromeBased Surveillance for Clinicians on the Frontlines of Healthcare: Focus on Rapid
Diagnosis and Notification,” www.medscape.com/viewprogram/2427.
23. R. P. Kadlec, A. P. Zelicoff, and A. M. Vrtis, “Biological Weapons Control—
Prospects and Implications for the Future,” JAMA, Vol. 278, No. 5, August 6, 1997,
pp. 351-356.
24. Tigi Ward,
communication).

Lubbock

Texas

Department

of

Health

(personal

25. Some recent evidence suggests that foodhandlers, caterers and chefs
in China were a “high risk group” for acquiring SARS-CoV. This adds further
evidence in support of the postulate that animals used as food (including, but not
limited to chickens and civet cats) in China are the “source” of SARS-CoV. R. P.
Wenzel and M. B. Edmonds, “Listening to SARS: Lesson for Infection Control,”
Ann Internal Medicine, 2003 (in press).

117

SECTION III.
WHAT CAN BE DONE
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CHAPTER 7
NEW MISSILES AND MODELS FOR COOPERATION1
Dennis M. Gormley and Richard Speier
NOTE: This chapter, first presented by the authors on March 17, 2003, was reviewed
and updated by the authors in January 2006.

THE THREAT
Even though ballistic missiles dominated missile nonproliferation
deliberations during the last decade of the 20th century, land-attack
cruise missiles (LACMs)—most notably America’s Tomahawk—
figured into no less than seven different military contingencies. The
Tomahawk’s most impressive role was reflected in its widespread use
against Iraq during Operation DESERT STORM, when, during the
first hours of the air campaign, Tomahawk strikes greatly leveraged
the subsequent effectiveness of manned aircraft by destroying critical
Iraqi air defense and command and control targets. Tomahawks, too,
figured into a variety of much smaller-scale contingencies, the most
controversial of which were the attacks on the al-Shifa pharmaceutical
plant in Khartoum, Sudan, and al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, in
retaliation for the al-Qaeda-sponsored embassy bombings in Africa
in August 1998.
Although the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant attack dominated
press scrutiny, the ineffectiveness of cruise missile attacks on Osama
bin Laden’s Afghan camps generated significant interest in new
roles for unarmed and subsequently armed unmanned air vehicles
(UAVs) even before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11).
Unarmed UAVs, with their extended loiter capability, could provide
surveillance and communications connectivity superior to that of
manned aircraft. But armed UAVs could do more. In the aftermath
of the terrorist attacks on New York City and the Pentagon, the
United States, for the first time, effectively unleashed Predators
armed with two Hellfire missiles for use in Afghanistan, and most
prominently, in a pinpoint attack against a top al-Qaeda operative
and five companions in Yemen. The notion of combining real-time
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eyes, by way of several organic surveillance packages, with a weapon
allowing for the virtually instantaneous engagement of so-called
time-critical targets was powerfully appealing. Assuming that the
authorization to fire could be prearranged or achieved quickly, such
a combined sensor and weapons-carrying UAV would more than
compensate for the limitations of using LACMs launched from great
distances hours after acquiring targeting intelligence. Arguably, the
armed UAV has become the most prominently featured military
instrument in America’s first war of the 21st century.
The employment of UAVs promises to make military operations
more discriminating in their effects. But, as this trend establishes
itself, more ominous possibilities are emerging. UAVs—both armed
and unarmed—are growing larger. They are breaching the threshold
for the most restrictive international nonproliferation restraints.
And civilian applications for UAVs are developing. These trends—
combined with the inherent capability of UAVs to deliver nuclear,
biological, or chemical payloads—set the stage for a new level of
proliferation threats—the very opposite of the discriminating use of
force.
The American use of armed Predators raises important questions
not only about how UAVs will help shape America’s current
military transformation, but also about the extent to which other
countries or terrorist groups might emulate American actions and
transform their own unarmed UAVs or small manned aircraft into
unmanned weapons-delivery systems or crude terror weapons.
Recent inspections in Iraq have uncovered a UAV that reportedly
is the system that Secretary of State Colin Powell discussed before
the UN Security Council in early February 2003 as having been test
flown 500km around a racetrack fully autonomously.2 Equipped with
sprayers that Iraq is known to have tested, such a UAV could have
threatened regional targets and conceivably even U.S. ones, were
such a vehicle launched from a ship offshore or covertly transported
into the United States.
The Strategic Setting.
Although the world’s UAV inventory is imprecisely documented,
according to one recent study,at least 40 countries produce over 600
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different UAVs, nearly 80 percent of which could be flown one-way
ranges of over 300 kilometres (km) and many substantially farther.3
Moreover, a small fraction of the world’s inventory of antiship
cruise missiles—primarily first-generation models with substantial
airframe volume—could be converted into land attack missiles with
ranges exceeding 300km. Further, there are inviting loopholes in the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) that permit aerospace
firms to sell flight management systems specifically designed to turn
small manned aircraft (including kit-built ones) into autonomously
guided and armed UAVs. Finally, were a country or terrorist group
motivated to develop a crude cruise missile or UAV either on its own
or with some foreign assistance, it could readily take advantage of the
last decade’s quantum leap in dual-use technologies that comprise
the chief components of autonomous air-vehicle development. These
include satellite navigation and guidance furnished primarily by the
USA’s Global Positioning System, high-resolution satellite imagery
from a growing number of commercial vendors, and digital mapping
technologies for mission planning.4
Impact of Proliferation on American Military Dominance. Should
cruise missiles and armed UAVs spread widely and become a
dominant feature of military operations or terrorist activity in the
21st century, the international security consequences could be
profound. Ironically, perhaps the most significant impact would
rebound on the United States—doubtless the most advanced nation
around the globe in developing and exploiting land-attack cruise
missiles (LACMs) and UAVs for military benefit. The proliferation
of LACMs and UAVs to complement ballistic missiles conceivably
could bolster the capacities of America’s adversaries to oppose
U.S.-led interventions in strategically important ways. LACMs and
UAVs could furnish new military leverage, due in significant part to
the capacity of cruise missiles (due to their steady horizontal flight
pattern, releasing anagent along a line of contamination) to enlarge
the effective lethal area of biological attacks by at least a factor of ten
over ballistic missiles.5 In addition, the potentially high accuracy of
LACMs suggests that even conventionally armed missiles may be
able to inflict significant damage on exposed targets. To envisage
such damage, one need only consider the airbases that U.S.-led
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coalition forces used during Operation DESERT STORM on which
aircraft were lined up wingtip-to-wingtip, and large tent cities were
left open and vulnerable to missile attack.
Cruise missile and UAV proliferation also are likely to create
unwanted dilemmas for American missile defenses. The United
States currently spends huge sums to defend against ballistic missile
threats. Yet, to the extent that America successfully pursues effective
theater and national missile defenses against ballistic missiles,
nations, and terrorist groups alike will be strongly motivated to
acquire LACMs and armed UAVs. For example, the low cost of
some cruise missiles and, especially, small airplanes modified to
become UAVs, renders the cost-per-kill arithmetic of missile defense
exceedingly unfavorable. For example, each Patriot PAC-3 missile
costs between $2-5 million, which compares unfavorably with either
a $200,000 LACM or $50,000-per-copy kit airplanes transformed into
armed UAVs.6 Because both ballistic and cruise missile defenses for
theater campaigns currently depend largely on the same high-cost,
high-performance interceptors, cruise as well as ballistic missile
attacks, especially saturation ones and those delivering weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) payloads, will present enormous problems
for the defender.
Advanced LACMs that fly low and have low observability
to air defense radars will raise the cost of cruise missile defense
dramatically.7 Even seemingly easy to detect armed UAVs could
challenge legacy air defense radars, including the Airborne Warning
and Control Systems (AWACS) and some ground-based radars.
Around 65 percent of the UAVs deployed today are propelled
by reciprocating engines, which means that they fly at speeds of
less than 80 knots per hour. Yet expensive air defense radars like
AWACS intentionally eliminate slow flying targets on or near the
ground in order to prevent their data processing and display systems
from being overly taxed. Although most ground based air defense
radars could probably detect such slow flying systems, the limited
radar horizon of ground based radars, combined with the possibly
large raid size of a threat, means that interceptor batteries could
be overwhelmed quickly, and their expensive missile inventories
rapidly depleted. There are no simple or cheap solutions that readily
return the advantage to the defender.
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Regional Military Imbalances. Potential or actual adversaries
of American military dominance are not motivated merely to
acquire long range missiles to deter or defeat Western-led military
interventions. Regional states, rogues or not, may be equally or
primarily driven to pursue missile acquisition for uniquely regional
reasons. Thus, regional military balances also could be adversely
affected by the spread of LACMs and UAVs. Chinese acquisition of
M-9 and M-11 ballistic missiles dominates calculations of the ChinaTaiwan military balance, but with noticeably less fanfare both sides
have begun to supplement their arsenals with cruise missiles. Closely
timed Chinese cruise and ballistic missiles attacks would severely
tax Taiwanese ground based radars that support their defense of a
small number of highly vulnerable airfields.8
The already unstable balance of forces between India and Pakistan,
too, could be adversely affected by the introduction of cruise missiles
and UAVs. According to an Indian report, in early December 2002, a
Pakistani reconnaissance UAV violated Indian airspace near the line
of control in Kashmir. The flight came immediately after renewed
shelling, suggesting that the UAV may have been collecting battle
damage information. Additional Pakistani shelling commenced
shortly after the Indian side detected the UAV, probably in an effort
to divert attempts to shoot it down.9 These escalations of tensions
in Kashmir have been mimicked in the broader arms acquisition
domain. Pakistan, for its part, is looking to the United States to sell
its army either highly sophisticated Predator UAVs or perhaps some
less controversial system to replace its own home grown but limited
Vision UAV, in order to improve its monitoring of the Kashmiri line
of control.10
India is even more active in both its own development and foreign
acquisition of cruise missiles and UAVs. Its Lakshya unmanned target
drone, which is thought to be capable of delivering a 450kg payload
over a 600km range, will reportedly soon be exported to an unknown
country (probably Israel).11 Israel, in turn, is supplying India initially
with two Heron long range reconnaissance UAVs, with more to
follow, to support its first major UAV base, located at the southern
naval command in Kochi.12 More controversial, due to its potentially
unwanted impact on MTCR effectiveness, is India and Russia’s co-
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development of the Brahmos dual-mode (antiship and land attack)
supersonic cruise missile, capable of delivering a 200kg payload
to a range of 300km. Both partners have openly expressed great
interest in large export sales of the Brahmos. The most provocative
development, however, derives from reports that Russia recently has
agreed to lease India an Akula II nuclear submarine outfitted with
300km range Club nuclear-capable cruise missiles. Indian military
analysts have already begun to characterize India as possessing a
“sea-based nuclear deterrent.”13
Cruise missiles also figure into tensions in the Middle East. Israel
is a major developer of reconnaissance UAVs, has deployed its own
Popeye air-launched LACM, and has probably deployed nucleararmed cruise missiles on her submarines.14 Of course, ballistic missiles
played a central role in Iran and Iraq’s 1980-88 “War of the Cities.”
While both countries have on-going ballistic missile development
programs, more recently cruise missiles and UAVs have become
a part of both nations’ missile arsenals. Iran has acquired cruise
missile technology—probably from Russia and China—for its own
program for developing an antiship cruise missile, called the Nur,
which comes in both a ground and air launched version. China has
also exported various versions of the Silkworm antiship cruise missile
to Iran; older versions, like the HY-2 or HY-4, could be converted
into land attack missiles with ranges of at least 500-700km.15 Iraq,
for its part, has had a long-standing interest in developing LACMs,
including a program in the 1980s to convert the Italian Mirach 600
UAV into an LACM. Evidence is also accumulating that a team of
engineers in Yugoslavia is working on a 1,400km range LACM for
Iraq, although it reportedly is only in the conceptual stage.16 More
ominous is Iraq’s transformation of the Czech L-29 trainer aircraft
into unmanned drones capable in theory of flying to ranges in
excess of 600km, although Secretary of State Colin Powell told the
UN Security Council in February that Iraq had abandoned the L-29
in favor of a home-grown UAV that had been tested on a racetrack
flying autonomously for 500km. Such UAVs, outfitted with the
kinds of spray tanks that the Iraqis are known to have experimented
with, could have devastating consequences were they to deliver
biological or even chemical payloads against regional targets, since
an unmanned aircraft’s flight stability permits it to effectively release
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and spray biological agent along a line of contamination. While
perhaps only 10 percent of a liquid anthrax payload might survive
the explosive impact of an Iraqi ballistic missile, nearly the entire
capacity of an L-29 spray tank (reportedly containing 300 litres)
would be available for dissemination—a factor of 15 better than
ballistic missiles.17
Defending the Homeland. LACMs and UAVs also have strategic
implications for homeland defense. Traditional threat analyses
employ “range rings” to show the distance beyond a nation’s borders
that its missiles can reach. But UAVs can destroy the relevance of
“range rings.” Cruise missiles or armed UAVs might be launched
from concealed locations at modest distances from their targets, or
brought within range and launched from freighters or commercial
container ships—in effect, a “two stage” form of delivery. The
mere fact that a ship launched LACM, fired from outside territorial
waters, could strike many of the world’s large populations centers
or industrial areas, ought to factor into decisions about protecting
homeland populations against missile attack. In the aftermath of the
9/11 terrorist attacks, key American decisionmakers have begun
seriously to contemplate such threats.18 Various National Intelligence
Estimates (NIEs) have drawn attention to the covert conversion of a
commercial container ship as a launching pad for a cruise missile.
There are thousands of such vessels in the international fleet; U.S.
ports alone handle over 13 million containers annually. Even a
large, bulky cruise missile like the Chinese HY-4 Silkworm, equipped
with a small internal erector for launching, could readily fit inside a
standard 12 meter shipping container. Indeed, the latest NIE argues
that because such an item, among several others, is less costly, easier
to acquire, and more reliable than an intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM), a cruise missile attack is more likely to occur than a ballistic
missile strike.19
The offshore option is not the only cruise missile or UAV threat
to worry about. Absent more effective controls on autonomous flight
management systems, the prospect of converting small airplanes into
weapons-carrying UAVs becomes truly alarming. 9/11 provoked a
rash of reforms to cope with future terrorist use of a large commercial
airliner as a weapon, but these reforms address commercial, not
private, aviation. Even though small converted airplanes cannot
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begin to approximate the effects of using a large airliner, the fact that
gasoline, when mixed with air, releases 15 times as much energy as
an equal amount of TNT, means that even small airplanes can do
significant damage against certain civilian targets. As we have noted,
such means are the best method for effectively delivering biological
agents. Most important, because such small airplanes could originate
from domestically based terrorists—kit-built airplanes do not need
a hardened strip to take off—they could be launched from hidden
locations in relatively close proximity to their intended targets. The
notion that a terrorist group might entertain the use of an unmanned
attack means is by no means far-fetched. One recent accounting of
terrorist activity notes 43 recorded cases involving 14 terrorist groups
where remote-controlled delivery systems were “either threatened,
developed, or actually utilized.”20 Such threats may explain in part
why MTCR member states agreed at their last plenary meeting in
Warsaw, Poland, to strengthen efforts to limit the risk of controlled
items and their technologies falling into the hands of terrorist groups
or individuals.21
The challenges and prospective costs of defending against both
offshore and domestic cruise missile threats are enormous. The North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is currently
studying the idea of an unmanned airship operating at an altitude
of 70,000 feet and carrying sensors to monitor and detect offshore
low flying cruise missiles. Several such airships would be needed
together with fast-moving interceptors to cope with perceived
threats. An architecture of perhaps 100 aerostats flying at an altitude
of 15,000 feet could act as a complementary or alternative system of
surveillance and fire control for an interceptor fleet. But additional
problems remain. A means of furnishing warning information to the
Coast Guard is needed on potentially hostile ships embarking from
ports of concern. Sensor data on missile threats must be made able
to distinguish between friendly and enemy threats prior to threat
engagement. Progress in national cruise missile defense will not
occur without corresponding improvements in respective service
programs. But the latter efforts lack the necessary funding and are
burdened by palpable service interoperability and doctrinal and
organizational constraints. The question of affordability looms large:
it is safe to say that even a limited defense against offshore cruise
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missiles would cost at least $30-40 billion, which is never taken into
consideration when debate occurs about the costs of national ballistic
missile defense. Finally, none of these costs or technical challenges
pertains to improved defenses against domestic threats. In the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, NORAD had no internal air picture;
nor were its radar assets linked with those of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), which controls internal United States air
traffic. Progress toward making such a linkage has occurred, but
major holes remain, especially when dealing with detecting low and
slow flying air targets.22 In sum, missile defenses against offshore
cruise missiles and domestic terrorist attacks employing small
airplanes will remain for at least the next decade operationally and
technically problematic, as well as financially taxing. The stress
on such defenses will grow worse if UAV proliferation gets out of
hand.
Trends in UAV Applications.
UAVs fit importantly into Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld’s view of a transformed American military. Upset with
the lengthy time it has taken to build up responses to military crises,
Rumsfeld foresees a U.S. military that could conduct decisive action
with rapidly deployable, agile, stealthy forces able to respond to
various contingencies, large and small, with a minimum of logistical
support. More important than the number of weapons platforms
would be the quality of networking between sensors and weapon
delivery systems (or “shooters,” in military parlance). The ubiquitous
employment of microprocessors throughout military systems; remote
sensing technologies (as employed on UAVs); advanced data-fusion
software; interlinked but physically disparate databases; and highspeed, high-capacity communications networks, would facilitate the
precise delivery of force against the most important time sensitive
enemy targets. Sequential fires against these targets, which simply
permit the enemy time to recover or hide, would be abjured. Instead,
networked sensors and shooters produce simultaneous fires,
improving effects by an order of magnitude.
Arming the Predator UAV exemplifies this transformation in
targeting. A decade earlier, in Operation DESERT STORM, American
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forces received relatively poor support from overhead reconnaissance
and surveillance systems, then the exclusive domain of the national
intelligence community. Space-based communications support
also produced inadequate results, and such support was critically
unavailable to military forces in Somalia in 1993. Circumstances
in Afghanistan proved radically different. Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM demonstrated the capacity of geographically dispersed
forces to perceive simultaneously and substantially the same
battlespace. This broadly based battlespace awareness allowed mass
effects to be achieved without the necessity of massing forces, thereby
reducing vulnerability. Near real time video data from Predator and
Global Hawk UAVs—under the control of military commanders,
not the national intelligence community—was relayed via orbiting
communications satellites to command centers and individual air
controllers on the ground. These air controllers could point their
laser binoculars at targets and instantly pass precision bearing
and range information (translated into latitude and longitude by
a GPS receiver) to command centers and aircraft circling nearby.
Combat aircraft armed with Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs),
relatively cheap modifications to existing unguided bombs enabling
them to be guided precisely by GPS signals to their targets, could
then “reprogram” their bombs to deliver them with remarkable
accuracy. Most impressively, this capacity to broaden battlespace
awareness through UAVs and space-based communications
enabled the America regional commander to direct the battle from
his headquarters in Tampa, Florida, while being instantaneously
connected to his forward headquarters in Kuwait and a subordinate
one in Uzbekistan.
What distinguishes armed UAVs from manned aircraft in such
roles is their capacity to loiter on call for periods of 24 hours or more
without exposing a piloted and expensive aircraft to enemy fire. As
of early November 2002, the U.S. Air Force possessed only about 50
Predators and only a small percentage are currently equipped to fire
Hellfire missiles.23 The CIA has a small number of armed Predators,
too, and new versions are being produced at the rate of about two
per month. These drones also have several operational weaknesses,
including difficulty of flying in bad and icy weather and vulnerability
to antiaircraft fire. At least ten Predators have perished during
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missions over Afghanistan or Iraq since the beginning of Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM.
Plans are afoot, however, to develop and produce improved
versions of the Predator. The currently flown model, called the MQ1B, is powered by a simple reciprocating engine, which propels the
UAV at a speed of 80 knots. Propelled by a turboprop engine, a
much faster (around 260 knots airspeed) and higher flying version—
the MQ-9B, or Predator B—has already been built, and three to four
more will follow in 2003, with production increasing first to nine
and then to 15 annually thereafter. Another version of the Predator
B, with a 20-foot wing extension, will enable it to stay aloft for 42
hour missions, carrying two external drop tanks and 1,000 pounds
of weapons. And while current Predators are restricted to carrying
Hellfire missiles, future versions will carry a variety of more potent
weapons, including 250 and 500 pound JDAMs and two different airto-air missiles. The expected unit cost for newer versions of Predator
will be double that of the current model, or roughly $4 million.24 But
in view of the Predator B’s capacity to dwell on station for nearly 2
days without producing pilot fatigue, refuelling, or wear and tear
on limited inventories of advanced high-performance F-15s or F-16s,
such armed UAVs are considered a bargain, at least for specialized
missions requiring persistent air caps and operating in air defense
environments in which manned aircraft would be unduly taxed or
vulnerable.
Unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs)—armed high
performance aircraft that many analysts say could represent the
most profound change in the American style of warfare—constitute
a potentially valuable but less certain complement to the American
military transformation than armed UAVs or more flexibly targeted
LACMs. The Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) is currently cosponsoring with the U.S. Air Force
a Boeing UCAV prototype, called the X-45A, which had conducted
five test flights through the end of 2002. Although the primary stated
mission of the UCAV prototype is air defense suppression, others
have been mentioned, including delivery of directed energy weapons
and even conventional weapons such as JDAMs. At such an early
stage in its development, it should come as no surprise that great
uncertainty characterizes UCAV development. Some, including the
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Secretary of the U.S. Air Force, are concerned that such a highly
dynamic mission as air defense suppression requires a pilot and that
less active missions such as strategic bombing may be more suitable
for future UCAVs. Also muddying the waters are discussions within
the Pentagon about merging the X-45A with U.S. Navy requirements
into a multi-service UCAV program along the lines of the Joint Strike
Fighter project.25 Close allies of the United States, in particular the
United Kingdom (UK), have begun to see a more prominent role
for both UCAVs and UAVs. The UK is exploring opportunities to
become involved in American UCAV development and has begun
a program for its own UAV, called Watchkeeper, which has many of
the features of the Predator. One of several motivating factors driving
the UK program is keeping pace with the emerging U.S. doctrine of
network centric warfare.26 Still, UCAVs, as distinct from UAVs and
LACMs, are likely to remain a desideratum rather than a practical
reality until numerous bureaucratic, doctrinal, and industrial
challenges are overcome.
Both technological and policy factors will shape the pace and
scope of future UAV prospects. Enormous advances in computer
processing power, sensor technology, communications, and
imagery processing and exploitation have greatly advanced UAV
performance. But technological push is constrained as well as driven
by policy considerations. LACMs like the Tomahawk languished for
nearly 2 decades before they came into prominence during Operation
DESERT STORM. Although Firebee reconnaissance drones flew
thousands of sorties during the Vietnam War, there was a significant
lag before the technological leap to the Predator was made. Service
resistance, determined in part by a continued preference for manned
platforms, will remain an important constraining factor. Nevertheless,
new requirements for so-called battlefield awareness, increased
pressure by the public and political leaders alike to avoid casualties,
and technological momentum have converged to accelerate UAV
applications.
POLICIES AND POLICY OPTIONS
Cruise missiles have been understood for many decades. But
modern UAVs—and especially armed UAVs and UCAVs—were
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at most on the drawing boards when major international security
policies were negotiated. The focus of policy makers on ballistic
missiles has also affected the coverage of UAVs in international
policies—or the lack of such coverage. Notoriously, UAVs and
cruise missiles were omitted from the list of proscribed systems in
UN Security Council Resolution 687, the cease-fire terms after the
first Gulf War against Iraq. This omission was not fully corrected
until the UNSC passed Resolution 1441 nearly 12 years later.
We shall now review four policies (or classes of policies) that
could affect future commerce in UAVs. In appropriate cases we shall
also discuss policy options. In ascending order of difficulty these
policies are (1) Arms control treaties, (2) Export controls in general,
(3) the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), and (4) the MTCR .
Arms Control Treaties.
Armed UAVs and UCAVs did not exist when negotiations were
completed for START I (1991),27 START II (1993),28 the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE—1990),29 and the INF
Treaty (1987).30 However, armed UAVs and UCAVs arguably are
similar in some respects to cruise missiles and to combat aircraft.
And these treaties restrict cruise missiles and combat aircraft.
We cannot pinpoint any current controversies regarding the
treatment of armed UAVs and UCAVs by these treaties. However,
such controversies would be treated with diplomatic confidentiality
if they arose. The Defense Department reviews armed UAV and
UCAV programs for treaty compliance.
Initiatives to modify existing reconnaissance UAVs to deliver ordnance
or to develop new unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) for flight
testing or deployment as a weapon—that is any mechanism or device,
which, when directed against any target, is designed to damage or
destroy it—must be reviewed in accordance with DOD Directive 2060.1
for compliance with all applicable treaties. Examples of treaties that may
be considered include: 1) the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty, 2) the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
Treaty, and 3) the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). As is
the practice for all programs, determinations will be made on a case-bycase basis with regard to treaty compliance of armed UAVs or UCAVs.31
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On theoretical grounds we can identify the provisions of the treaties
under which issues might arise.
The START Treaties between the United States and the Soviet
Union (later Russia) restrict the numbers of “long-range [over 600
kilometers] nuclear ALCMs.” The START I Treaty also restricts
“nuclear armaments [on] an aircraft that is not an airplane, but that
has a range of 8000 kilometers or more,”32 identified in the Ninth
Agreed Statement as “lighter-than-air aircraft such as balloons,
drifting aerostats, and dirigibles.”33 In the event that an armed UAV
or UCAV were (1) air-launched, deemed to be a cruise missile, and
nuclear armed or (2) lighter-than-air and nuclear armed—it could
run into START controversies. However, the distinctions between
armed UAVs or UCAVs on the one hand and “cruise missiles” on
the other hand, discussed below with respect to the INF Treaty, may
mitigate these controversies. An armed UAV or UCAV may, after all,
be considered an “aircraft” rather than a “cruise missile.” However,
this interpretation will not relieve an armed UAV or UCAV of all
treaty restraints. The CFE Treaty restricts “aircraft.”
The CFE Treaty, between the United States, the Soviet Union,
and European states restricts the numbers of “combat aircraft”
based in Europe. The Treaty defines “combat aircraft” as “fixedwing or variable-geometry aircraft armed and equipped to engage
targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs,
guns, cannons, or other weapons of destruction, as well as any model
or version of such aircraft which performs other military functions
such as reconnaissance or electronic warfare”34 (italics added). The
definition says nothing about whether the aircraft are manned or
unmanned. Consequently, and theoretically, this definition could
apply to armed UAVs or UCAVs based in Europe. In addition, the
italicized language theoretically could apply to other types of UAVs
based in Europe. Similar CFE restrictions apply to various types of
rotary wing aircraft.35 But we have seen no indication that unmanned
systems were envisioned when the Treaty was negotiated. The CFE
numerical limits are high, dating from the last years of the Cold War:
13,600 combat aircraft and 4,000 attack helicopters based in Europe—
with various regional and country sublimits. So the restrictions, if any,
on armed UAVs, UCAVs, and other UAVs may not be onerous.

134

The INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union
eliminates “ground launched cruise missiles” with a range capability
of 500 to 5,500 kilometers and tested as weapon-delivery vehicles.
Does it apply to armed UAVs and UCAVs? Arguably, an armed UAV
or a UCAV is not a cruise missile; it is recovered after use. Moreover,
a UCAV is arguably not “launched”; it “takes off” from a runway
like an airplane rather than being launched from a “launcher,” which
is defined in the Treaty as “a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based
transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM.”36
The range of an armed UAV or UCAV adds another distinction from
cruise missiles; the Treaty defines the range capability of a GLCM as
“the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its
standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by
projecting its flight path onto the earths [sic] sphere from the point
of launch to the point of impact”37 (italics added). Because an armed
UAV or UCAV does not have a “point of impact,” it may not fall into
the range restrictions of the Treaty.
All of these treaties have fora in which compliance issues can be
discussed. Moreover, the United States can withdraw from any of
these treaties on 6 months notice (150 days for the CFE Treaty). But,
as discussed above, it is not at all clear that the treaties will ultimately
restrict armed UAVs or UCAVs.
On the other hand, we should remember that the legal profession
currently is engaged in debating whether the relatively new technology of e-mail messages should be regulated as telephone
conversations, letters sent through the postal system, or—in the
case of wireless e-mail messages—broadcast media. The even newer
technologies of armed UAVs and UCAVs may offer equally fertile
opportunities to adapt restrictions similar to those applied to older
systems. But the fact that armed UAVs and UCAVs may not have
been in the minds of treaty negotiators offers an argument that they
are not covered by the treaties at all. They may ultimately be deemed
to be neither cruise missiles nor aircraft but rather entirely new
systems different from both.
Export Controls in General.
In most governments, export controls are divided into controls on
military items and on civil (or dual-use) items. In the United States,
135

the former are administered by the State Department and the latter
by the Department of Commerce (DoC).
Up to the present time, UAVs have been largely military—but not
exclusively so. Japan, South Korea, and Russia manufacture UAVs
for crop-dusting. The United States anticipates an emerging market
for UAVs with a variety of civilian applications. Under present
export control practices, these “civil” UAVs would be controlled by
the DoC or its equivalent in other governments.
This creates a potential security problem. “Civil” UAVs can be
used to deliver military payloads. Given the interest of the 9/11
hijackers in crop dusters, any air vehicle capable of dispensing an
aerosol is a potential threat. Should such systems be controlled by
the DoC?
The controversy over space satellite exports controlled by DoC
highlighted the concerns about leaving such controls in an agency
devoted to fostering exports. The State Department’s export controls
generally are regarded as tougher than those of the DoC, which
is why exporters favor the latter. The same concerns would be
applicable to “civil” UAVs in all governments. The DoC is supposed
to refer export applications covered by the MTCR for comments
by the Defense and State Departments, but there are exceptions. If
DoC denies the export outright, it does not need to be referred; in
such case the “no undercut” rule applicable to MTCR decisions (see
below) may fail to be imposed. Also, DoC does not require an export
license for missile-related exports to Canada—among 98 pages of
DoC “license exceptions.”38
The problem of “civil” exports for which licenses are not required
is most acute in “license-free zones.” Members of the European
Community do not require export licenses for dual-use items traded
among themselves. This creates an “Nth exit problem,” in which the
number of possible exporters increases and the opportunities for
unwise exports increase as well.
In the United States, there is a current proposal to move into
the State Department the control of all UAVs—military or civil—
capable of delivering a 500kg payload to a 300km range. That still
leaves lesser “civil” UAVs controlled by the DoC. As the discussion
below indicates, these lesser UAVs are the subject of increasing
international concern.
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So the responsibility for controls over UAVs is likely to be an issue
for some time. At present the issue appears to be confined to those
nations marketing crop-dusting UAVs. U.S. Government officials
can remember no case in which the DoC has received an application
for a UAV export.
The Wassenaar Arrangement.
With the end of the Cold War, the structure of export controls
directed against the Iron Curtain nations seemed to many to be an
anachronism. Those controls were administered by the multinational
Coordinating Committee (COCOM), which gave members a veto
right on munitions and dual-use exports.
COCOM administered controls on items, such as munitions and
electronics, that were still sensitive even in the post-Cold War world
and that were not covered by nonproliferation export controls.
Therefore, in 1996 a larger group of governments (including Russia)
formed a new regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), to promote
“transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional
arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing
destabilizing accumulations.”
The WA39 sets out its guidelines in “Initial Elements,” revised
three times since the original policy, and includes control lists of
munitions and dual-use items. UAVs are controlled on Item ML10(c)
of the munitions list:
c. Unmanned airborne vehicles and related equipment, specially
designed or modified for military use, as follows, and specially designed
components therefore:
		 1. Unmanned airborne vehicles including remotely piloted air
vehicles (RPVs) and autonomous programmmable vehicles;
		 2. Associated launchers and ground support equipment;
		 3. Related equipment for command and control.

and also controlled on Item 9.A.12 of the dual-use list:
12. Unmanned aerial vehicles having any of the following:
		 a. An autonomous flight control and navigation capability (e.g., an
autopilot with an Inertial Navigation System); or,
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b. Capability of controlled-flight out of the direct vision range
involving a human operator (e.g., televisual remote control).

Note 9.A.12 does not control model aircraft.
These dual-use controls are limited by a “Validity Note” and a
“Statement of Understanding”:
Validity Note: The control of unmanned aerial vehicles described in 9.A.12.
is valid until December 5, 2004, and its renewal will require unanimous
consent.
Statement of Understanding: Participating States understand a model
aircraft as intended for recreational and competition purposes.

So the WA’s dual use controls on UAVs are subject to a sunset clause
and may expire in less than 2 years.
UAV technology and associated software also are covered by the
WA’s controls. Moreover, WA dual use controls are graded at three
levels. UAV hardware, in Item 9.A.12 above, is subject to the lowest
grade of dual use controls. However, the highest level of dual use
controls (“very sensitive”) apply to certain UAV software:
9.D.1. “Software” specially designed or modified for the “development”
of equipment or “technology” in 9.A. or 9.E.3. of this Annex.
9.D.2. “Software” specially designed or modified for the “production” of
equipment in 9.A. of this Annex.

The quotes in the “very sensitive” items refer to terms defined by the
WA, and Item 9.E.3. refers to jet engine technology.
What is the net effect of these controls? They are not nearly
as tight as the MTCR controls described below. The WA controls
basically involve only a requirement to conduct export reviews and
to make international notifications. Every 6 months, for deliveries
and denials to nonparticipating states, the WA requires notifications
of deliveries of munitions items and of denials of the least sensitive
(e.g., UAV equipment) dual use items. With respect to exports
beyond the participating states of the most sensitive dual use items
(e.g., UAV software), the rules require “extreme vigilance,” delivery
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notifications “on an aggregate basis” every 6 months, and denial
notifications within 60 days. Participating states are to notify each
other within 60 days of an export undercutting a denial notification.
On the other hand, the WA deals with UAVs of very short range,
“out of the direct vision range”—a control coverage much more
extensive that the MTCR’s range of at least 300km. And a January
2003 U.S. proposal to the WA would go further beyond the MTCR by
adding, as an “anti-terrorism” measure, controls on kits to convert
manned civil aircraft to “poor man’s” UAVs:
PROPOSED TEXT: 9.A.13. Equipment and systems, and specially
designed components therefore, designed to convert manned civil
aircraft into Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s) controlled by 9.A.12.a
or 9.A.12.b.

The WA’s controls may grow in effectiveness as the regime continues
to be modified, and UAVs may become increasingly affected by the
regime. But this has not happened yet. At present, the lack of strong
denial rules and the sunset clause on UAV dual use controls leaves
the WA as a second tier of international UAV controls behind the
main control policy, the MTCR.
The Missile Technology Control Regime.40
The MTCR was announced in 1987 by the G-7—the United States,
Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or West
Germany), Italy, Japan, and the UK. It was a new nonproliferation
export control regime to “limit the risks” of nuclear proliferation by
controlling transfers that could contribute to unmanned delivery
systems for nuclear weapons.
Over the subsequent years, the MTCR’s scope was expanded
to cover unmanned delivery systems for nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons. And the membership expanded to include all
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the
European Community (EU), the European Space Agency, Australia,
New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil, Russia, Ukraine, South Africa,
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Republic of Korea.
Moreover, Israel, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia have made a
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political commitment unilaterally to observe the MTCR rules. Other
candidates for EU membership, such as Cyprus and Malta, must
adopt MTCR controls as part of the EU package but have not yet
made a political commitment to the MTCR. China has adopted
some elements of the MTCR, but there are troublesome differences
between the letter and practice of China’s policies and the MTCR.
The regime controls exports for two categories of items. Category
I consists of items of greatest sensitivity, which are subject to the most
stringent controls. UAVs are covered in Category I, Item 1.A.2.:
Complete unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise missile
systems, target drone and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering
at least a 500kg payload to a range of at least 300km.

Formulated in the original version of the regime, the 500kg payload
was considered the minimum payload for a relatively unsophisticated
nuclear weapon, and the 300km range was considered the relevant
range for the most compact theaters in which nuclear weapons
might be used. Range/payload tradeoffs are taken into account
in determining the capability of a UAV, and in 2002 “range” and
“payload” were specifically defined. (The definitions were weakened,
however, by a regime statement that the determination of range
is the sole responsibility of the exporting government.) Category
I controls also are applied to production facilities and design and
production technology for UAVs with a 500kg/300km capability.
Complete guidance sets of a specified accuracy for UAVs—and their
production facilities, production equipment, and technology—are
also covered under Category I, Item 2.
Category II consists of equipment, components, materials, and
technology that, while generally dual use, could make a contribution
to Category I systems. For UAVs, these include most of 18 Category
II items ranging from jet engines, to composites, to flight control
equipment and avionics, to stealth materials and test equipment.
In 1993, in order to cover systems capable of delivering chemical
weapons (CW) or biological weapons (BW), using lower payloads
than would be needed for nuclear weapons, the regime added (for
UAVs):
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Item 19.A.2. Complete unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise
missile systems, target drones and reconnaissance drones) not specified
in 1.A.2., capable of a maximum range equal to or greater than 300km.

That is, the regime now includes in Category II unmanned systems
capable of delivering any payload to a range of 300km.
Several levels of rules apply to these items:
Absolute prohibition (until further notice) on the transfer of Category I
complete production facilities or the technology for such facilities. It
obviously does not make sense to have a nonproliferation regime that
allows the creation of new suppliers.
Strong presumption to deny transfers of Category I items. This strong
presumption of denial also applies to missiles of any range or payload,
or any MTCR-controlled item, for which the purpose is deemed to be
the delivery of nuclear, biological, or chemical payloads. Transfers of
Category I items may be made. But they are to be “rare” and may only
be made if there are (1) binding government-to-government assurances
with respect to the end-use and end-user and (2) supplier and not just
recipient responsibility for the end-use.
Case-by-case review of export applications for all controlled items.
No-undercut provision according to which MTCR partners will respect
each others’ export denials or consult before undercutting a denial.
Information exchanges to enforce these rules. And,
Catch-all provisions, observed by most partner governments, under which
export reviews will be required for missile-related transfers, whether or
not on the MTCR control list, to any destination engaged in Category I
programs.

Because, under international law, a policy (such as the MTCR)
cannot supersede a treaty, the MTCR’s rules do not restrict
transfers required by the treaties establishing NATO, the European
Community, or the European Space Agency. The license-free zone
established within the European Community for dual use transfers
allows free trade in many Catgory II items within the Community.
In addition, there is a diversity of practices with respect to transfers
among MTCR partners. For instance, in 1989 the British established
an Open General Export License, waiving the requirement for caseby-case reviews of dual use Category II transfers to other regime
members.
141

The MTCR, which is an export control regime, does not restrict
indigenous programs. However, the United States insists that a
candidate government forego “offensive” Category I programs (a
definition that has become increasingly loose over the years) before
it will approve the candidate as a new member. And the MTCR
members have synchronized their diplomacy against indigenous
missile programs in nations of proliferation concern—leading to a
recent 106-nation International Code of Conduct loosely discouraging
ballistic missile (but not cruise missile or UAV) programs.
MTCR coverage of UAV technology. The MTCR’s control list is
revised frequently. With respect to complete UAV systems, the
controls have expanded from systems with the 500kg/300km
capability (subject to a strong presumption of export denial) to
systems of any payload with a 300km range (subject to case-by-case
review). A current proposal, for approval under a 6-month “silence”
procedure, would expand the Category II coverage to something
closer to the WA’s “autonomous” and “out of the direct vision range”
criteria:
Item 19.A.3 Complete unmanned aerial vehicle systems, not specified in
1.A.2 or 19.A.2., designed or modified to dispense an aerosol, capable of
carrying a particulate or liquid of a volume greater than 20 litres, and
having any of the following:
a. An autonomous flight control and navigation capability; or,
b. Capability of controlled flight out of the direct vision range involving
a human operator.
Technical notes:
1. Complete systems in item 19.A.3 comprise those UAVs already configured
with or already modified to incorporate, an aerosol delivery mechanism. An
aerosol consists of a particulate or liquid dispersed in the atmosphere. Examples
of aerosols include liquid pesticides for crop dusting and dry chemicals for cloud
seeding.
Notes:
1. Item 19.A.3 does not control model aircraft intended for recreational or
competition purposes.
2. Item 19.A.3 does not control UAVs, designed or modified to accept
multiple payloads (such as remote sensing equipment, communications
equipment), that lack an aerosol dispensing system/mechanism.
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There are other control list expansions that might be appropriate to
help limit the proliferation of UAVs capable of delivering nuclear,
biological, or chemical payloads:
• Flight control systems for the conversion of manned aircraft
to unmanned vehicles (the WA proposal);
• Complete UAVs with a given stealth capability;
• Other UAV penetration aids, such as towed decoys and
terrain-bounce jammers specially designed to match the
delivery system they are aiding; and,
• A wider range of jet engines, now exempted as being for
manned aircraft but suitable for UAV use.
These control list expansions would limit all UAVs—the Category II
models (80 percent of all UAVs now on the market) that can deliver
any payload to a range of 300km, and the Category I models that can
deliver a 500kg payload to that range. The smaller, Category II UAVs
are real threats in terrorist hands—delivering kilogram quantities
of biological agents—or in professional military hands—saturating
defenses.
But the most vexing question concerns the growing use of
Category I UAVs for surveillance and, as armed UAVs or UCAVs,
combat use.
The problem of large UAVs. Category I UAVs can deliver nuclear
payloads or such large quantities of chemical or biological agents
that meteorological uncertainties can be swamped. The 500kg (or
greater) payloads of such systems can be used to penetrate defenses
in a variety of ways—with some payload devoted to penetration aids
or, if necessary, with some payload devoted to more fuel to allow onthe-deck flight profiles or round-about routing to approach targets
from all azimuths.
The MTCR prescribes “a strong presumption to deny transfer”
of such systems. But these systems are in increasing demand. This
demand raises the threat that Category I UAVs may become a route
to cruise missiles for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). But, on the other hand, the demand is currently driven by
the use of UAVs to apply military force with great discrimination—
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just the opposite of a mass destruction threat. Early in 2002 the
administration established a confidential interim policy governing
the export of such Category I systems.41 But what should be the
policy over the longer term?
The danger of any loosening of Category I controls—in effect
for nearly 16 years—is specifically that of the proliferation of UAVs
usable as cruise missiles, and more generally that of a slippery slope
with respect to other Category I controls. The next point down the
slippery slope would probably be a loosening of controls on space
launch vehicles—the hardware, technology, and production facilities
of which have long been recognized as being interchangeable with
those of long-range ballistic missiles.
Given that the MTCR’s current Category I rules allow for some
flexibility for “rare” transfers, the cause of nonproliferation would
seem best served by retaining these rules and working within them.
This would avoid the weakening of a 16-year-old nonproliferation
standard and would minimize the risk of slippery slopes that could
exacerbate the proliferation problem.
Given the alternatives and the dangers of cruise missile
proliferation, only as a last, reluctant resort would nonproliferators
want to consider modifying the export rules with respect to Category
I UAVs. The basis for such a modification of rules could be to ensure
that Category I UAV transfers were substantially more expensive
than Category I cruise missile transfers—so that the recipient nation
could afford far fewer UAVs than cruise missiles. This is a difficult
criterion to meet because, if the MTCR works as intended, some
nations might not be able to obtain Category I cruise missiles at any
price. But the criterion can be approached by taking advantage of
a UAV’s extensive infrastructure requirement. A new UAV policy
along these lines might read as follows:
The transfer of Category I equipment for a complete unmanned air
vehicle system (Item 1.A.2) may be considered more favorably if all of
the following conditions are met:
1) All of the Guidelines requirements are satisfied, except for the
strong presumption to deny the transfer.
2) The system is not specially designed for internal or external
ordnance delivery.
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3) The system is specially designed for recovery and reuse.
4) Upon completion of the proposed system transfer, the recipient
will have installed full capabilities integrated with the proposed system
to:
		

A) Command and control system flight and recovery,

		

B) Retrieve data transmitted by the system, and

		

C) Analyze the retrieved data.

The only modification of the MTCR’s Category I rule would be to
“consider more favorably” such a transfer and to be prepared to
overcome the “strong presumption to deny.” This modification,
however, is a change in the central rule of missile nonproliferation; so
it would be something to be considered only after trying to live with
the less radical alternatives. The modification could be expected to
unleash pressures for similar provisions with respect to space launch
vehicle transfers. So looser rules on Category I UAV transfers could
facilitate both cruise and ballistic missile proliferation.
Moreover, this modification would not ease the transfers of
Category I armed UAVs or UCAVs. Given that their purpose is to
deliver ordnance, they pose the same proliferation threats as cruise
missiles. The policy language for “treating more favorably” UAV
exports may only be kicking the armed UAV and UCAV cans down
the road. But it is difficult to foresee any reasonably safe way to
loosen controls on large armed UAVs or UCAVs.
A safer option—supplementing the policy of working within the
Category I rules—might be to develop the UAV industry in a manner
similar to that of the space launch industry. This would involve
providing “services” but not the transfer of hardware beyond the
jurisdiction or control of the state considering a sale. In all but the
most advanced nations, many elements of UAV operations—such
as satellite imagery for the selection of operating areas and satellite
communications for retrieval of data—are already provided on a
service rather than an ownership basis. UAV services would extend
this principle by having the supplier nation maintain and operate
UAVs, while the recipient nation directed the operations and received
data gathered by the UAV.
This would be a cultural change for the young UAV industry, but
it might make military sense. As Thomas Cassidy, president and CEO
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of General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, said with respect to the
Predator system (which is growing over the Category I threshold),
The last thing [a forward commander] needs is to maintain and operate
airplanes. What he needs is intelligence support—somebody looking and
then piping video directly to him on a little TV set that we’ve already
made for the special forces people.42

Another aerospace veteran, speaking off the record, anticipates that
UAV services could be a lucrative business model. Such services
would resemble the early and profitable IBM decision to market
computer services in preference to hardware sales. UAVs might be
painted in the colors of the nation purchasing the services. But the
exporting government could retain jurisdiction and control of its
UAVs by licensing its own nationals to maintain and operate the
vehicles in and over territories approved in an export license.
The Israeli Air Force, as described by a senior defense ministry
official, is buying “visint [visual intelligence] by the hour” from a
civilian Israeli firm, Aeronautics Unmanned Systems. The firm owns,
maintains, and launches an Aerostar UAV, hands it off to military
operators when it is over the target area, and retrieves it from the
military operators 12-14 hours later. The firm also conducts the entire
UAV operation for the Israeli police, turning over to the police only
real-time imagery collected by the vehicle.43
The U.S. military itself has considered hiring UAV services from
a foreign supplier. As of November 2002, PACAF, after losing a
satellite that was monitoring Pacific Ocean weather, requested the
assistance of the Australian firm Aerosonde for weather-monitoring
UAVs. Aerosonde leases such UAVs in units of three for about
$700,000—air vehicles, service, and support staff included.44
UAV services are analogous, not only to space launch services—
which meet the objectives of missile nonproliferation—but also to
uranium enrichment services which meet the objectives of nuclear
nonproliferation. In both cases, a recipient’s insistence on hardware
rather than services is a strong indicator of a nefarious purpose. And
in both cases multinational institutions, not just national sources,
may provide part or all of the service.
There are downsides to UAV services. Some supplier governments
might not be assiduous in retaining jurisdiction and control of the
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vehicles. And, even if the hardware were kept physically secure,
technical and operational insights of value for cruise missile programs
would almost certainly leak out.
And there is the question whether a contractor would be forbidden
to fly a UAV into a combat zone on the grounds that he could
become a “combatant in war.” The legalities of this would need to be
thrashed out. There might be alternatives, such as allowing military
personnel from the recipient state to operate imaging shutters or to
launch ordnance from the UAV—without gaining hands-on access.
Or the supplier state might provide military personnel to manage
“combatant functions”—an extension of U.S. Defense Department
physical security provided for certain sensitive transfers or U.S.
operation of Patriot missile batteries on loan.
But the upsides of UAV services are intriguing. Proliferation
hazards would be constrained compared to the alternatives. The
precedent of looser controls on space launch vehicles could be
avoided. The practice of “dumbing down” exports in order to meet
nonproliferation constraints might no longer be necessary. Subject
to the end-uses approved in export licenses, the benefits of large
armed UAVs and UCAVs might be shared with other nations. In
short, while meeting the nonproliferation objectives of the MTCR,
UAV services would allow the military benefits of the technology
to be shared without undue interference from the constraints of the
MTCR.
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CHAPTER 8
GERMAN NUCLEAR POLICY
Ernst Urich von Weizsäcker
Nuclear fission was discovered here in Berlin by Otto Hahn and
Fritz Strassmann in 1938, but the first applications were made in the
United States. Enrico Fermi’s first nuclear reactor began producing
small amounts of energy in Chicago as early as 1942, and the first
atomic bomb exploded in the Alamogordo desert in 1945.
The Nazi period was the ultimate disaster for Germany (and
others). The earlier scientific excellence—bringing more Nobel Prizes
to Germany than to any other country during the first third of the
20th century—was badly eroded by Nazi tyranny and criminal antiSemitism. What the Nazis did not do was done by the War. German
industry virtually had ceased to exist in 1945, and almost all cities
were destroyed.
The mindset after the war was characterized by guilt, peaceful
reconstruction, pacifism (even under the threat of Soviet expansion),
and an almost antinational sentiment of “Europeanism.” The near
absence of patriotism after 1945 was, of course, a consequence of its
horrendous abuse by the Nazis but remains difficult for Americans
to understand.
Concerning energy policy, two factors were dominant in post-war
Europe: coal was the chief source of energy, and demand was rising
steeply. The first significant move towards West European integration
was the European Community of Coal and Steel (ECCS), founded
in 1951. Its six countries, Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands,
Belgium, and Luxembourg, were the nucleus of what 6 years later
became the European Economic Community. The ECCS also became
a symbol of industrial democracy, of co-determination, because for the
heavy industries’ supervisory boards a one-to-one parity between
capital and labor became a mandatory rule, motivated perhaps by
the fact that steel at the time was also the core of the arms industry
that needed international control.
Not too much later, nuclear energy entered the scene, with
France—having almost no coal—taking the initiative. All ECCS
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countries were happy to agree on a common nuclear power policy
for which the European Community of Atomic Energy of 1957
(EURATOM) was founded. Significantly, EURATOM was founded
jointly with the European Economic Community and ranking with it
at par!
EURATOM had no military arm. This was particularly important
for Germany. When the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer
intended to yield to American pressures to join NATO’s nuclear
weapons program, an outcry of protest swept the country, with a
group of 18 atomic physicists, including Otto Hahn, then President
of the prestigious Max-Planck-Society, and Werner Heisenberg and
Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, directors of the Max-Planck-Institute
for Physics, leading the protest. They were later called the “Göttingen
18,” although only six of them actually resided in Göttingen. The
atomic physicists clearly saw the peaceful use of nuclear power as a
great hope and were all the keener to keep nuclear energy out of the
military odium. In the end, Adenauer had to give in.
Very soon, nuclear power became a technological routine no
longer dependent on world class physicists. During the 1960s and
1970s, nuclear power became a centerpiece of industrial renewal
and was supported massively by all political parties. The “Limits to
Growth” report to the Club of Rome (1972) with its gloomy pictures
about resource depletion and environmental pollution, and the
energy shock of 1973 added to the feeling that nuclear power was
perhaps the solution to a whole range of pressing problems. Similar
to the developments in Britain and France, some 10 nuclear reactors
were planned during the 1960s and another 15 during the 1970s. Also,
nuclear ships were planned. It all looked like an easy run promising
formidable profits for the growing nuclear industry. The nuclear
industry even suggested doing away with household metering
because electricity was going to be so cheap that there would be no
point in metering it.
From Wyhl to Chernobyl.
Much to the surprise of the ruling elites, the tide turned against
nuclear power during the mid-1970s. The turning point was Wyhl.
This wine-growing village on the Upper Rhine facing France was
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spotted by the conservative provincial government of BadenWürttemberg as a site for a major nuclear reactor. But the government
totally underestimated the local sentiments against the plan. Even
the thoroughly conservative wine-growers stood up against it.
They feared that the water vapor belching out of the cooling towers
plus a warmed-up river could cloud the sky and take the sun from
their vineyards. In addition, fears of radioactive radiation were
spreading. Students from nearby Freiburg University initiated
systematic protests and started street blockades against the heavy
construction machines approaching the site. Moreover, they created
the “Volkshochschule Wyhler Wald,” a popular, if demanding, “school”
of adult education teaching about the steam and clouds problem,
radiation, disposal problems, vulnerability of nuclear installations to
terrorism and war, solar energy, and energy efficiency.
The coal-dominated state of North-Rhine-Westphalia seized
the opportunity of commissioning the Freiburg-based Ökoinstitut
to write a report on a nuclear-free future for Germany. The
Federal Government under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, however,
maintained its full support of nuclear energy, but the popularity of
this position was visibly dwindling as the Wyhl protesters gained
sympathies throughout the country.
Popular science writer Robert Jungk published Der Atomstaat
(1977), in which he elaborated on the authoritarian political structures
nuclear power would imply.1 This catapulted the atomic controversy
to the level of fundamental questions of freedom and democracy, thus
further eroding the support for nuclear power, however peacefully
intended.
The nuclear controversies were positively instrumental in the
emergence of a new political party, the Greens. (The so-called
5 percent-hurdle that parties must take to enter parliament was
meant to and has worked to strongly discourage the creation of new
parties.) The Greens were quite radical in many regards, but their
unifying theme was opposition to nuclear power in all its forms.
They therefore were particularly at odds with the ruling Social
Democrats (SPD) under Chancellor Schmidt—from which party
many of the early Greens originated. The SPD came into rough times
anyway because of the widespread phenomenon of “stagflation”
that demoralized Keynesian “liberals” all over the place. Schmidt’s
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junior coalition partner, the Free Democrats (FDP), changed sides
and spearheaded neoliberal thinking in the country, helping the
conservative Christian Democrats (CDU) under Helmut Kohl to
assume power. Thus the Greens inadvertently found themselves in
an alliance of opposition with the SPD against the new conservative
government, and gradually their views infested the larger partner.
Schmidt retreated from party politics while the party moved to the
left.
Around 1983, the combined issues of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization’s (NATO) nuclear rearmament with cruise missiles
and the new “Waldsterben” (forest dieback) brought hundreds of
thousands of protesters to the streets and created an atmosphere in
which the Kohl government lost the popular majority in opinion
polls. Fortunately for him, he had 3 years to go before the next
elections, but he felt it was time to act against the steady rise of the
Greens. One factor in particular alarmed Kohl and his U.S. friends
under President Ronald Reagan: the Greens wanted Germany to step
out of NATO, thus making a potential majority of the Greens and the
SPD a true spectre for Atlantic defence policy.
Looking at the high popularity of ecological issues, Kohl
decided to confront the Greens by putting himself at the top of the
environmental movement. This is how Germany under a conservative
government became known as an environmental champion and
a rather stubborn fighter in the European Union (EU) for stricter
environmental standards.
It all happened before the reactor disaster of Chernobyl in April
1986, although some developments were influenced by the Three
Mile Island accident. Chernobyl definitively put an end to any plans
of expansion of nuclear energy. In the SPD, it shifted majorities
and triggered a decision at their party convention at Nuremberg a
few months later to completely phase out nuclear power within 10
years. Polls suggested that this decision gave the party a strong and
additional popularity push, and that it might take just another 3 years
to regain power, together with the Greens, in the federal elections
scheduled for 1990.
This prospect, however, made it all the more urgent for Kohl to
step up his environmental profile. Immediately after the Chernobyl
disaster, Kohl created the new federal Ministry of the Environment
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(environmental policies thus far had been handled by the Ministry
of the Interior.) A year later, in 1987, he appointed a top-class man
for the portfolio, Professor Klaus Töpfer, who had served as state
environment minister in the Rhineland Palatinate. Töpfer introduced
the green dot system for packaging waste and initiated very proactive
German and European climate policies. In this, he was backed by
an all-party Bundestag commission on climate policy, that boldly
demanded a 25-30 percent reduction of CO2 by 2005.
From German Unification to the SPD-Green Coalition of 1998.
Then came the German unification, in a way Kohl’s masterpiece.
At the 1990 elections, he was rewarded generously by an impressive
victory. The SPD contender, Oskar Lafontaine, and the Greens had
made lots of mistakes in the context of the unification, notably by
not showing the necessary enthusiasm. (On one important issue,
Lafontaine was probably right, namely his strong warning against
the 1:1 exchange rate of the East German against the West German
D-Mark because this rate implied rapid bankruptcies essentially for
all East German firms selling their goods to East European clients
paying their dues in Roubles at an agreed exchange rate with the
East German Mark. Some analysts see this as the real cause for the
nonending tragedy of the German economy after unification!)
Concerning nuclear policy, the unification conveniently allowed
Kohl to satisfy antinuclear sentiments by closing down all East
German reactors and the planned disposal facility at Morsleben.
In the meantime, the climate policy agenda was moved to the
forefront of international environmental policies. The adoption at
the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit of the Framework Convention
on Climate Change (FCCC) had an important side effect on nuclear
power. It helped keep the nuclear option alive, despite continuing
public mistrust. In Germany, the German Physical Society (DPG)
significantly was in the forefront of educating the public about the
urgency of climate policy, and not a few critics felt that this was a
maneuver for a revival of nuclear energy.
Another 4 years of Kohl’s administration followed from 199498. German industry had urged Kohl to rid himself of Klaus Töpfer
who was seen as a liability to industry in the new post-cold-war
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era of globalization and of relentless cost competition. Kohl did as
suggested and gave Töpfer a minor and less controversial portfolio,
replacing him by Angela Merkel from East Germany, who at the time
had no credits or experience in the field. She actually managed her
new field much better than expected and was instrumental in getting
the Kyoto Protocol of the FCCC agreed to in 1997.
Concerning nuclear policy, the South German states of Bavaria
and Baden-Württemberg, both governed for ages by Christian
Democrats (Bavaria by the CSU sister party), felt that the Chernobyl
shock was now over and one should return to “reason,” i.e., to a
further expansion of nuclear energy. But industry placed no new
orders for nuclear power plants, and opinion polls showed no signs of
new sympathy with the nuclear option. Anyway, the power industry
was considerably more hesitant than conservative politicians were
in regards the continuation, let alone expansion of nuclear energy.
The “Ausstieg,” Perhaps the Most Distinguishing
Decision of SPD and Greens.
The federal elections of 1998 brought Kohl’s government to
an end after 16 years. The SPD campaign included a commitment
for a phase-out of nuclear power. The new chancellor, Gerhard
Schröder, former premier of Lower Saxony, entered a coalition with
the Greens, who had an even stronger view on the phase-out of
nuclear energy. Very soon, Schröder, together with Green Minister
for the Environment Jürgen Trittin and Economics Minister Werner
Müller, entered talks with the nuclear industry and finally found
an agreement for a stepwise exit from nuclear power. The talks had
been well-prepared by Schröder’s attempts to arrive at an energy
consensus with industry during his time as premier of Lower Saxony.
These talks actually annoyed Lafontaine who wanted the thing done
by governmental oktroi (decree).
What is the substance of the phase-out, or the “Ausstieg,” as
it is called in German? In essence, the German Government made
an agreement with the electric utilities on a phase-out, with a total
amount of 2.623 Terawatthours—of nuclear electricity remaining to
be supplied. The utilities are invited to trade the permits allocated
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to them so as to optimize the economic output. Old reactors needing
more maintenance would be retired sooner, while some of the newer
ones would continue to operate until the total amount permitted was
exhausted. That could be at 2025 or perhaps as late as 2030.
Other parts of the deal were a prohibition on building new
reactors, an end to the reprocessing of nuclear materials, and a 10year moratorium on the exploration of the planned final disposal
facility for highly radioactive waste in the salt domes below the
Lower Saxony village of Gorleben.2
The postponement to a later date of the vexing question of the
final disposal of radioactive waste was done at a price. It became
necessary to build intermediary storage facilities for radioactive waste
at each reactor site. The nuclear industry actually welcomed this
condition because it helped terminate for the time being the highly
controversial and increasingly expensive shipments of radioactive
waste on roads or railways. Also, the intermediate storage served to
reduce radioactivity and heat production from nuclear waste to some
thirty percent of the original intensities, thus dramatically easing the
physical specifications for final disposal.
Many Greens and Social Democrats felt the deal was much
too generous towards the nuclear industry, while some industry
representatives thought it was too ambitious. My own assessment
is that is has been a fair deal. It meant that each reactor would be
allowed to run for 32 years. Assuming that it takes some 16 years for a
nuclear plant to be written off, the owner has another 16 years to make
fat profits on it. Moreover, the liberalized electricity markets offered
plenty of options to import electricity from abroad. When Edmund
Stoiber, the Bavarian Premier and the conservative candidate for the
Chancellery in 2002, announced during his campaign that in case of
victory he would initiate a revival of nuclear power, it was industry
that reminded him that the deal was agreed upon with Schröder,
and that there was no intention of ordering new nuclear reactors.
For the Coalition and other ecologically minded people, the deal
was ambitious enough to make it politically feasible to adopt a highly
proactive renewable energies law (which would have been unrealistic
without the time pressure given by the “Ausstieg”). Moreover, the
fact that a highly industrialized country felt it could afford phasing
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out atomic energy altogether has been an extremely strong signal to
the international community.
In retrospect, after 6 years of the “Red-Green” government, it
can be said that the phase-out of nuclear power stands as the move
that distinguishes the government most visibly from the positions of
the conservative opposition. (With regard to social and tax policies
as well as defense and foreign policies, the reality of the SPD and
Greens governance has come very close to what the conservative
camp has done and proposed during the past 10 or 20 years!)
Perspectives.
The big question is, of course, whether the Schröder government
is right to assume the country can afford the Ausstieg. The time will
come undoubtedly, when the replacement problem for nuclear power
becomes highly pressing. The surplus capacities of electricity that
characterize the European power industry in our days, are certain to
disappear within the next 10 years. Rising prices of natural gas have
surprised earlier optimists. Wind energy is still on the rise but as
yet very far from substituting for nuclear power. So far, all German
wind power taken together is worth a mere three nuclear reactors
(although the capacity may be worth ten or more reactors, but then
the wind is not always blowing at optimum speed).
It is hard to believe, therefore, that renewables will be sufficient
to close the gap that will be left when nuclear electricity disappears
from the market. A more realistic popular option has been the
construction of combined cycle fossil power plants using coal and
natural gas as fuels. But with the dramatic rise in gas prices, that
option is no longer very attractive, and people from all political camps
have become more accustomed to supporting renewable sources of
energy as the core of the answer to challenge. As a matter of fact, the
conservative CDU recently has begun to say that they would like to
extend the running time for nuclear reactors in order to leave more
time for the build-up of renewable sources of energy.
I am reading with interest that in the United States a new
discussion is on-going about a revival of nuclear energy, with an
aggressive build-up of new nuclear reactors. Although some groups
in Germany may hope for a similar debate in that country, I see it as a
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marginal minority position. What finds far more support is the more
conventional idea of extending the permitted life time for nuclear
reactors. Many people from industry are demanding exactly that.
But the motive tends to be only that an extended life time would
simply take some steam out of the energy debate.
If the nuclear phase-out appears as an irreversible decision, if
renewable sources of energy are simply too expensive to be serious
candidates for replacing all of today’s nuclear plants, what could then
be the solution? Leaving out coal, the major cause for the greenhouse
effect, I am inclined to think of a systematic worldwide strategy of
opening an entirely different option, which tends to be left out and
forgotten by mainstream energy planners. It is a systematic approach
to increase energy efficiency.
What is that? Essentially energy efficiency or rather energy
productivity means to extract more well-being from one kilowatt-hour
or from one barrel of oil. Surprisingly, the physics of energy invite
speculations of a dramatic improvement of energy productivity. One
kilowatt-hour, after all, is enough, to lift a 10-liter bucket of water
three times from the sea level to the top of Mount Everest. What we
do with one kilowatt hour, is extremely poor by comparison, chiefly
because energy is so fabulously cheap.
With my friend Amory Lovins, I dared to put on paper the kinds
of technological improvements which are available. In our book,
“Factor Four,” we feature 20 examples of how to quadruple energy
productivity, and some of them actually go much beyond a factor of
four.3
The main challenge politically will be to make it profitable to
go in the direction of aggressively increasing energy productivity.
You would not be prepared to carry a 10-liter bucket three times up
Mount Everest for anything like the price we pay for one kilowatt
hour.
Emissions trading, a revenue neutral ecological tax reform, and
desubsidizing energy consuming industrial and transportation
activities can lead us a long way towards making energy productivity
more profitable.
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CHAPTER 9
PRESIDENT BUSH’S GLOBAL NONPROLIFERATION POLICY:
SEVEN MORE STEPS
Henry D. Sokolski
More than any other post-Cold War presidency, the Bush
administration has emphasized nonproliferation enforcement.
Certainly, its actions in the cases of North Korea, Iraq, and Libya
have prompted the most significant debate about how to strengthen
nonproliferation since India exploded its first bomb in 1974. This
window of interest needs to be exploited to strengthen nonproliferation
enforcement in as country-neutral a fashion as possible.
Toward this end, the United States has itself proposed a new,
tougher set of nonproliferation rules. By far, the most important of
these rules are the seven specific proposals President Bush made on
February 11, 2004, in an address at the National Defense University
(NDU). Properly understood, these proposals recommend a sounder
reading of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—one that
is true to the NPT’s original intent and that deflates mistaken
interpretations of the treaty that have enabled North Korea, Libya,
Iran, and, earlier, Iraq, to acquire much of what is needed to make
nuclear bombs.
President Bush characterized these states’ misguided views as
a “cynical manipulation” of the treaty. He specifically referred to
these states’ efforts to twist the NPT’s call for the sharing of peaceful
nuclear technology into an unqualified right to “the fullest possible
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information.”
This it clearly is not. As the NPT’s first article makes clear, no
nuclear weapons state that is a party to the NPT (the United States,
Russia, China, France, or the United Kingdom) is permitted to “in any
way . . . assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapons state to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices.” Similarly, the NPT’s second article prohibits all
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other members of the treaty from “manufactur[ing] or otherwise
acquir[ing] nuclear weapons,” and from “seek[ing] or receiv[ing] any
assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.” Finally, the NPT
requires all peaceful uses of nuclear energy to be safeguarded with
the aim of preventing their diversion to help make bombs. When
the NPT speaks in Article IV about “the inalienable right” of NPT
members to develop nuclear energy “without discrimination,” it
explicitly circumscribes this right by demanding that it be exercised
“in conformity” with these articles.
For years, too little effort has been made to define what “in
conformity” means. This is what President Bush dealt with in his
February 11 address. He emphasized that nations seeking to develop
peaceful nuclear energy have no need either for materials that can
be used directly to fuel bombs—separated plutonium and highly
enriched uranium—or for the uranium enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing plants required to produce these materials. As such,
he proposed that the world’s leading nuclear suppliers of lightly
enriched uranium fuel (which cannot be used directly to make bombs)
guarantee a steady supply of this fuel to nuclear energy-developing
states that are willing to renounce trying to build enrichment and
reprocessing facilities themselves. He further proposed that nuclear
supplier states should refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing
equipment or technology to any state that does not already “possess
full-scale functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants.”
Beyond this, the President proposed to strengthen international
efforts to interdict illicit nuclear shipments and procurement
networks; do more to reduce the accessibility to nuclear weaponsusable materials; and tighten procedures at the United Nations (UN)
nuclear watchdog agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). Finally, President Bush urged that within a year, no nuclear
supplier should export nuclear equipment to any state that has not
yet signed the new, tougher IAEA inspections agreement known as
the Additional Protocol.
All of these proposals help give teeth to the NPT’s prohibitions
against the export and acquisition of nuclear weapons related
capabilities and materials. They also constitute a useful extension
of the calls by former Presidents Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter
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nearly 30 years ago to discourage the use of nuclear weapons-usable
fuels for commercial purposes.
President Bush’s proposals, though, should be viewed only as
a start. In fact, several additional measures logically follow from
the President’s seven proposals and are needed to assure effective
nonproliferation. Building on the Bush proposals, the United States,
other nuclear suppliers, and like-minded states will also need to:
1. Refuse to buy any controlled nuclear items or materials from
new states attempting to develop enrichment or reprocessing
plants.
2. Update and strengthen IAEA controls to account for the new
ways states could divert peaceful nuclear activities and materials to
military purposes.
3. View large civilian nuclear projects with suspicion—including
nuclear power and desalinization plants, large research reactors,
and regional fuel cycle centers—if they are not privately financed
or approved after an open bidding process against less risky nonnuclear alternatives.
4. Demand that states that fail to declare nuclear facilities to the
IAEA (as required by their safeguards agreement) dismantle them in
order to come back into full compliance and disallow states that are
not clearly in full compliance from legally leaving the NPT without
first surrendering the nuclear capabilities they gained while NPT
members.
5. Support UN adoption of a series of country-neutral rules that
track the above recommendations to be applied to any nation that
the IAEA and the UN Security Council cannot clearly find in full
compliance with the NPT.
6. Starting with the United States, but including Pakistan and
India, formally get as many declared nuclear weapons states as
possible to agree henceforth to not redeploy nuclear weapons onto
any other state’s soil in peacetime and to make the transfer of nuclear
weapons-usable material to other nations illicit if the transfer is made
for a purpose other than to dispose of the material or to make it less
accessible.
7. Build on the successful precedent of Libya’s nuclear renunciation
by encouraging its neighbors—starting with Algeria, Egypt, and
Israel—to shut down their largest nuclear reactors.
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What do these ideas entail? How do they relate to the President
Bush’s proposals? To answer these questions, each suggestion is
examined in turn.
1. Refuse to buy any controlled nuclear items or materials from or to
new states attempting to develop enrichment or reprocessing plants. One
of President Bush’s proposals that has already been adopted by the
G-8 is that nuclear supplier states not sell fresh fuel to nations that
are unwilling to renounce reprocessing or enrichment, and that
they refuse to sell any enrichment or reprocessing technology and
equipment to states that do not already possess “full-scale functioning
enrichment and reprocessing plants.” Implementing these rules
would certainly help establish a norm against the further spread of
commercial reprocessing and enrichment plants. What would be even
more effective in deterring new states from developing reprocessing
or enrichment, however, would be first to restrict nuclear commercial
intercourse with such states by getting the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) membership, and as many other states as possible, to refuse
to buy any nuclear commodities or services from them. Second, NSG
members should back this rule by making it clear that they will cut
off nuclear exports to any state that buys enrichment or reprocessing
services or goods from these nuclear entrant nations.
Who would this rule hit hardest? Iran for starters. Nuclear officials
there claim that they intend to export reactor fuel from their uranium
enrichment and fuel fabrication facilities to other members of the
NPT. If the United States is strict about what constitutes “full-scale
functioning plants,” Brazil and Argentina could also be affected.
Brazil is about to launch a commercial enrichment effort at Resende.
Officials there concede, however, that their effort would not be able
to supply even 60 percent of Brazil’s own fuel requirements until the
year 2010. They have not even reached an agreement with the IAEA
about the proper safeguarding of Brazil’s enrichment facility. Still,
Brazilian officials have already announced that they intend to export
enriched uranium by 2014.
Certainly, if the United States and other like-minded nations
grandfather Brazil’s enrichment effort as being “full-scale and
functioning” while demanding that Iran shut its facilities down, the
hypocrisy would be more than just clumsy, it would undermine the
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credibility of the President’s enrichment and reprocessing restrictions
for any other country. As for Argentina, it is considering offering
reprocessing services to states that buy its large export research
reactors.
Neither of these countries’ nuclear programs could pretend to be
economic without foreign customers. If the United States is serious
about achieving the President’s goal of freezing the number of
states that have reprocessing and enrichment plants, pursuing this
complement would be useful.
2. Update and strengthen IAEA controls to account for the new ways
states could divert peaceful nuclear activities and materials to military
purposes. President Bush also backed giving the IAEA more authority
to do more extensive nuclear inspection by suggesting that the world’s
major nuclear suppliers agree to ban controlled nuclear exports to any
state that does not sign the IAEA’s Additional Protocol for nuclear
inspections. Backing the Additional Protocol certainly has merit. The
problem with merely backing its adoption, however, is such support
fails to address the deficiencies of existing IAEA nuclear audits even
with the Additional Protocol. These gaps also need to be addressed.
What are they? The first and perhaps most immediate IAEA
shortfall is the agency’s lack of near real-time surveillance to prevent
the diversion of fresh and spent reactor fuel that could be used to
make bombs. IAEA inspectors currently rely on cameras whose
“take” of the areas in which fresh and spent fuel are stored is viewed
every 90 days.1 Because these cameras do not have a full view of
these storage areas, though, it is possible for would-be bomb makers
to divert fresh or spent fuel without the knowledge of the IAEA. If a
state has declared or covert reprocessing or enrichment plants, these
materials could be converted into weapons usable fuel in a matter of
days or weeks—i.e., well before the IAEA could ever know any illicit
activity had taken place. To help eliminate this danger, the agency
should install real-time full-view surveillance cameras and keep one
or more inspectors at the reactor site to keep these cameras running
and to report if they should break down.
This, of course, will cost money. The logical parties to foot the bill
are the users of the nuclear facilities being inspected. Toward this
end, the IAEA’s membership should agree to assess an additional
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fee based on the actual level of use of each of the nuclear facilities
being inspected that the users of these plants would be expected to
pay in order to remain in full compliance with the IAEA safeguards
obligations.
Another IAEA deficiency is its lack of any public record of the
special nuclear materials it is supposed to be auditing. In fact, the
IAEA does not publish the actual amounts of special nuclear materials
it is supposed to be safeguarding, including separated plutonium
and enriched uranium that could be quickly converted into nuclear
weapons. The net result is that just how much dangerous nuclear
material there is and how well it is being guarded is a matter of
speculation. The original argument for keeping this information secret
was that it might reveal some industrial secret about the production
capabilities of particular states. After more than 3 decades of nuclear
activity under the NPT and the events of September 11, 2001, this
line of argument no longer seems tenable.
Finally, the IAEA needs to reevaluate its current list of direct
use materials—i.e., those nuclear commodities that can quickly
be converted into bombs and that, therefore, deserve additional
inspections and control attention. Currently, the agency’s list is
limited to highly enriched uranium, separated plutonium, and
mixed oxide fuel. Given all the news about Dr. A. Q. Khan’s export
of uranium enrichment technology and the enrichment programs
in North Korea, Libya, and Iran, there has been some discussion of
the need expand the list to include uranium hexafluoride—the feed
stock for uranium enrichment facilities. It might also make sense to
include materials nations might use to boost fission devices: Tritium,
lithium deuteride, and helium three.
3. View large civilian nuclear projects—including nuclear power
and desalinization plants, large research reactors, and regional fuel cycle
centers—with suspicion if they are not privately financed or approved after
an open bidding process against less risky alternatives. Among the most
important of President Bush’s proposals were two that would assure
fresh reactor fuel exports to nations that renounced attempts to enrich
uranium or chemically separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel
and ban reprocessing and enrichment exports to states that do not
already have “full-scale functioning enrichment and reprocessing
plants.” As the President noted in his February 11 NDU speech, these
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steps are essential to help prevent new states from making nuclear
weapons fuel.
This is not because the IAEA or national intelligence agencies
can detect covert reprocessing or enrichment activities in a
timely fashion. As recent experience with covert enrichment and
reprocessing activities in Iran and North Korea demonstrates, they
cannot. Nonetheless, it is still important to make new reprocessing
and enrichment activities illicit, if only to prevent discovered covert
reprocessors and enrichers from legally excusing themselves by
claiming—as Iran did—that they merely “forgot” to notify the IAEA
of their activities.
Making the mere possession of such facilities illicit would clearly
make exposed covert reprocessing and enrichment activities out-ofbounds. Yet, the only surefire technical safeguard against suspect
nations quickly acquiring nuclear weapons is to prevent them from
acquiring significant amounts of fresh, lightly enriched fuel or
from generating significant quantities of spent reactor fuel. Lightly
enriched uranium can be fed into a covert enrichment line to make
a bomb’s worth of highly enriched uranium in a matter of days:
Spent fuel can be covertly reprocessed to extract a bomb’s worth of
plutonium just as quickly. Both spent and fresh lightly enriched fuel
are part and parcel of most large reactors’ operations. This suggests
that rules are needed not only to help make suspect reprocessing and
enrichment-related facilities illicit, but to spotlight suspect nuclear
reactors as well.
How might this be done? Fortunately, Adam Smith’s “invisible
hand” of free markets and competition can help. As it turns out, many
large commercial nuclear projects and all suspect nuclear projects in
less developed nations are demonstrably uneconomical compared
to less risky options. Nuclear power and desalinization plants have
significantly higher capital costs than their non-nuclear alternatives.
In poor, developing countries, the performance of nearly all these
plants has been abysmal.
Given the surfeit of isotope-producing research reactors—there
are roughly 140 in operation in over 40 countries worldwide—there is
scant economic justification for the further construction of additional
large research reactors: One can import medical, agricultural, and
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industrial isotopes from existing machines and send one’s scientists
to these machines to do research much more cheaply than one
can build a large research reactor of one’s own. Virtually all of the
existing research reactors, moreover, can be converted to run on nonweapons-useable fuels.
As for recent Department of Energy (DOE) and IAEA proposals
to create regional reprocessing and enrichment parks, these too are a
bad buy. Right now, we have more than enough enrichment capacity
to supply lightly enriched fuel to all legitimate civilian reactors. If
anything, the lack of demand would suggest the need to further
downsize existing enrichment capacity. Reprocessing, meanwhile, is
an uneconomical answer to a problem that does not exist: It makes
much more sense from a security and economic perspective to store
spent fuel in casks and to use fresh reactor fuel rather than to recycle
weapons-usable plutonium for civilian reactor use.
What this suggests, then, is a simple tenet: Any large civilian
nuclear project that is started before considering safer alternatives
in an open international bidding process should be regarded as
suspect. Certainly, Iran’s power reactor and enrichment activities, as
well as North Korea’s entire program, Pakistan’s import of Chinese
reactors, Algeria’s large research reactor, and Brazil’s proposed
uranium enrichment undertaking, would all fail this test. To make
this guideline credible, however, the United States and its allies will
have to apply it to their own civilian nuclear undertakings as well.
Further federal subsidies and funding of commercial-sized
undertakings such as the Westinghouse AP1000, international
Generation IV reactor and advanced fuel-cycle cooperation, the
advanced hydrogen production nuclear reactor, and the ill-starred
$6 billion-plus mixed oxide plutonium disposition program should
cease. Such cuts should not be seen as anti-nuclear, but rather as
pro-free market. Certainly, if it made sense for Congress and Ronald
Reagan to oppose federal funding of such large and potentially
dangerous energy projects on economic grounds 20 years ago, it
makes even more sense today—after 9/11, the new nuclear security
imperatives, and the clear lag in international nuclear demand.
States, of course, are free to do as they please. However, nations
that use public funds to support uneconomical nuclear projects
should bear the full costs of the risks they are running. Certainly, if
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they are in debt or need to borrow, they should recognize that their
bad investments will be accounted for in the market’s determination
of their nation’s sovereign credit rating. Uneconomical nuclear
projects by definition, after all, lose money. More important, they all
too frequently tempt their backers to try to make ends meet by selling
parts of the project off to whomever is interested, including wouldbe bomb makers. Brazil whose nuclear program was running in the
red in the l980s, for example, saw advantage in striking a nuclear
cooperative agreement with Iraq. Dr. Khan who needed cash and
technology to complete a new missile project for Pakistan did the
same with North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Pyongyang, meanwhile,
also stretched for funds, is sharing it nuclear know-how with Iran.
All of these nations are or have been subject to economic or trade
sanctions as a result of these transactions. This, in turn, should also
highlight the economic costs of pursuing such risky ventures.
4. Demand that states that fail to declare nuclear facilities to the IAEA
(as required by their safeguards agreement) dismantle them in order to
come back into full compliance and disallow states that are not clearly in
full compliance from legally leaving the NPT without first surrendering
the nuclear capabilities they gained while NPT members. The Bush
Administration, by its actions and words in North Korea, Iraq,
and Libya, has gone a long way toward establishing the rule that
whenever a violating nation fails to properly declare nuclear facilities
to the IAEA, it must dismantle them in order to come back into full
compliance with its NPT obligations. What the United States should
do now is to propose this requirement explicitly.
This would certainly be a helpful, country-neutral rule to have in
place when dealing with countries like Iran. The United States should
also make it clear that no nation that the IAEA and the UN Security
Council is unable to clearly find in full compliance with the NPT will
be allowed to leave the treaty legally without first surrendering all
the nuclear capabilities it gained while a member of the NPT. The
idea behind this is that one cannot enter into a contract, violate it,
then announce withdrawal, and not be held accountable for one’s
misbehavior while a party to the contract.
Some U.S. government legal counsels have objected to this
commonsense requirement in the case of the NPT out of fear that
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adopting such a rule might somehow raise questions about the
legality of the United States withdrawing from treaty obligations,
such as the ABM Treaty. Their concerns, however, are unfounded:
The United States is a law-abiding nation that complies with its treaty
obligations. If it takes actions inconsistent with a treaty, it only does
so after it is no longer a member of the agreement or because it has
formally chosen not to be a party. This certainly was the case with
the ABM Treaty.
5. Support UN adoption of a series of country-neutral rules that track
the above recommendations to be applied to any nation that the IAEA and
the UN Security Council cannot clearly find in full compliance with the
NPT. The idea here would be to take advantage of something that, so
far, has frustrated U.S. and allied diplomats—the IAEA’s and the UN
Security Council’s reluctance in making definitive determinations of
any nation being in violation and worthy of being sanctioned. Rather
than wait upon either of these bodies actually to find a specific
country in clear violation of the NPT and then try to get a consensus
to sanction, it would make far more sense to delineate in countryneutral terms and in advance what the minimal consequences
should be for any country the IAEA and the UN Security Council
cannot clearly find to be in full compliance. This approach has the
clear advantage of being country-neutral and of forcing the IAEA
and the UN Security Council to reach consensus only if they want to
prevent action.
6. Starting with the United States, but including Pakistan and India,
formally get as many declared nuclear weapons states as possible to agree
henceforth to not redeploy nuclear weapons onto any other state’s soil in
peacetime and to make the transfer of nuclear weapons-usable material to
other nations illicit if the transfer is made for a purpose other than to dispose
of the material or to make it less accessible. One of the most nettlesome
nonproliferation challenges President Bush discussed in his February
11 NDU speech was reining in the nuclear proliferation activities of
non-NPT states such as Pakistan. Islamabad’s blatant proliferation
activities technically broke no law. Even worse proliferation,
however, is possible: There is reason to worry that a future Pakistan
might transfer nuclear weapons to another country. Saudi Arabian
officials are reported to be studying how they might acquire nuclear
weapons from another country such as Pakistan.
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What makes these plans plausible—besides Pakistan’s and Saudi
Arabia’s close security ties—is that they could be carried out legally
under the NPT. The treaty, in fact, allows nuclear weapons to be
transferred to nonweapons state members (e.g., to nations like Saudi
Arabia) so long as the weapons remain under the control of the
exporting state. This loophole was explicitly inserted into the NPT in
the l960s by U.S. officials who were anxious to continue deploying
U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on NATO’s and Pacific allies’ soil.
Today, keeping this loophole open no longer looks so attractive.
In fact, the United States already has withdrawn its tactical nuclear
weapons from foreign allied bases it had in the Pacific, including
South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. The reason is simple: With air- and
sea-launched cruise missiles, nuclear-capable carrier-based aircraft,
stealth bombers, and accurate submarine-launched and land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles available to quickly deliver nuclear
weapons, there is no longer any U.S. or allied need to base tactical
nuclear weapons on foreign soil.
The United States is now withdrawing much of its military
from Europe. As these troops are withdrawn and as concerns about
nuclear terrorism and proliferation grow, the rationale for keeping
U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in places like Germany will become
weaker, and the desire to prevent other states from redeploying their
nuclear weapons onto other states’ soil will increase. To address this
concern, it would be useful to close the loophole in the NPT that
allows this.
The question is how. Some have suggested that we simply make
these nations nuclear weapons state members of the NPT. The problem
with this approach is that such a move would appear to reward states
that have stayed out of the treaty and violated its tenets. A sensible
alternative would be for the United States to work with as many
nuclear weapons states as possible to get a formal agreement that,
henceforth, no nation will redeploy nuclear weapons onto another
nation’s soil during peacetime. The United States could also try to
get other nuclear weapons states to agree to make the redeployment
of such weapons or the transfer of nuclear weapons-usable materials
illicit so long as the transfer was for purposes other than disposing
of these materials or making them less accessible. Such a proposal
might usefully be raised in the context of upcoming talks with the
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Indian government regarding President Bush’s promised reopening
of U.S. nuclear cooperation.
Certainly, if the United States agreed to impose such limits on
itself, it could help persuade other nuclear weapons states—including
those that have not yet signed the NPT—to agree to do so as well.
One also could match such diplomatic efforts with initiatives to get
as many nonweapons states as possible to agree not to receive nuclear
weapons in peacetime.
7. Build on the successful precedent of Libya’s nuclear renunciation
by encouraging its neighbors—starting with Algeria, Egypt and Israel —
to shut down their largest nuclear reactors. President Bush rightly has
spotlighted the success he has had in getting Libya to renounce its
nuclear weapons program. The challenge now is figuring out how to
establish this precedent as a practical nonproliferation standard that
can be applied again in at least one other case. In this regard, neither
North Korea nor Iran seem particularly promising prospects, since
they are resisting cooperation—much less denuclearization.
The prospects, on the other hand, look much better closer to Libya
itself. Specifically, now that Tripoli no longer has a nuclear program,
it would seem reasonable for its neighbors to reciprocate by at least
shutting down their largest nuclear plants.
Questions have been raised about Algeria’s need for a second
large research reactor. This reactor can make nearly a bomb’s
worth of plutonium per year; is located at a distant, isolated site; is
surrounded by air defenses; and only makes sense if it is intended
to make bombs. In fact, Algeria already has a second, smaller, less
threatening research reactor in Algiers. Shutting down the larger
plant at Ain Ousseara would save Algeria money and make everyone
breathe easier.
Additionally, there is Egypt’s large research reactor purchased
from Argentina. It, too, can make nearly a bomb’s worth of plutonium
annually. Perhaps Egypt could offer to mothball this plant in
exchange for Israel shutting down its large plutonium production
reactor at Dimona. The latter is quite old and will require hundreds
of millions of dollars to refurbish. Israeli critics opposed to the
continuing operation of the Dimona reactor have publicly called for
its shutdown in the Knesset.
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Certainly, progress on any of these fronts would be helpful in
addressing other proliferation problems in the Persian Gulf and
elsewhere. At a minimum, they would help isolate Iran’s nuclear
misbehavior and establish a stricter norm that for the time being,
no nation in the Middle East should operate a large reactor or
commercial sized nuclear facility of any kind.
The point here, as with the other proposals above, is to build on
the clear nonproliferation successes we now have. Certainly, if we
do, we will be safer. If we do not, it is just as certain that we will be
buying far more trouble than we can afford.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9
1. One of the ironies of the IAEA’s current efforts to promote adoption of the
Additional Protocol is that the agency is offering to reduce the number of times
it will review its camera takes of fresh fuel storage areas to once a year for those
nations it has determined do not have a covert nuclear weapons program. Given
the intelligence surprises regarding covert enrichment activities that have taken
place in Iran, Iraq, Libya, South Korea, and North Korea, one would think the
agency would want to increase its inspections of such fuel.
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